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Abstract: This dissertation examines F.W.J. von Schelling's Philosophy of Nature (or
Naturphilosophie) as a form of early, and transcendentally expansive, naturalism that is,
simultaneously, a naturalized transcendentalism. By focusing on space and motion, this dissertation
argues that thought should be viewed as a natural activity through and through. This view is made
possible by German Idealism historically, and yet, is complicated and obscured by contemporary
philosophy's treatment of German Idealism in both analytic and continental circles. The text engages
with the foundations of Schelling's theory of nature as well as geometry, field theory, inter-theory
relations, epistemology, and pragmatism.
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0 - Introduction
In the following I attempt to outline my general approach to F.W.J. von Schelling as a
philosopher concerned with the problem of nature and how philosophy has, historically, ignored or
reduced nature's importance. By nature, I mean the open series of nested physical systems which
comprise the cosmos. I do not wish to merely defend nature as an object of inquiry, but, following
Schelling, hope to demonstrate that philosophy is not possible without a robust concept of nature, a
nature that necessarily grounds yet exceeds philosophical conceptualization. It is important to note,
however, that this does not mean that philosophy, or human thought more generally, should be a priori
limited, but that thought is part of nature's spatially and temporally expanding continuum. In order to
address this rather abstract conceptualization, I focus on the themes of motion and space. Before
approaching these particular themes I will sketch an outline of the contemporary state of philosophy
(but focused on realisms and materialisms) and why I believe the work of F.W.J. von Schelling has a
useful role to play in it. While any sketch of contemporary philosophy is provisional, and biased from
my own view point, I am specifically interested in how contemporary philosophy, both analytic and
continental, has returned to questions of materialism and realism while somehow avoiding nature as
topic, or problem, for philosophy. Even more specifically, I wish to link this avoidance of nature in
contemporary philosophy with current thinkers who address German Idealism, and Schelling, both
positively and negatively. I then examine recent Schelling scholarship, and my project's relation to it,
before going into Schelling's general approach to philosophy as a system, as well as his methodology.
Lastly, I provide a chapter by chapter outline of the project.
0.1 - Schelling and Contemporary Philosophy
The entire new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common defect that nature is not available
for it and that it lacks a living ground. Spinoza’s realism is thereby as abstract as the idealism of Leibniz. Idealism is the
soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can constitute a living whole. 1

1

F.W.J. von Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and

1

The above epigraph, which marks the back cover of Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of
Nature after Schelling, marks one of the central concerns of this dissertation as well. Unsurprisingly,
this flags the current project's fidelity to that text while, simultaneously, generating the necessity of
differentiating this text from that one. Or, in a proper Schellingian fashion, identity does not mean
equivalence but indicates a bifurcation of dependence and independence. Or, in other words, a
difference, to be true to an origin, or an influence, must stretch its consequences to test the ground's, or
source's, elastic mettle. In other words, I share the problem that nature is indeed left out of much
modern and contemporary philosophy, and take it as an impetus to investigation. However, while
Grant's task is largely a historical one, in that Schelling's project requires rescuing from obscurity,
fragmentation, and misinterpretation, my project here is more to bring Schelling, and the Schelling
resurrected by Grant as well as by Daniel Whistler, Bruce Matthews, Jason Wirth, and others, into
contact with specific strands of contemporary continental and analytic philosophy. This requires some
brief qualifications.
By contemporary philosophy I mean philosophy from the last decade, and not, as is too often
the case, simply post-Heideggerian philosophy. By contemporary, I mean the strains that have
developed in the last decade but, that of course, have roots reaching further back. In this regard, I
define contemporary continental philosophy as following the rise of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek (at
least in the English speaking-world), the emergence of Speculative Realism, and the various 'turns' to
materialism, metaphysics, and ontology. A parallel, though differently motivated move, can be
observed in the halls of analytic philosophy whereby the increasing complexity and conceptual
ramifications of the physical sciences has prompted more adventurous forays into dispositions
(Stephen Mumford, Stephen Molnar, David Ellis), modality and possible worlds (David Lewis),
process metaphysics (Johanna Seibt), and the like.
Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 26.
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While one could easily state that analytic philosophy has ignored nature as potentially
exceeding its concept as noted above, particularly in the philosophy of science, or in science and
technology studies, I believe there has been a general trend to limit nature's influence in analytic
strands of thought that have taken up German Idealism pace Schelling.
While the weight of their particular disciplinary histories no doubt play different guiding roles,
in both continental and analytic philosophy a turn towards the outside, in grander and more speculative
philosophical gestures, can be observed. This move, however, is couched in quite different, often
opposed, methods or ethics. Many figures of New Materialism for instance (Jane Bennett, William
Connolly, and Karen Barad's related agential realism) take Derrida and Deleuze as inspirational or, at
least, as figures whose general critiques cannot be bypassed. The newness of the New Materialists
then, comes from the fact that they are attempting to do materialism while accepting the critiques of
Derrida, and the notion of materialism following Deleuze (that matter is material 'stuff' and its
inseparability from things that matter such as politics, ethics, etc). Thus, for them, as well as for other
ontological liberalists (such as Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, and Markus Gabriel) the argument
broadly is that everything equally has being, and, simultaneously, worth. Liberal ontology situates
philosophy as far reaching but, while adopting a veneer of modesty, it pursues an ontology or
metaphysics out of political, aesthetic, or logical fairness, i.e., due to non-philosophical demands. My
question here, is how can all of these approaches eschew any serious discussion of nature as defined
above?
Alain Badiou, in tandem with the ever-growing popularity of Slavoj Žižek, on the other hand,
both triumphantly embrace the traditional bravado of classical philosophy's reach, albeit supplanting it
with finer, non-philosophical tools; mathematics (in the form of Cantorian set-theory for Badiou) and
Lacanian psychoanalysis for Žižek. However, while Badiou and Žižek propose, and work out, massive
systems of philosophical inquiry, unsurprisingly with and against Hegel and his French reception, they
3

nevertheless remain focused upon the problematic of the subject, whether political or otherwise,
whereas the aforementioned New Materialists, generally see the post-Kantian, or psychoanalytic
fixation on the subject, as a residue of anthrocentricism.
It is in this tumultuous cauldron of Deleuze versus Badiou, or Derrida versus Žižek, from which
Speculative Realism emerged in the mid-2000s. Following Quentin Meillassoux's text After Finitude,
Ray Brassier, who translated the text, came into contact with Graham Harman's Object-Oriented
Ontology and, was already aware of, Iain Hamilton Grant's nascent Schellingian naturalism. While
never self-identifying as a coherent movement, these thinkers shared mostly an antipathy to what
Meillassoux (interestingly a student of Badiou) had deemed correlationism, namely that subject and
object, following Kant, were always-already caught in a co-determining, and thus inescapable, loop.
As Meillassoux defines it: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to
consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.”3 In addition,
Meillassoux names two variants of correlationism: weak correlationism and strong correlationism.
Weak correlationism, which Kant is the flag-bearer of, asserts the above claim while maintaining the
conceivability of the in-itself whereas strong correlationism dismisses any possibility of thinking the
in-itself.4
The four figures mentioned each, in their own way, attempted to propose means of escaping
such an epistemic loop. The only other common feature, though which excludes Harman, was a
general interest in the consequences of the contemporary sciences which led Meillassoux, Grant, and
Brassier, to pull from, and investigate, contemporary analytic philosophy as well. The insistence that
nature exists prior to human thinking, and that it forms and impinges on human action and thought,
goes against decades of hermeneutic, phenomenological, and post-modern doxa which would
2
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London:
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 5.
3
Ibid. p. 66.
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otherwise relegate nature as 'just another discourse,' grand narrative, master-signifier, or pre-critical
fantasy. While analytic philosophy has been markedly less anti-realist, or at least anti-physicalist,
numerous moves in ethics and philosophy of mind have been stalwartly internalist and/or normativist,
against the advances of both scientific and philosophical naturalism.4
It is here that Schelling's place, and his potential importance, in contemporary philosophy can
begin to be articulated. Contra many traditional readings of Schelling, Iain Hamilton Grant refuses to
temporalize the periods of Schelling's thought into two, three, or four slices, and instead argues that his
thinking is, through and through, a philosophy of nature. For one, this immediately retaliates against
the consistent dismissal of Schelling by Hegelians who take the latter at his word regarding the former.
While Deleuze showed some sympathy for Schelling, both Badiou and Žižek repeat the gesture of
making Schelling a mere historical note, a stepping-stone between Fichte and Hegel. I will address this
in the following chapter. In addition, Grant's claim, which I will refer to as the continuity thesis, runs
against much of past, and current, scholarship on Schelling. Daniel Whistler has taken up the
continuity thesis as well, while Bruce Matthews, Jason Wirth, and Markus Gabriel, while they argue
for philosophical continuity across Schelling's text, do not define this continuity as a strictly
Naturphilosophical one.
If one accepts the continuity thesis, then a broad comparison of Schelling to Hegel is instructive
here. Is it only that Schelling's method scares would-be Schellingians away? Or, is that those who
cherry-pick and chop up Schelling's work into periods do it because he seems to present an antiHegelian style of philosophy, because he is a protean or pre-post-modern thinker? One cannot, in good
faith, justify either claim in my view. For the former, Schelling and Hegel had equally wide breadth
concerning the topics of their philosophical investigations and it seems unlikely that methodological

4
Thus I would argue that Schelling fits into an externalist strain of thought albeit one that is not antirepresentationalist such as in the work of Fred Dretske.
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difference alone is the deterrent. Following the latter claim, Schelling's approach to philosophy cannot
be classified as anti-systematic, or non-systematic, but, as I will argue below, his notion of
systematicity is ablative. The reason for this is not the same one that generally motivates poststructuralist claims to knowledge, i.e., that there is no master discourse, but because there is already a
system which pre-exists any system of knowledge, that is, the cosmos, or nature. It is this assertion
regarding the primacy of nature over thinking, that Schelling, following Grant's reading, is a noncorrelationist, or simply, that nature is whether or not we humans exist to think it. I discuss what
exactly ablative systematicity means for Schelling below.
But, since we do exist, how are we to think this nature? It is here that Schelling appears both
modest and grand in his general philosophical approach. While he believes that the physical sciences
provide invaluable knowledge regarding nature, he also believes that philosophy is in the position to
identify conceptual biases, as well as local practical limitations, in any given investigation. Hence
philosophy is broad and grand yet its tests, like the hypotheses of any scientific endeavor, the locality
of any action or deed. Philosophy, for Schelling, consists in testing and mapping the consequences of
any given act whether practical or noetic, philosophical or scientific. This is apparent in Schelling's
hyper-constructive method which I briefly examine below.
The argument that Schelling's philosophy is a continuous philosophy of nature, has
consequences for the practice of philosophy itself. Namely, for Schelling, taking nature as an open-set
of nested processes (of which thought is one) means that philosophy studies forces or powers, and
treats things as secondary. This move simultaneously empowers and localizes the resources of
idealism, as well as, problematizing the resources of realism generally and, for our purposes here,
naturalism in particular. If everything is ideal, and a part of a nature with no outer boundary, then our
responsibility for our actions becomes deepened. Ignoring the productive ground of nature arises not in
the form of an ethical imperative, but as ontologically, and formally, unignorable. Furthermore, this
6

installs a minimal difference between philosophy of nature and Naturphilosophie. While both
philosophize about nature, the latter also attempts to explore how nature philosophizes, and, how
nature is impossible without a concept of nature as thinking through us. Given this schema following
from the generally continuous, and/or Naturphilosophical readings of Schelling, it is worth providing a
brief survey of other past and current literature on Schelling.
The first wave of secondary literature on Schelling (in English, German, and French) is perhaps
better known through its reputation than by its actual content. It has become a standard trope of
Schelling scholarship in the last few decades, as already indicated, to begin by lamenting the
fragmentary treatment of Schelling in the initial wave of secondary literature.5 This strategy is often
justified, by both its proponents and its detractors, as necessary given Schelling's 'wild and protean
nature.' That is, since Schelling's own work was seen as rife with inconsistency and changing form, one
was given carte blanche to pick and choose from his various texts and phases. The Essay on Human
Freedom is a privileged choice following the attention it has been given by Heidegger, Nancy, Derrida,
and others. Alan White's text Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom is one of the first
well known secondary English texts following this mode. Bruce Matthews suggests that only four of
the texts deserve mentioning: Alan White's Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom
(1983), Andrew Bowie's Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (1993), Edward Beach's The
Potencies of the God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology (1994), and Dale Snow's Schelling and
the End of Idealism (1996).6
While I agree with Matthews' assessment that all these authors are guilty of 'cherry-picking',
5
This would seem to exclude early secondary literature written by many English thinkers in the late 19th century.
Numerous students in part inspired by Samuel Coleridge, attended Schelling's lectures in the early to mid 19th century and
no doubt began a series of critiques and accounts of his work. These accounts, such as Henry Crabb Robinson's and John
Watson's account of Schelling's Transcendental Idealism, while scattered, often attempt to grasp the whole of Schelling's
system. This is also true in Henrik Steffen's autobiography The Story of My Career, trans. William Gage (Boston: Gould
and Lincoln, 1863).
6
Bruce Matthews, Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2011), 226-227.
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this does not negate many of the broader claims they make in regards to Schelling's wider thought
albeit from the perspective of a particular form of Schelling's thinking. Given the focus of Matthews'
own project however, the accusation of cherry-picking begs the question of whether any account of
Schelling's thought can be totalizing. Following the abductive logic of C.S. Peirce, with whom we will
engage below, it seems that the best means of addressing Schelling's work is to begin from a particular
field and, following Grant's discussion of extensity in Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, push the
field to its limit in order to grasp a snapshot, however imperfect, of the absolute (or what I will argue
should be discussed simply as nature). Similarly, while I am largely convinced by the general outline
of the German Idealist project outlined by Paul Franks' All or Nothing, his assertion that Schelling was
in pursuit of one complete system seems, to me, questionable.7
Matthews does not, however, mention the tendency, beginning most notably with Slavoj Žižek,
of placing Schelling in a psychoanalytic context in The Indivisible Remainder. This has been followed
by treatments of Schelling in this vein by Adrian Johnston, Sean McGrath, and, to a lesser extent,
Markus Gabriel. While this trend has brought light on, and expanded knowledge, of Schelling, I would
argue that it often, though not always, has the tendency of placing Schelling closer to both Hegel and
Kant by molding his Naturphilosophical speculations into theories of subjectivity without adequate
justification. These texts which, again, following Žižek, are largely supplemented by Lacan and Hegel,
tend to focus on the Ages of the World and The Essay on Human Freedom, at the expense of all others.
There is also, however, a variant of this tradition which is less critical of Schelling and, on the other
hand, focuses more on the Freudian aspects of Schelling's thought than the Lacanian ones. Here one
can mention Sean McGrath's The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious (2011) as well
as Matt Ffychte's The Founding of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud, and the Birth of the Modern
7
Nowhere is this more clear than in Schelling's discussion of philosophy as an asystaton in F.W.J. von Schelling,
“On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” in German Idealist Philosophy, ed. Rudiger Bubner (London: Penguin Books,
1997), 168.
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Psyche (2011). While these psychoanalytic approaches can serve to deepen our understanding of
Schelling, they risk placing Schelling too firmly in the context of psychoanalysis
The third wave of Schelling Scholarship, in which we are now engaged (and in which I would
place this text) rejects the fragmentary view of Schelling and argues that the breadth of his work is
unified by a singular principle. These works are characterized then, not surprisingly, by which central
theme they choose. I would argue that this begins with Jason Wirth's text The Conspiracy of Life
(2003) which, while in many ways mirroring the pre-post-modern reading of Schelling found in
Bowie, attempts to concentrate around the theme of life. Wirth's concept of life is heavily theological
and reads life not in its organic form but in terms of life as human or divine existence. Also in this third
wave is Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (2006), which takes the form of
Naturphilosophie itself as the uniting theme in Schelling's work. Like Matthews' text, Grant pays
particular attention to how Schelling engages Plato and uses Plato against Kant in order to articulate
his one-world physics of both thought and nature.
Most recently Bruce Matthew's Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy can be taken as a kind
of synthesis between Wirth and Grant's approaches as it argues that life is the unifying theme, but life
taken in terms of its organic form. Like Grant's work, Matthews spends considerable time in tying this
organic form of thinking to Schelling's utilization of Plato's Timaeus. Other texts which have attempted
similar approaches are Bernard Freydberg's Schelling's Dialogical Freedom Essay and Devin Zane
Shaw's Freedom and Nature in Schelling's Philosophy of Art. One can also add Daniel Whistler's
Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language (2013) as well as Tyler Tritten's text Beyond Presence
(2012).
While this covers the majority of book length studies of Schelling's work, there have texts and
essays which deal extensively with Schelling's work though not always in a direct manner, numerous
essays by Arran Garre place Schelling's work in the context of Whitehead's Process Philosophy. Robert
9

Richards, Timothy Lenoir, David Farrel Krell, Christopher Lauer, Tilottama Rajan, and more recently
Dalia Nassar have produced excellent works placing Schelling in the broader context of German
Idealism and Romantic Thought.
Outside the strictures of Continental Philosophy proper, numerous works on the history of
science and technology have provided interesting treatments of Schelling. Gilles Châtelet's Figuring
Space devotes a third of its pages to discussing the relation of Schelling's work to modern mathematics
and physics. L. Pearce Williams argues that Schelling's role cannot be excised from any coherent
attempt at developing the history of modern physics in his The Origins of Field Theory. Furthermore,
Joan Steigerwald's numerous essays are an invaluable source for placing Schelling in the context of
romantic science.
In analytic philosophy Schelling's day has not, and may never, come. While in the last few
years interest in Schelling's once friend and eventual nemesis Hegel has been piqued (most notably in
the work of the so-called left Sellarsians Robert Brandom and Robert Pippin), Schelling, as Andrew
Bowie has most openly lamented, is left out of the picture. This is not too surprising given that the
Hegel adopted by the thinkers mentioned tends to draw overwhelming from Hegel's logic.
An avenue for probing and cultivating the possible analytic roots entangled with Schelling's thought
can be found in Peirce's abductive logic and praise of Schelling's Naturphilosophie and how this feeds
into contemporary uses of asymptotic thinking in philosophies of science. The analytic interpretation
of Schelling can be supported by the connections that can be drawn in Schelling's use of identity in
relation to theories of the continuum, to theories in the natural sciences, which, relying on Peirce,
investigate the importance of the continuous over that of the discrete.
0.2 - Schelling's Ablative Systematicity
Nothing upsets the philosophical mind more than when he hears that from now on all philosophy is supposed to lie caught
in the shackles of one system. Never has he felt greater than when he sees before him the infinitude of knowledge. The
entire dignity of his science consists in the fact that it will never be completed. In that moment in which he would believe to
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have completed his system, he would become unbearable to himself. He would, in that moment, cease to be a creator, and
would instead descend to being an instrument of his creation. 8
To what extent is a system ever possible? I would answer that long before man decided to create a system, there already
existed one, that of the cosmos. Hence our proper task consists in discovering that system. The true system can never be
created but only uncovered as one that is already inherent in itself9
The idea or the endeavour of finding a system of human knowledge, or, put differently and more appropriately, of
contemplating human knowledge within a system, with a form of coexistence, presupposes, of course, that originally and of
itself it does not exist in a system, hence that is an [asystaton] – something whose elements do not coexist, but rather
something that is in inner conflict.10

Given the above sketch of the contemporary philosophical climate, as well as, the current forms
of secondary literature on Schelling, how it is that Schelling's thought regarding systematicity
functions is, I believe, even more relevant than it was in his time. As Paul Franks in his impressive text
All or Nothing illustrates, systematicity, the demand that philosophy function as an organized whole,
was central to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel's projects. Franks argues that this requirement for a system,
often alienates analytic, and I would add most contemporary continental, philosophers from addressing
any of the German Idealists.11 It is prevalent in post-Heideggerian thought to characterize Hegel, in
particular, as the arch-enemy of free-thought who wished to totalize the world. Franks complicates this
caricature by articulating what the German Idealists saw as systems and by pointing out why they
sought systematicity in the first place. Firstly, Franks claims that in attempting to provide the premises
for Kant's critical conclusions, the German Idealists qualified any notion of system with two demands:
namely, that any system must be both monistic and heterogeneous. He defines them thusly: “the
holistic condition that every particular (object, fact, or judgment) be determined through its role within
the whole and not through any intrinsic properties; and the monistic condition that the whole be
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grounded in an absolute principle that is immanent and not transcendent.”12
Quite simply, the positive aspect of German Idealist systematicity is to construct a system that
can be as solid and far reaching as Spinoza's (or, at least how the German Idealists understood Spinoza
via the Pantheism Controversy), and yet still behave according to Kantian strictures for knowing. The
negative aspect, as a result of the Pantheism Controversy, was a deepening of philosophical skepticism
following both the revival of Spinoza and Kant's championing of reason. While I will address the
controversy in the following chapter, the main thrust is simply that both these strands of thinking
forced one to decide the limits of the power of reason vis a vis faith as, to not do so, one would either
forgo the fortunes gained from the Enlightenment, or, on the other side, fall into a Godless nihilism.
Franks then steps back from the historical details and formulates the problem in terms of the Agrippean
or Munchausen trilemma. The trilemma, which fundamentally has to do with ultimately justifying
knowledge, goes like this:13
1-Argument by circularity: Makes a justification that does simply relies on its own logic (this we can
see as the fundamental logic of correlationism mentioned above, which is reduced to its purest form
via facticity in Meillassoux.
2-Regressive argument: Everything requires a further proof which in turn requires further proof ad
infinitum (this is accepted by ontological liberalists mentioned above, accepting, to various admitted
degrees, infinite regress supported by philosophy as description).
3-Axiomatic Argument: One states an axiom which is supported by accepted percepts (both Badiou and
Žižek are central thinkers in this regard)
Here are the possible responses quoting extensively from Franks:
1- You have failed to answer the question until you manage to answer the why-question in a way that falls into none of the
three options. Unless that happens, there is no reason to assume that you have given any justification whatsoever, and
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indeed there is no reason to assume that any justification whatsoever is available.
2- In at least some cases, there must be an answer to the question that falls into none of the three options, even if you have
not yet succeeded in giving it. For if there is no reason to assume that justifications are sometimes available, then there is no
reason for anything.
3- Even if you answer the question in a way that falls into one of the three options, your answer may still be satisfying, The
two previous responses assume that no adequate justification can be, without further reason, infinitely regressive or circular.
But this assumption is mistaken. The fact that some line of response to a why-question is vulnerable to the [Munchausen]
trilemma does not mean that it is an in-adequate line of response, and it provides no ground for skepticism. 14

While, as Franks argues, this ancient trilemma resurfaced, and was the negative condition of the
emergence of German Idealism, we can say that contemporary continental, and analytic reactions to
German Idealism, indicates that such skepticism has deepened and transformed. Regardless of whether
one agrees with the solutions that Meillassoux proposes, it is hard to ignore that he highlighted a
particular bias in contemporary philosophy, one that is very much centered on anti-systematicity.
Correlationism, one could argue, is the application of this methodological skepticism brought into the
very structure of thought itself. This means that much of contemporary philosophy struggles to
axiomatize, or otherwise justify, philosophy's broad reach without even appearing as totalizing in a
naïve view of German Idealism. Badiou's return to Truth and Platonism is only possible through a
mathematics of incompleteness while, similarly, Žižek can be Hegelian only by attaching idealism to
Lacanian psychoanalysis, and discussion the subject as rupture, break, et cetera.
The three epigraphs from Schelling above indicate how his view of systematicity anticipates
skepticism applied not only to the all (as both Fichte and Hegel did) but also that skepticism applied to
philosophical authority itself. Schelling is not merely against systems since he asserts they exist, the
problem is, of course, that there are many systems in conflict with one another. A system must then be
universal in such a way that its principles are applicable outside of its particular domain (whether it be
nature, art, science, mythology etc.) but must, at the same time, be able to identify particular shifts and
differences within their domain to do justice to them. Or, put simply, a system must be open to its
14
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materials and possibly destroyed by them, yet must hold its form enough to be compared to, and
attached to, other systems.
It is in this sense that I must disagree with Franks' articulation of the heterogeneous and
monistic demands as applying to Schelling. While Schelling admits that every determination, every
thing, determines each other, he does not view this as a closed system, i.e., he is not a holist.15 I
address this in Chapter 4. This follows from his re-articulation of the transcendental, against the
limitations of Spinozist immanence, in that the transcendental is the a priori as a generative motion
unleashed from sheerly human conception. Put succinctly in Schelling's own terms: “It is not because
there is thinking there is being but because there is being there is thinking.”16 Furthermore, Franks sees
Schelling's abandonment of universal validity, i.e., that there must be one system that universally
applies, as irrational or elitist.17 Yet, the uncertainty of the practice of philosophy is difficult because of
its obscurity, and Schelling offers no criteria to successfully pursue philosophy other than a stoic-like
abandonment of all of one's earthly comforts. I address this in Chapter 6. Thus, and once again to turn
to the epigraphs above, the fact that Schelling asserts that we must collect systems, which are always in
disarray, in order to even attempt to discover the traces of the cosmos as a pre-exisiting system,
demonstrates, if anything, a humility, but one that does not hide behind that claim to humility as a
philosophical justification in, and of, itself.
In the wake of a return to 'grand' philosophy (Badiou, Žižek) followed by an explosion of
ontological and metaphysical speculation, Schelling's ablative notion of systematicity, as that which
degrades to protect what lies beneath (philosophy as such, nature as such) seems an important model.
The tension in the above epigraphs, is that between creation and discovery, between acting in such a
15
Franks repeatedly stresses Schelling's Spinozism despite the former's critiques of the latter. Furthermore, Franks
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way that augments knowledge, and discovering that knowledge which already exists in order to
augment it. It is here I now turn to Schelling's method of construction.
0.3 - Schelling's Constructive Method
The poet Heinrich Heine once compared Schelling and his followers to whirling dervishes who
“continue spinning round in a circle until objective and subjective worlds become lost to them.”18
Heine's comment no doubt stems from Schelling's attempts to complicate, through his concept of
identity already mentioned, the relation of subject and object, to deprive them of their thing-hood and,
instead, extrapolate their synthetic and positional nature. This spinning, which ends in absolute
confusion, has haunted Schelling, marking him a thinker of (apparent) motionless identity, an advocate
of absolutizing a black night devoid of difference, or worse. Yet Schelling's notion of identity is not
one which nullifies difference, but in which difference follows from a primordial continuity, a
meontological continuity which makes possible a unitary approach to Schelling. Philosophy
necessarily isolates and divides this synthetic field to think it yet, this does not explain how it is that
nature arises in us, i.e., how both nature creates thoughts in us and how we come to have abstract
concepts about nature which can be locally applied to manipulate natural phenomena. Or, to refer to
points made above, philosophy can only discover by constructing and testing these constructions
against other systems and against the world as it appears. This disarray of systems, of thoughts, is part
of the world but, to complicate things further, this world is not one of closed immanence, but always
augmented, and populated by, Potenzen (or powers). A direct way of seeing how these problems lead
to Schelling's constructive method is to focus on space and motion.
In terms of motion, in a lecture given in Erlangen entitled “The Nature of Philosophy as a
Science,” (1821), Schelling begins by discussing how the first cause of nature (insofar as that can be
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speculated) is an infinite motion if it is to be claimed that the world begins in disarray, but can be later
thought and systematized. Following this, Schelling points out that the assumption of an absolute
movement is always a consequent absolute since everything is activity, everything has a past and
unknown trajectory. Furthermore, the synthetic distinctions we make are relative to a relatively fixed
frame and to ourselves. It is a mark of intellectual laziness, Schelling argues, that critics jump to
claiming this is naïve idealism when in fact it speaks to being caught in the momentum of the world
and, in a nature, which necessitates the reality of the ideal. As Daniel Whistler has noted, Schelling's
brief text “On the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature and the Correct Way of Solving its
Problems” (1802) clearly states not only of the importance of nature in Schelling but also serves as a
response to Heine and the double relativity above:
Without doubt, there is a reason for the fact that I separate philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy from one
another and have tried to generate the latter in a quite different direction than the former. If the reason for this fact has not
been extensively dealt with in this journal before now, then this is merely because for the time being the journal is devoted
more to the internal culture of this science than to investigating and proving its possibility (of which I am personally
certain), and also because this proof can be achieved successfully only in a general presentation of philosophy. [...] If there
is to be an idealistic type of explanation (or rather construction), then this is not to be found in the philosophy of nature as I
have established it. - But then was it just a matter of that? - I have expressly proposed the opposite. If therefore the idealistic
construction of nature as I establish it is to be judged then it must be judged according to my System of Transcendental
Idealism, but not my Outline of Philosophy of Nature. But why then is this not idealist? And is there even (and the author
agrees with this) any type of philosophising other than the idealist? Above all, I hope that this expression is to be further
determined [in what follows] that it has been up until now. There is an idealism of nature and an idealism of the I. For me,
the former is original the latter is derived.19

The aforementioned dizziness of Heine is remedied by understanding that while the momentum
of nature is original, we experience, as beings capable of philosophy, the momentum of ideality first.
But, against Franks and other critics, Schelling argues that one breaks out of the 'magic circle of
consciousness' by turning it against itself; the rotations of the mind are capable of depotentiating
objects, to think their essence without thought. In essence, the highest form of abstraction is what gets
us closest to a sense of the objective in a world that is continuously constructed, that is endlessly
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produced at the hands of nature. Or, since one is already in the world, one is already being affected by
it and, as a consequence, one is already thinking according to it. The only way of thinking the world,
while being composed by it, is to acknowledge that pure epistemological escape is impossible and that,
instead, one pushes and stresses the material in order to discover what it is original while
acknowledging, this origin and for that matter any particular end, has already been decided by other
powers.
Attempts to read Schelling's method have generally emphasized its intuitive nature (Forester,
Franks) or its temporal form (Beach, Beiser, Tritten), or its constructive aspect (Matthews, Nassar).
Given I have already discussed Franks above, I believe that the intuitionist approach, that intuition is
Schelling's only method, generally comes from an inability to see Schelling's method whatsoever.
Heine's critique of Schelling as a dizzy, or indiscriminate thinker, emerges from a general stereotype of
romanticists and, to a lesser extent, German Idealists in that they believed that thought and the world
could simply be merged by wanting it to occur. While I argue that intuition, as one form of thinking, is
indispensable for Schelling, it does not describe his method. Intuition, for Schelling, is a capacity that
helps one pivot between multiple methods distributed between Naturphilosophie and transcendental
philosophy. I discuss Forester's particularly dismissive account in Chapter 5 below and set the matter
aside for the moment. The 2nd and 3rd approaches, while having more promise, ignore the protopragmatic and locative aspect of Schelling's thought, i.e., its properly spatial character. In my reading
of intuition below, intuition functions not as an immediate and direct connection between mind and
nature, but as an indirect and vague attempt at thinking the continuity between nature and mind in a
very localized, and minimal, sense.
Beach in his Potencies of the Gods emphasizes the temporal character of Schelling's method,
coupled with what Beach sees as a voluntarism, or emphasis on will, via Schelling's concept of the
potencies. While I discuss this at length in Chapter 4, for now, the important aspect is the fact that
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Beach sees Schelling as pursuing a method based on all-inclusive succession.20 While I see merit in
Beach's emphasis on temporalization, I believe he over-emphasizes the notion of will, or subject, as a
particular human being when I believe Schelling's account of subjectivity, and the potencies, is more
generic. Beiser argues that Schelling is heavily indebted to Kant but merely in that he takes Kant's
deduction beyond the law, or perhaps, in Schelling's case, under the stable ground which Kant thought
was practical. That is, Beiser seems to suggest that Schelling's method is deduction beyond the
particularly straight-forward function of the transcendental ideal. Beiser argues that, in this sense,
Schelling's method is pulled between an a priori method, simply of digging for ever deeper grounds,
and one supported, and challenged by, empirical findings in the natural sciences.21
This split is also emphasized by Tyler Tritten in his Beyond Presence, although he emphasizes
the late work as opposed to the earlier texts on which Beiser focuses. Tritten argues that Schelling's
method is one that oscillates between the a priori and the a posteriori. Specifically, Schelling's method
can be viewed as broadly intuitive in that it acknowledges the a priori as a problem, and, as a focus for
negative philosophy, or a philosophy of pure reason, while acknowledging that philosophy must also
attend to the accidental, or the contingent, category of experience.22 This oscillation, as already
suggested above, is what allows thinking agents to test their own grasp of a concept and its expression
with, yet beyond, that singular expression of it.
Bruce Matthews focuses on the constructive aspect of Schelling's method, namely, that
Schelling's emphasis on freedom necessitates that we construct with nature in order to discover its
structure. He writes: “In direct violation of Kant’s doctrine of method, Schelling adopts the procedure
of construction as the methodology for his philosophy. Only this productive method of construction
20
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can supply the possibility of envisioning the dynamic dualisms of our estranged existence.”23
Matthews goes on to state that Schelling does not violate Kant's prohibition on construction simply to
oppose Kant, but because, as Schelling sees it, Kant cannot even construct the schema on which he
relies without such an intuitive notion of construction.24 Whereas Dalia Nassar argues that Schelling's
method is constructive, for her it is constructive in two opposed ways. For Nassar, Schelling's method
is caught between philosophy and mathematics, or between demonstrating logically the succession of
states that mirrors nature and consciousness, and, the more Spinozistic method of the Presentations.25
Paul Franks also endorses a constructive reading but one tied to intuition, a construction taking place in
solitary intuition as opposed to a more broadly applicable Hegelian dialectic.26 Franks also suggests
that Schelling too quickly aligns construction with exhibition (Darstellung).27 Franks' comment reflects
a typical, and often Hegelian, gesture in regards to Schelling. The idea that Schelling generated
multiple systems because of his own Protean (or indecisive) nature is a claim that can only be made by
overlooking his central concerns, which is to say, to reduce him to a moment in the history of
philosophy leading up to Hegel. Furthermore, it would be more than tragic, if our choice was between
having no system, or having noetic totalitarianism.
In specific regards to intuition, many of the above readings, I would argue, would benefit from
analyzing, and taking seriously, the aforementioned continuity thesis. By continuity thesis I mean two
interrelated claims. First, Schelling's meontology of potencies asserts that there is a underlying, if
difficult to access, continuity composing and connecting all things. Things are, after all, expressions of
this continuity but are dynamically free, or individual, in how they express the potencies out of which
they are built. Secondly, the continuity thesis expresses Schelling's series of philosophical systems as
23
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necessarily interconnected, and built off of, one another.
Taken up properly, Schelling's intuition, or productive imagination as Matthews orients it,
cannot be viewed as merely an exercise in abstract philosophizing, as the armchair philosopher
deciding what constitutes the cosmos. The form of isolation that such a notion would require is, for
Schelling, impossible. That is, given that we are simultaneously produced by, and in nature, every act
requires its potential consequences to be rigorously traced. Philosophy in general, and as Schelling's
constructivism via the space of intuition emphasizes, is meant to model and simulate these actions
before we take them, and not, to replace or nullify action tout court. As I will address below, this
applies to both productive and intellectual intuition, to the tacit knowledge of a crafts-person
constructing in the former case, and of the philosopher tacitly abstracting in the latter case.
More generally, my aim in this text is to demonstrate that nature, as an open set of nested
physical systems, is a topic that continental philosophy has largely minimized in the last fifty years.
While this is a broad claim, my hope is that by outlining the use of German Idealism in the
contemporary moment that this will demonstrate why, and how, Schelling's thought as a form of
naturalism should be taken up alongside Hegel's thought. What Schelling offers is a complex way of
addressing how to adequately grasp what it is we think nature is, not only to do philosophy, but to
continue to exist as thinking entities that are composed by, and of, such a nature. Because such a task is
colossal, I further restrict myself to the notions of space and motion and, in particular, how they relate
to the genesis of thought, and thought's relation to action, across Schelling's work.
0.4 - Chapter Outline
In Chapter 1, I begin by outlining how Schelling conceives of thought as a species of motion, a
particular form of motion which we humans have access to, an access, while incomplete, demonstrates
that we participate in thought but cannot claim to have it. I demonstrate how this rather speculative
argument leads Schelling away from Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza because of their shared insufficiency at
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combining nature and freedom, or, the world and thought, in a satisfactorily continuous way. By
naturalizing thought, that is, by making thought a process outside of us, but one that has a pressure, or
a volition, Schelling is able to claim that Kant's dismissal of teleology is unwarranted if this teleology
is merely an objective fact about a nature that has not determinable beginning or end. That is, Schelling
naturalizes thinking which, in effect, destabilizes teleology since if nature has a goal to its creation, it is
only to create endlessly, or, so it would appear to our limited mental capacities.
To further articulate this naturalization, I then turn to J.G. Fichte, Schelling's mentor, who
inspires Schelling in creating a more active form of thought than Kant, in arguing thought must be an
uncertainly bounded capacity. But, whereas Fichte saw philosophy as beginning, and ending, with an
extreme form of subjectivism, Schelling sees Fichte's treatment of the I, or the subject, as erasing
nature as external world in order to grant thought maximum freedom. I then examine how Schelling's
reaction to the immanent concept of nature in Spinoza exhibits the opposite concern, namely, that
Spinoza's mechanistic and deterministic articulation of nature does not allow for an adequate
articulation of human freedom. However, rather than merely asserting human freedom above nature as
Fichte arguably does, Schelling suggests a maximally expansive form of naturalism that allows for
nature to be dynamically constituted by forces one of which is thought. I then close the chapter by
examining Schelling's peculiar utilization of Platonic cosmology and Aristotelian naturalism, in order
to further support his argument concerning the motive, or volitional nature, of thought. Specifically, I
claim that Schelling utilizes Plato and Aristotle to demonstrate how unifying an abstract image of
universal motion (from Plato's Timaeus), and a naturalistic ethological view of animal movement
(taken from Aristotle's De Anima), allows one to naturalize abstraction while demonstrating how
seemingly abstract ideas, such as dimension, can emerge naturalistically.
In Chapter 2, I continue to investigate the resources that Schelling utilizes to construct his
dynamic concept of nature vis a vis the thinking subject. Instead of focusing on the general activity of
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thought, however, I analyze how the problem of being in a nature that we seem to be able to contain in
thought becomes apparent in the relation between sense and construction-in-thought (whether in terms
of imagination, intuition, et cetera) to notions of space. The figures which I engage here are Kant,
though focusing on different texts than in Chapter 1, and the post-Kantian Salomon Maimon. In
regards to Kant, I analyze his remarkable text “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”
which defends and describes the function of reason in navigational terms. Kant uses the term
navigation as short-hand for the synthesis of motion and space between the numerous capacities of
inner navigation (experience, intuition, reason, speculation), and that of outer structure (space, horizon,
direction, magnitude, etc). Or, the way in which navigation is described in Kant, can be taken as a
measure of the tensions between the inner and outer grounding of space and motion, and how the
bridge from inner to outer is constructed and considered either analytic (as self-evidently external), or
synthetic (as provisionally internal). In this chapter, I argue that Kant begins to lean upon naturalistic
modes of explanation while disavowing them, i.e., Kant relies on the reasoner-as-navigation through
the physical medium of the body and its resulting feelings. Following this, I move onto Kant's
somewhat controversial Opus Postumum. In the Opus Postumum Kant expands the navigational model
of the orientation essay by returning to the relation of human knowledge to the form of the physical
sciences he had previously explored in The Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences. I
examine warring interpretations of Kant's final text in order lay the foundation of Schelling's further
dynamization of nature, as well as, thinking itself. Following this, I address how Salomon Maimon's
critique of Kant's a priori synthetic, supported by his discussions of mathematics, suggests that
speculation, such as the speculation in which Kant engages in the Opus, breaks the critical system but
in a way that allows for a synthesis of the natural and mental in a fashion that inspires Schelling's
dynamic treatment of nature. This dynamic treatment centers on the problematic relation of the
qualitative to the quantitative primarily in terms of magnitude. Namely, how is it that the intensive and
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the extensive can interact, measure, and be measured, from a purportedly neutral location. Maimon's
law of determinability, in what appears in a proto-Schellingian fashion, attempts to combine a genetic,
or asymmetrical creation of objectivity on the one hand, with a polarity between intuition and
conceptualization on the other hand. The notion of the genetic, which accompanies that of
determination, is imperative for maintaining difference in any case where dualisms (mind and nature,
inner and outer) are questioned. Maimon's attempt at being speculative, yet empirical, presents a
particularly helpful way of leaving the gravity-well of Kant's system, while still recognizing the
veracity of the transcendental beyond the merely schematic. I conclude by arguing that a
physicalization of Kant's perspectival mode, conjoined with Maimon's discussion of magnitudes,
creates a historically indirect, but conceptually fertile, ground for Schelling's re-construction of nature
via powers or Potenzen.
In Chapter 3, I outline Schelling's concept of mathematics in order to address how intuition,
space, and continuity function in his thought. I argue that Schelling's engagement with geometry, in
conjunction with his utilization of K.A. Eschenmayer's notion of Potenz as algebraic exponential,
speaks to an early form of intuitionist mathematics which is important to Schelling's thought (at least)
two areas: one, in discussing the relation of quantity to quality (indexing Chapter 2), and, two, in
constructing and describing thought as a species of motion (to point back to Chapter 1). Looking at the
geometrical and algebraic themes across Schelling's thought allows one to view how his intuitive, yet
continuous, concept of space functions as a way to map the difference between kinds (via geometry),
and a difference in intensities (via algebra), in a nature composed of continuous forces. These pursuits,
in different but bound ways, illustrate the complex form by which Schelling integrates human thought
into nature by naturalizing that which seems most artificial: the synthetic creations of mathematical
intuition. To unpack these claims, I contrast and compare Schelling's concept of number as indicator of
force, via Maimon, to Schelling's fellow Naturphilosoph Lorenz Oken who argued that numbers were
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endowed with substance. In order to address the geometrical tendencies of graphical demonstration, I
examine how Schelling utilizes the line to exhibit forces and polarities in nature. Following Gilles
Châtelet's reading of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, I argue that the geometrical and the diagrammatic
allows Schelling to avoid an over-utilization of logic, and the separability of the logical domain, and to
demonstrate how the tracing of nature, via geometry, adds to nature's very expression. I then return to
how the diagrammatic and the algebraic can be combined to discuss the relation of powers, intuition,
and space.
In Chapter 4, I build off of the previous chapters' focus on Schelling's sources, and his
divergences from those sources, and attempt to address the meontological core of Schelling's work
over all, namely, his theory of powers (or the Potenzen). The systematic need for these powers, which
are not equatable with either modality or possibility, follows consequently from Schelling's
explorations of dynamics, via Kant and Spinoza on the one hand, and in the articulation of thought-asactivity via Fichte on the other hand. That is, I explore how the Potenzen are pivotal to naturalizing
thought and dynamicizing nature in that they keep nature and thought interconnected but not fully codetermining. Schelling's utilization of the Potenzen, I argue, functions to combine the stability of
identity as form, as well as, the creativity and contingency of freedom-as-dynamics. For Schelling, an
unavoidable ramification of this freedom, particularly when glancing over the history of philosophy, is
the free construction of philosophical systems. My more specific goal in producing a historical survey
of Schelling's Potenzen is to demonstrate how Schelling attempts to construct and maintain a minimal
difference between motion and space (or, more generally in the terms of the Potenzen) between
creation and structure. This difference lies in determining the status of the Potenzen as a domain of
inexistent necessity. Inexistent necessity, or the contingent necessity of necessity, is Schelling's
argument for an original (but consequently original) momentum to creation which, because of its
inexistence, is necessarily ungraspable (or unprethinkable) for us, yet, is the condition of all forms of
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creation noetic and otherwise. This does not mean nature as such, or the Potenz as such, are the
unprethinkable (taking the unprethinkbale as an entity) but that finding them in thought, it what seems
to be for us, potentially has ontological consequences. But, just because we discover the Potenzen in
thought does not mean that thought contains nature or the Potenzen, but that the construction of the
Potenzlehre (as always being in thought) is how we create a provisionally minimalistic meontology.
Thus, to say a Potenz or power is, only means that there are general classes of can-be-states (or
dispositions, or tendencies) that function across numerous dimensions. In approaching Schelling's use
of powers or potencies historically I have two subsequent aims: firstly, to uphold, and do justice to, the
continuity thesis, i.e., that Schelling's work is not fractured into periods conceptually, but only in focus.
Secondly, by moving historically through Schelling's use of the Potenzen, I hope to demonstrate how
their lack of domain specificity (whether in thought, art, production, natural processes etc.) exhibits
their basic functional use as opposed to being viewed as metaphysically domineering or ontologically
superfluous.
In Chapter 5, I address the apparently problematic status of epistemology in Schelling's work.
Given the (at times) overblown emphasis on Schelling's anti-Kantianism, there would seem to be little
hope in articulating anything like a theory of knowledge across Schelling's oeuvre. I emphasize
knowledge's spatial and navigational functions in Schelling's texts, in particular, how the navigational
locates, and constructively constrains, the capacity of the subject to synthesize. This is accomplished, I
will argue, via a spatialized reading of Schelling's concept of intellectual intuition and its relation to
construction.
Against a generic, or naïve reading of intuition, I argue that intuitive is a rudimentary form of nonintentional abstraction, a genesis of temporary, and experimental, immediate conceptual space. This
intuitive spatializaiton of epistemology in Schelling can be viewed as the problem of location and
synthesis on two axes. The first vertical axis is the purportedly asymmetrically causal or generative
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axis of nature represented by Schelling as the Stufenfolge (or graduated stages of nature). The second
axis is the horizontal representation of nature in terms of fields or domains of knowledge. Or, put
otherwise, Schelling's epistemology must deal with the vertical axis of the transcendental method
which manifests as the Stufenfolge, as well as the horizontal axis which manifests itself as fields or the
scientific classification of the progression of the potencies (Potenzen) via a form of Peircean
abduction.
I then examine how the horizontal or field-based view of Schelling's thought can be elaborated
with the assistance of Robert Batterman's work on inter-theoretical relations between scientific theories
when it comes to emergent phenomena. Batterman demonstrates how even a hardcore realism is left
with competing theories which requires often indirect methods for examining what seems apparently
the case according to our senses. I then turn to another vein of interepretation regarding Schelling's
theory of knowledge – that of facticity and fact-based ontologies. Against an overly epistemological
reading of Schelling, I examine Markus Gabriel's use of Schelling to argue for a fact-based
transcendental ontology. Gabriel's view, in my opinion, far too quickly erases the Naturphilosophical
roots of Schelling's project in order to make him compatible with, but critical of, contemporary
analytic philosophy. I then engage the work of Gilles Châtelet in order to demonstrate the importance
of Schelling's indifference points for examining the relation between intuition and construction,
between scientific theories, and between philosophy and science. Schelling's combination of
construction-as-dynamics and intuition as recognition of those dynamics, is best illustrated by
Châtelet's analysis of Schelling's influence on field theory and the diagrammtic tools required to
capture fields made of forces. Put more generally, Chapter 5 attempts to discern where Schelling's
claim to knowledge falls between reliance on spatial intuition, facticity (the status of facts as facts),
and sense as a physical domain.
In Chapter 6, I demonstrate how Schelling's emphasis on motion and space, coupled with his
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particular mode of philosophical speculation, leads to a form of proto-pragmatism. I work out this
pragmatism via Schelling's turn towards Aristotle in the 1821 Erlangen lectures (“On the Nature of
Philosophy as a Science”) by moving through the connections between the great American pragmatist
C.S. Peirce and Schelling. Specifically, I argue that Peirce's fondness for Schelling demonstrates the
links between speculation and pragmatism generally, as well as, indicates how Schelling's use of
intuition is an early version of Peircean abduction. I then compare Schelling's proto-pragmatism with
the analytic thinkers who have taken German Idealism, in conjunction with the pragmatic legacy of
Peirce, as well as Sellars, as implying a philosophy which emphasizes normativity at the cost of nature,
namely, McDowell and Brandom (referred to as Left Sellarsians or Pittsburgh Hegelians). I then close
by appealing to the contemporary pragmatist Mark Wilson who synthesizes and operates between the
scientific considerations of Peirce, and the communicative and practical pragmatism of the Pittsburgh
Hegelians. Wilson, through a focus on classical concepts in the physical sciences, demonstrates the
limitations of a normative approach to human thought. Specifically in regards to thought, Wilson
attempts to argue for a navigational approach to cognition that steers clear of both the normativity of
the Pittsburgh Hegelians, as well as, the more hard-nosed neuroscientific articulations of consciousness
in the work of Daniel Dennett, and Patricia and Paul Churchland (categorized as Right Sellarsians); the
former emphasize reason as sui generis from the naturalistic context, whereas the latter investigate the
impact of the natural sciences arguably at the cost of normativity. Peirce, Sellars and, as I will argue,
Schelling, all in their own ways, attempt to construct a philosophy where the division between the
capacity to articulate particularly human concerns, and the capacity to adequately describe and situate
our place in the natural world, are not incompatible endeavors.
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1.0 - The Natural Forge of the Transcendental: The Movement of Thought and the Space of
Nature
My aim, in this first chapter, is to outline how Schelling conceives of thought as a species of
motion, and, to argue that this conceptualization arises from three dissatisfactions; 1-Schelling's
interest in, and critique of, Kant's use of teleology, 2-Schelling's adoption and critique of the activity of
Fichte's system, and 3-Schelling's critique of the immanent concept of nature found in Spinoza. More
specifically, these concerns of Schelling lead him to construct a form of maximally expansive, or
transcendental, naturalism in which nature as such is an open system that is made of self-augmenting
open systems. While this will be fleshed out throughout the entire project, this chapter explores and
emphasizes how Schelling's uptake of Kant's concerns with inner space via teleology, Fichte's activity
contra a static concept of the noumenal, and Spinoza's active notion of nature, all lead Schelling to
fixate on thought as a motion that traverses an open, or unbound, nature. This motion, which cuts
across space while synthesizing and augmenting what it encounters along the way, can be taken as a
naturalized notion of the Kantian transcendental.
The final question is: What does Schelling's transcendental (or non-eliminative) naturalism
mean for the status of thought and the status of nature taken apart, and together, when both center on
motion and space?28 I attempt to answer this question by sketching Schelling's very particular selection
of concepts from Plato's cosmology and Aristotle's naturalism in the final section.
1.1 - Thought as Direction: Schelling via Kant
In his early text “Of the I,” (1795) Schelling notes his fascination with a particular passage of
Kant's 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment while making the following statement. I quote
Schelling at length:
28
In this regard my initial starting point is similar to Thomas Nagel's as exemplified in his recent text Mind and
Cosmos. However, as I will argue in the latter chapters of this dissertation, Nagel suffers from a narrow reading of
reductionism. As an alternative to Nagel, I believe that Schelling's concept of depotentiation preserves the capacities of
thought without over-determining the cosmos with the structure of thought. I return to Nagel in the final chapter of this text.
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Since there is no imperative for the absolute I, no practical possibility, then, if the finite could ever fulfill its entire task, the
law of freedom (of the imperative) would attain the form of a law of nature (of being). And vice versa, since then the law
[241] of the finite's being would have become constitutive only through freedom, and this law itself would inherently be a
law of freedom. Therefore, the ultimate to which philosophy leads is not an objective but an immanent principle of
preestablished harmony, in which freedom and nature are identical, and this principle is nothing but the absolute I, from
which all philosophy has emanated. Just as there are no possibility, no necessity, and no contingency for the
nonfinite I, so likewise it does not know of any purposes to be attained (Zweckverknupfung) in the world. If, for the
nonfinite I, there were any mechanism or any technique of nature, then, for that I, technique would be mechanism and
mechanism would be technique, that is, both would coincide in its absolute being. Accordingly, even the theoretical inquiry
must regard the teleological as mechanical, and the mechanical as teleological, and both as comprehended in one principle
of unity, although nowhere realizable (as an object).29

The young Schelling is skeptical as to whether Kant can so strongly infer that the teleological
principle of nature is an adequate defense against a dynamic form of nature that, for Kant, too readily
threatens the grounds of practical action. Furthermore, Schelling is skeptical as to whether any
teleology of this form can be inferred at all. In other words, Schelling is uncertain as to how Kant can
claim the strangeness of biological creatures leads to a regulative concept of natural purposes and why
such purposes, even only as regulative ideals, apply only to the biological. For Schelling, Kant's
selective use of teleology, even as a mere regulative ideal, is question begging if it serves largely to
keep the dynamism of nature at bay. Alternatively, Schelling suggests that a form of unity, between
nature and freedom, would remove the artificial barriers that Kant had constructed, barriers which had
largely failed to dispel the unease he had sought to vanquish.30
The consequences of Schelling's claim are quite extensive as he, even at this incredibly early
stage, is attempting to demolish the ontological (or at least anthropological) certainty of inner space (of
a notion of a subject distinct from the outside natural world). One possible path would be to trace
Kant's thoroughgoing anxiety about the status of the biological vis a vis the ground of reason. That is,
one could argue that Kant has to give life-forms an ontological excessiveness, and a purposiveness, in
order to subsequently ground the forms of reason that can potentially emerge out of them. The function
29
F.W.J. von Schelling,“On the I as a principle of Philosophy,” in The Unconditional in Human knowledge: Four
early essays (1794 -1796), trans. F. Marti (Lewisburg : Bucknell University Press, 1980), 126-127.
30
For an extensive account of this unease see Joan Steigerwald, “Natural Purposes and the Purposiveness of Nature:
The Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment,” in Romanticism and Modernity, eds. Robert Mitchell and Thomas
Pfau, 29-46, (New York: Routledge, 2011).

29

of biological purposiveness would 'pre-ground' the schematic function of reason for Kant in perpetuity.
Yet, as Schelling goes on to explore in his First Outline in particular, he does not see such an internally
defined ground for the organism (or for any phenomenal product or Scheinprodukt for that matter).
Organisms, or any form of individuation, any individual thing, are merely meta-stable events
composed and decomposed by the forces of nature in which they are nested. But, rather than engaging
at length with the differences between Kant and Schelling at the level of the organism, I wish to focus
on the interior space which the organism requires for Kant in order not only for purposiveness in
nature to hold, but also so that, for him, this purposiveness can be cleanly translated into moral
imperatives.

The specific focus here is the construction of an inner space to root teleology in order

for nature to be properly navigable, and, for human constructs to be appropriately compatible with the
natural world. This imperative is central to Schelling as well, but, he is willing to sacrifice the minimal
safe distance, or interior space, which Kant insists upon for the sake of compatibility, whereas Kant's
priorities, are the reverse. This lack of an inner barrier indicates the related but, in the end, quite
different notions of the transcendental in both Schelling and Kant which I will now explore.
Transcendental philosophy, for Kant, as that which fundamentally determines the conditions of
experience, is often criticized as a self-justifying juridical model. Or, in other words, the criticism is
made that Kant wants to solidify the power of his own (or ostensibly anyone's) brandishing of the
scepter of reason via subjective judgment. My critique of Kant's concept of the transcendental,
particularly as it applies to judgment, does not share these motivations. I believe judgment can be taken
up as a form of categorization at worst, and, as a simultaneously exploratory, and simplifying machine
of reason, at best.31 While I believe this view potentially sells Kant's notion of judgment short, it is
somewhat easy to see the troubling legislative aspect of Kant's transcendental conditions as they apply

31
I will take up this issue in the following chapter in relationship to Kant's “What is Called Orientation in
Thinking?”
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to nature. In The Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant goes to great lengths to limit the power of
nature through the power of reflection. In the section on the dynamic sublime, Kant quickly squelches
any possibility of a dynamic nature stating that nature has power, but never dominion, over us because
our safety in the face of an immense natural occurrence (mountain, tidal wave, volcanic eruption etc.)
simply increases our own vital powers.32
This passage is indicative of the way in which Kant discusses nature as mechanical, purposive,
and lawful, from the very beginning of The Critique of Judgment. Furthermore, Kant immediately
divides nature and freedom via a separation of the scientific and the practical.33 For Kant, nature
necessarily conforms to our power of judgment.34 As Kant writes: “The special principle of the power
of judgment is thus: nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance with the form
of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment.”35 Thus while Kant's safety-zone
simultaneously protects the figure of the thinker from the wrath of exterior nature, as well as, providing
a stable ground from which judgment can sort out experience from the formal a priori structures which
make experience possible, the notion of interior space has an earlier and more physical grounding, as
well as one to which Kant, as I argue in the following chapter, returns in the Opus Postumum (1802).
In his early text “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space”
(1768) Kant builds the safety-zone of inner space in an altogether different manner. As Eckhart Forster
points out, this text marks the end of Kant's long held agreement with Leibniz over the generation of
space by way of entities. Whereas Kant had previously held with Leibniz, against Newton, that
absolute space made no sense (in that absolute space relied upon an arbitrary decision of the creator of

32
Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2000), 143-144 (5: 260 – 5:261). I follow the standard citation of Kant's work where notation in parentheses refer to Kants
gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902) while references to the Critique of Pure Reason have the standard
A and B versions referenced as well.
33
Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 3-5 (20:196 – 20: 198).
34
Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 8 (20: 202).
35
Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 19 (20:216).
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where to place the universe) in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” Kant sees Leibniz's relative notion
of space as unable to address the problem of direction. Kant writes referring to Leibniz's mentioned,
but never published, analysis situs:
What I am seeking to philosophically determine here is the ultimate ground of the possibility of that which Leibniz was
intending to determine the magnitudes mathematically. For the positions of the parts of space in reference to each other
presuppose the direction in which they are ordered in such a relation. In the most abstract sense of the term, direction does
not consist in the reference of one thing in space to another – that is really the concept of position – but in the relation of the
system of these positions to the absolute space of the universe. 36

Kant goes on to state that he is attempting to determine whether or not the unity of space has an
existence outside of the relations between parts. Kant quickly adds a caveat – namely, that the absolute
space which he seeks to determine is not one made of matter, or that is otherwise physical in any strict
sense, but that he seeks to construct a form of absolute space not for engineers, but for geometers.37
Kant begins to construct this notion of direction (focusing on the relation of right to left and left to
right) by appealing to spiral patterns in organisms, weather, as well as the celestial motions. Kant
argues that these motions are anchored to our bodies using, for instance, the example of the compass –
east and west must be translated into left and right in order for cardinal directions to have any import
on our understanding and subsequent actions. Strangely, Kant converts this natural skew of right over
left into an argument that the mechanics of nature provide us with a feeling whereby we consequently
emphasize the right over the left. Kant then writes: “What we are trying to demonstrate, then, is the
following claim. The ground of the complete determination of a corporeal form does not depend
simply on the relation and position of its parts to each other; it also depends on the reference of that
physical form to universal absolute space, as it is conceived by the geometers.”38
Kant's example, to which he returns and which will be discussed in the following chapter in
relation to magnitudes, is that of chilarity, or handedness. Kant argues that some internal ground is
36
Immanuel Kant, “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space,” in Theoretical
Philosophy 1775-1780, trans. and ed. David Walford (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 365 (2: 377).
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necessary in order for the bodily tendency of left and right to make sense and that, furthermore, this
inner ground points to a notion of absolute space, or fixed reference, by which right and left make
sense. That is, put otherwise, right and left cannot determine themselves only in relation to the other
for this says nothing as to why their orientations are mirrors or, as Kant puts it, incongruent
counterparts, of one another.
Kant's absolutization of space however, did not hold for long. In The Critique of Pure Reason
(1781) Kant argues against the reality of space yet maintains the importance of absolute inner space
but an inner space which becomes slowly idealized. As Christian Kerslake skillfully outlines it:
So why did Kant soon deny the reality of absolute space, and affirm its ideality? In The Critique of Pure Reason he gives
two arguments against the reality of space. First, the Newtonians create an absurd proliferation of entities when they think
of real things coexisting with an ‘eternal and infinite self-subsisting nonentity, which exist[s], (yet without there being
anything real)’ (A39/B56). Second, geometry is threatened by the reality of space, as its apriority would no longer be
immediately guaranteed. But there is a clue from a late set of lectures on metaphysics that Kant has another anxiety. ‘If we
consider space as real, we assume Spinoza’s system. He believed only in one substance, and all the substances in the world
he held for its divinely inhering determinations (he called space the phenomenon of the divine omnipresence)’ (LM 368,
AK. 28:666).39

We can begin to see how teleology is co-determinate with Kant's concept of internal ground.
This internal ground is essentially a navigationally-necessary microcosm of absolute space, i.e., one's
sense of direction cannot, for Kant, merely be that of moving within a world, but that movement
requires a notion of orientation by which the absolute space of the world is, at least minimally, fixed
for the subject. But instead of arguing this fixity through either a mental screening, or manipulation of
feelings, or external sensations, or through an appeal to the situated and navigational development of
the organism as an organism of a particular species, Kant threads inner space and movement, into
purposiveness and teleology which he relies on to fix the parameters of space. That is, Kant makes a
priori regulations of what could be described as naturalistic derivations.
Schelling takes up and modifies both of these claims by addressing teleology in his early work
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Christian Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009),
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and then the orientation of the organism abstractly in the First Outline (1799), as we have seen, and
then more specifically in his later Aristotelian work of the lectures on Pure Rational Philosophy (18471852).40 In regards to Kant's strange purposive threading, Schelling writes in the First Outline:
To Philosophize about nature means to heave it out of the dead mechanism to which it seems predisposed, to quicken it
with freedom and to set it into its own free development—to philosophize about nature means, in other words, to tear
yourself away from the common view which discerns in nature only what 'happens'--and which, at most, views the act as a
factum, not the action itself in its acting. 41

One could compare this sentiment with that of Kant, albeit at a later stage. In the Opus he
writes:
“it is we who first provide the data out of which cognitions can be woven (into the cognitions possible
from them): e.g. attraction, for the sake of determinations and laws of its relation in space and time. He
who would know the world must first manufacture it – in his own self, indeed.”42
Here Schelling emphasizes a perspectival view altogether different from Kant's that he will
articulate throughout his career. For Schelling, one approaches an embodied perspective not by
immediately determining what inner ground is necessary for small determinations, but in arguing that
only an overview, or abstracted perspective, which is nonetheless built from small determinations, is
capable of viewing subjectivity as a problem for, and not a solution to, nature's dynamism. These small
determinations, or forms of dependence, are exactly those components of nature on which our
cognitive architecture is made and upon which it rests. This point is clear in Schelling's above
mentioned lectures on Pure Rational Philosophy when Schelling, in opposition to Kant, asserts the
species specificity of dimensionality:
What accords with the progressivity of organic forms stands in direct proportion to the separation and actual differentiation
40
The texts I am working with are lectures translated by Iain Hamilton Grant that appear in Schelling's complete
work in Philosophische Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie oder Darstellung der Reinrationalen Philosophie in
F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke. K. F. A. Schelling, (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta,1856), Bd. XI. Throughout I will refer to
them as the Darstellung following Grant and Daniel Whistler's usage.
41
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of dimensions. The slightest change in their relations changes the entire type. The same muscles that draw an animal’s head
earthward, when reversed, posited as the past as it were, direct the human apex above. Throughout the entire ascending line
of the animal kingdom we may note how the heart is increasingly transposed from the right or the middle towards the left.
With this guiding thread in hand it becomes easier to demonstrate the progressive transformation of one and the same
primal form through the entire series of organic beings 43

Thus while right and left for Kant must index a inner ground that necessarily computes right
and left into all visual activities, for Schelling, whether or not certain motions are privileged or not has
to do with the physical constraints those species (or even inorganic entities) have prior to learning to
move with and against them.
While much more can be said of how Schelling utilizes and augments the Aristotelian inspired
discussion of dimensionality which arises from corporeal constraints, I am specifically interested in
how the speculation regarding dimensions, rather than leading to worries about finding immediate
ground as in the case of Kant's “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” instead leads, for Schelling, to the
immediate, or ultimate ground, as a subject being suspended in the name of further experimentation.
The structure of the subject is far less important for Schelling then what the subject, or what
subjectivity as human in this location, can do. The problem, and what Schelling gains from Fichte, is
how one can best think human thought as an activity when its ultimate ground belongs elsewhere, or,
perhaps nowhere at all. While Fichte's and Schelling's philosophical trajectories quickly diverge, the
pressure of the act is a concept that Schelling adapts whole heartedly as will be discussed below.
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1.2 - Thought as Activity: Schelling via Fichte
There is a fairly well-known saying that the German Idealists (primarily Fichte, Schelling,
Hegel) ran through the door which Kant had only wished to peek through. This speaks to, among other
things, the cautious uncertainty of Kant's position being 'ruined' by the German Idealists who wanted to
talk more about 'things in themselves' or, in various ways, to get rid of the things in themselves all
together, and expand the Kantian ground outwards, as a defense against both accusations of dogmatism
and skepticism. Whereas Slavoj Žižek has argued that Hegel effectively ontologizes that which Kant
had recognized without really recognizing (namely that the subject comes to be substance through a
kind of indirect self-recognition),44 the contemporary Pittsburgh Hegelians take both Fichte's and
Hegel's idealism to be one that grounds the stability of the starting subject position on the efficacy of
the normative which is sui generis, and separate from, what John McDowell calls, following Wilfrid
Sellars, the logical space of nature.
In essence, the problem of how mind and world (or thought and nature) interact in Fichte and
Hegel is based upon a self-sustaining space of reasons where, via linguistic structures, habit, and
rearing, a subject in that space needs to be able to self-test that the world is 'thus and so' in relation to
us saying that the world 'is thus and so.' This capacity cannot, following Brandom and McDowell, be
anchored in naturalistic processes (to do so would be to fall into the naturalistic fallacy as Sellars
called it) because the set of rules governing conceptual behavior is different in kind from those laws
which govern the logical space of nature. However, the way in which the logical space of nature is
described immediately fixes the game in a way that any kind of naturalism, other than empirical
explanation, cannot but fail to appease the force of second nature (the space of reasons). That is, I
believe that Schelling's naturalism is not a bald naturalism as McDowell would put it, but, given
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Schelling's speculative concept of nature, that it questions the descriptive ground put in place by the
Pittsburgh Hegelians (as well as that of Fichte).
Put otherwise: if naturalism is the strand of thought which fundamentally describes laws and
their empirical ambit, such a formulation presupposes the efficacy of description, already grounded, as
the boundary of the space of nature. Such a formulation dismisses outright the varieties of naturalism,
and specifically any speculative tools they wield, whether in Hegel, Schelling, or otherwise. While one
can overemphasize the speculative, one can, perhaps not quite as easily, erase the speculative tools of
philosophy (as well as those of the physical sciences) whereby the pragmatist pushes past the
immediacy of the practical via the risk-taking move of generating a hypothesis.45 While I will address
the Pittsburgh Hegelians at length in Chapter 6, I bring them up briefly here namely in order to suggest
that their articulation of Hegel makes him similar to Fichte, particularly, in jettisoning all talk of nature
for the sake of reason's power. Schelling's break from Fichte, over the problem of nature, prepares the
way for Schelling not to be taken up in contemporary analytic philosophy, as well for the sidelining of
philosophies of nature more generally.
Schelling's concept of nature appears at its most critical when it is taken as a naturalism in the
form of speculative physics (two terms he explicitly attaches to his philosophy of nature in the
Introduction to the First Outline of 1799). Though initially uncertain as to the efficacy of speculation
in his earliest texts, Schelling later pushes speculation as the necessary means by which thought can
begin to ascertain, however indirectly, what nature should be in order for something like us to exist at
all. Schelling begins these speculations though a naturalization of Kantian formalisms (via an appeal to
Plato's nature-as-forming in the Timaeus, Aristotle's proto-ethology, and a decentralizing of Fichtean
thought-as-activity), thereby making naturalism dynamic, and not substantive, and idealism derivative,
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and natural.
This naturalization of Kant's transcendental in Schelling has been most expertly fleshed out in
the work of Iain Hamilton Grant. Whereas Kant is concerned with how experience is possible (as a
synthesis of impressions into experiences, sensations which, in an empirical register, must be of
nature), Schelling wonders how nature must be in order for us to be and for us to be able to think of
something like nature. The first point – the question of how nature must be in order for us to be -assumes, as a ground, that nature pre-exists us (or more generally that being precedes thinking). Thus,
while Schelling does not at all dispute the starting point of Kantian critical philosophy, Schelling
claims that Kant should not be lambasted for peeking through the door at the in-itself illegitimately,
but that this peeking (through our speculative capacities) can only ever be grounded in a continuum
between the space of nature and the space of reasons. In so doing, Schelling claims that Kant did not
go far enough, namely in stating that things in-themselves should, to acquire something approaching a
'higher realism,' be forces in-themselves, or activity in itself. In this sense, on a formal level, Schelling
appears to go in the opposite direction to Fichte who, in order to shore up Kant's idealism against its
critics, denied the noumenal realm tout court, replacing it with an internalized not-I.46 Fichte's very
project of the science of knowing (de Wissenschaftslehre) is a project of internal critique taken to a
impressive extreme.47 Seemingly paradoxically, Schelling's fascination with Fichte's I as the form of
philosophy, the I as endless doing, is not taken by Schelling as a seed for a rampant idealism (at least,
as idealism would be construed by Kant) but as arguing that the activity of being-as-self can only be
grounded in an existence outside of it, namely, the speculatively determined dynamics of nature.
As Dieter Sturma puts it:
46
By internalized I, I am referring to the notion of projection that is the focus of Fichte's 14th lecture in the 1804
Wissenscaftslehre. This projection can be taken as the outside world influencing pre-intentional consciousness, or, it can be
viewed as simply the capacity to be objective within the realm of consciousness.
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As far as Schelling is concerned, it is an unshakable fact of finite existence that the latter does not simply possess the
external and inner conditions of its own 'coming to self awareness' at its own disposal. Our various forms of theoretical and
practical dependence upon inner and outer nature impose narrow limits on the possibility of self-knowledge. By virtue of
the naturalist incorporation of subjectivity, these forms of dependency continue to exercise their effects and do not simply
lose their influence when rational individuals enter into the domain of explicit consciousness and self-consciousness.48

That is, whereas Fichte took nature (as not-I) to be an internalized and formal constraint on
which the activity of the I operates, Schelling sees this activity of nature, and appearing in our minds,
as our own activity (as intentionality), as only possible following a self-inhibition of mental activity in
order for anything resembling reason to even be possible. Or, the activity of thought weighs itself
down with the not-I (as constraint) in order to think cogently not, pace Fichte, to exceed it. While on
the one hand this can be read as Fichte simply arguing for the irreducibility of conscious experience,
the degree to which he claims existence, and not merely thinkability, depends upon the I, obscures the
reality of external beings.49 In Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature Schelling writes:
Fichte's philosophy was the first to restore validity to the universal form of subject-objectivity, as the one and all of
philosophy; but the more it developed, the more it seemed to restrict that very identity, again as a special feature, to the
subjective consciousness; yet as absolute and in itself, to make it the object of an endless task, an absolute demand, and in
this way after extracting all substance from speculation, to abandon it as just empty froth, while proceeding, on the other
hand, like the Kantian theory, to reconnect absoluteness with the deepest subjectivity, through action and faith. 50

Fichte's error, according to Schelling, is to locate such activity in the consciousness alone while
at the same time bringing in objective constraints (in terms of Kantian schemata) in order to ground the
consciousness-as-activity in the world. In other words, Fichte abandons all of nature, because all
activity, and all constraint, is internal to thought itself. Fichte does not set out to eradicate nature but to
ground philosophy in what he sees as real living.51 Fichte argues that other post-Kantian thinkers
(Schelling no doubt being the one he has in mind) have held too close to the thing in itself “as a dead
48
Dieter Sturma, “The Nature of Subjectivity: The Critical and Systematic Function of Schelling's Philosophy of
Nature,” in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy:Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedwick (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 227.
49
This is tied to Fichte's notion of facticity, namely, that facticty applies to how sense functions for the natural
sciences, as well as, the so-called facticity of the individual. Or, in other words, the question is whether Fichte's notion of
fact has more to do with a form of subjective-objectivity of the senses, or whether it is more a proto-phenomenological
form of intentionality, when it comes to the topic of nature, or externality more generally.
50
Ideas, 54.
51
Fichte, The Science of Knowing, 21.

39

being” instead of focusing on the absorption of the thing in itself into consciousness.52 For Fichte it is
not even possible to conceive of an unprethinkable realm as thingness must be always already
thinkable.53
This core dimension of Fichte's thought is pulled between the ground of consciousness being
rooted a posteri in a self-evident factum, and, in an absolute beyond facticity as such. Paul Franks
argues for the former stating that Fichte, following Niethammer's critique of Reinhold, got around the
problem of thought as self-grounding by taking it as a self-evident feature of consciousness.54 Allen
Wood argues, contra Franks, that Fichte fundamentally agreed with Reinhold but simply amplified
Reinhold's principle of consciousness into an absolute subjectification of the subject-object (into I and
Not-I).55
Given Fichte's influence on Schelling, how is it even possible for the latter that we can think
something like nature outside of us? Schelling's alternative is to place activity, albeit skeptically,
within the noumenal realm making the form, and constraints of the subject, a self-inhibition of such
activity. Again, the functional constraints of consciousness that allow the activity of thought to
recognize itself as thought would be at least partially inaccessible to the mind as self-constraining
(hence the importance of Schelling's assertion that only nature is a priori). Or, as Schelling put it in the
Stuttgart Seminars, quoted above in the introduction, the cosmos existed before any system created by
human thought. Thus, mental powers such as reflection and judgment would become second order
functions, powers exercising themselves only after the activity of the mind had been restricted to give
itself form and to thereby relate to the exterior world. Schelling writes in The System of Transcendental
Idealism:
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The self senses when it finds in itself something opposed to it, namely, since the self is mere activity, a real negation of
activity, or state of being affected. But to be that which senses, for itself, the (ideal) self must posit in itself that passivity
which till now has been present only in the real; and this can undoubtedly occur only through activity.56

For Schelling the real (the logical space of nature) interferes with the space of reasons in such a
way that the space of reasons must limit itself (posit something like nature, some outer field, or
manifold) in order to recognize its own capacity to act. For Schelling, nature comes to be thought, as
thought, recognizes there is nature, as thought would never operate without assuming that that which is
real in it is also ideal. The difference between Fichte and Schelling here is apparently slim, yet far
reaching. While Fichte recognizes some level of inaccessibility of consciousness' root, for
consciousness, this obscure activity must still be in consciousness. For Schelling, this 'in' functions
only as an ideal copy of the actual, or natural, activity from the outside passing though, and
constituting, interiority.
1.3 - Thought as Dynamic Nature: Schelling via Spinoza
To address nature appropriately, Schelling found himself faced with the task of constructing a
species of monism that circumvented the limitations and purported dangers of traditional monisms
proposed, and criticized within, the Pantheism Controversy--that controversy which, at least partially,
spurred German Idealism forward, and centered upon the figure of Spinoza. Following Paul Franks, if
the central tenet of German Idealism is what he refers to as heterogeneous monism (of systematizing
difference within continuity), Schelling is able to accomplish this construction via a system of
philosophy (or, perhaps more accurately, a series of systems) that is disseminative in its structure and
is comprised of forces (not substances).57 Furthermore, in such a monism, which for many implied
determinism, Schelling articulates a notion of the transcendental as the very movement of form to
form, thereby granting an abstract heterogeneity to Schelling's thought while maintaining a

56
F.W.J. von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 1978), 61.
57
Paul Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

41

meontological (non-being, or power based) continuity.
Schelling's general position regarding the relation of thought and nature should be viewed not merely
as a repetition of Spinoza's, or of the reformulations of Spinoza coming out of the controversy (namely
Lessing's, Jacobi's, or Mendelsohn's), but as a reformulation of the role of subjectivity-without-subject
following a synthesis of Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza in the light of the dynamics of his time. While, like
Kant, Schelling is wary of making space merely real in accepting Spinozistic substance, he does not
wish to make it as ideal as either Kant or Fichte would have it. It is how Schelling handles the
integration of the absolute-as-concept into his thinking of space and motion that interests us here.
However it will be of benefit to rehearse the Pantheism Controversy's general contours to get a general
grasp of the role that Spinoza, and Spinozism, played at the time.
The controversy, which raged for over a decade, saw the numerous pivotal minds of Germany
deadlocked in battle over the importance and reach of reason vis a vis belief. The debate was not
couched in the terms of philosophy versus religion, but was made internal to the structure of
philosophy itself. It was a debate which centered on the limits or non-limits of reason as a power and
whether such a power could be self-grounding, grounded in nature, or needed, necessarily, to be
grounded in divine calculations.
The controversy erupted between Frederich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn who were both
friends and commentators on the work of the late great Lessing. When Jacobi revealed that Lessing
was an avowed Spinozist, debate erupted over what kind of Spinozism Lessing ascribed to (following
Spinoza's teachings in any form was tantamount to heresy at the time) and whether reason (without
faith) could lead to anywhere but nihilistic ruin. Jacobi claimed that since for Spinoza everything was
extended substance, his dogmatic system necessarily excluded God and faith. Mendelssohn's shocking
response was that theism and pantheism were essential the same, and, that reintroducing faith or belief
into philosophy was exactly what the Enlightenment had attempted to do away with in the first place.
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In a sense, the Pantheism Controversy, which Kant attempted to stay out of as long as possible,
repeated the debate for which he had supposedly thrown down the gauntlet, and ended, with the advent
of his critical system; namely the debate between dogmatism and empiricism in which his creating the
transcendental was intended to put a stop to endless skepticism. Following the basic plot of The
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant denied both the dogmatist's claim that reason could construct
knowledge purely, and speculatively, apart from reality (most notably referring to Spinoza and
Leibniz) and the empircist's claim that experience could ground its own justifications without
appealing to the non-empirical constructions of reason (namely referring to Hume).
Kant's great legacy, as is well known, was to create a neutral zone between the camps in which
we utilize reason, so as to retroactively construct only that which is necessary to make sense of the
experiential world with which we are always already in contact. In essence, the Pantheism Controversy
posed the question: “What is the Ground of this critical middle-ground in terms of reason or belief?”
That is, if the middle ground is a mixture of reason and experience, what is the basis for the very
capacity of this mixture? The argument that the retroactive construction via reason of schemata to
make experience coherent could be applied to the very possibility of the middle-ground itself, lead to
accusations of Spinozism which, in turn, meant nihilism and atheism. On the other hand, Jacobi argued
that whether ontological proof could be wagered in its favor or not (which Kant had decidedly said it
could not), a belief in God, is necessary in order to have any kind of critical system without falling into
godless speculation. Whereas Kant famously left room for faith, but argues that reason could not prove
god's existence, the Pantheism controversy demonstrated attempt to force the issue regarding the
consequences of the separation of reason and god, i.e., at what point does faith step in to function with,
and or against, reason?
In so many words, the Pantheism Controversy was troubled by whether the ground of reason
(however carefully delimited by Kant) was a self-grounding function of reason itself, or an externally
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gifted and ultimately unknowable ground that was itself unreasonable. Beyond the Pantheism
Controversy being about a crisis of meaning, I would argue that it is actually a crisis of location, of
reason in space (and, subsequently, of the space of reason itself). Jacobi, in recounting Lessing's initial
revelation of his Spinozism to him writes:
'Jacobi: Whoever does not want to explain what is inconceivable but only wants to know the borderline where it begins: he
will gain the largest space for human truth.
Lessing: Words, dear Jacobi, mere words! The borderline you want to fix cannot be determined. And on the other side of it
you give free rein to dreaming, nonsense and blindness.
Jacobi: I believe that the borderline can be determined. I want not to draw it, but only to recognize what is already there.' 58

Whereas Schelling would assert that the answer to the question “Where is Reason?” is 'in
nature,' he would also acknowledge the unsatisfactoriness of this reply. As Grant has discussed in
recent lectures, this epitomizes the novel, yet limited, capacity of transcendental thinking to relocate
the tensions within nature, to re-describe them, but in a way that deadens them.59 Or, for Schelling, the
transcendental should not be a cognitive re-appropriation of nature, but a demonstration of how nature
passes through, and determines consciousness. Hence, the Kantian advent of the transcendental
disavows any covering over its potentiality by submitting it to the practical-as-ground or ethical as
ground – a project which Jacobi initiated brandishing nihilism as the punishing specter if the project
should fail. Against this, Schelling sees Spinoza's mechanistic view of nature, in its immanent form, as
too limiting in that it decides, from the beginning, what the borderline mentioned by Lessing and
Jacobi above is, and, where it is.
That is, while Spinoza's construction of the singular substance of God in nature, and nature in
God, brought down accusations of heresy and eventual banishment on the modern thinker, Schelling is
able to avoid such threats by striking against Spinoza's monism and opening up the productivity of
nature (and incidentally Divinity): process in the sense that the transcendental serves as an
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irrecoverable motion of forms-making-forms and not merely as the engine of reason's schematic form.
While the Pantheism Controversy set Fichte, Mendelsohn, and others afire with the flames of
nihilism (as they made claims for reason's self sufficiency thereby eschewing the need for faith or
belief), Schelling remains above the fray as his articulation of the transcendental is not beholden to
reason as such, but merely makes possible the emergence of reason out of the unreasonable on the one
hand, while troubling the facticity of reason, as we are born into it as unavoidable schema, on the other
hand. In other words, Schelling changes the problem from 'where to divide the territory of reason from
the territory of faith?' into 'how do we best discover how the apparently unreasonable feeds and forges
the reasonable?'
This shift of terrain allows Schelling to critique Kant for separating freedom (or what I will
argue is better described as dynamics) from the noumenal realm (the posited realm of things in
themselves existing outside of human experience). As Schelling makes clear in a lengthy footnote in
his lectures on The History of Modern Philosophy, Kant obliterates the possibility for a “higher
realism” when he denies the thing-in-itself its properly dynamic character:
[...]If one had to distinguish a Prius and Posterius in sensuous representation, then the true Prius it would be what Kant
calls 'thing in itself'; those concepts of the understanding which it shows itself as affected by in my thinking are, according
to Kant himself, precisely that by which it first becomes object of my thinking, thus is able to be experienced by me; the
true Posterius is, then, not as he assumes, that element which remains after the concepts of the understanding have been
removed, for rather, if I take these way then this is the being which is unthinkable, before and outside the representation, it
is thus the absolute Prius of the representation, but the true Posterius is precisely this Unknown (which he himself
compares with the X of mathematics).60

It is in the same text that Schelling charges Spinoza with a priori extracting freedom from
nature. As Schelling writes: “Spinozism is really the doctrine which sends thought into retirement, into
complete quiescence; in its highest conclusions it is the system of perfect theoretical and practical
quietism, which can appear beneficent in the tempestuousness of a thought which never rests and
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always moves.”61 Thus for Schelling thought is a form of activity, or real movement, but one that is
necessary but not sufficient. In contrast to figures such as Deleuze, Schelling's naturalization of
thought-as-activity, following a combination of Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza, requires a dynamic
rethinking of nature and not merely an application of the model of thought onto nature in general. If
this were the case Schelling would not require the caveats listed above in relation to Kant, namely, he
would need not be concerned with how thought affects reality and how reality affects thought, by
replacing the notions of origin and end with Prius and Posterius.
Despite such passages, there remains an attempt to simultaneously claim that Schelling is a precritical Spinozist through and through, a thinker who merely ignores the Copernican Turn of the
Critical Revolution. A particularly acerbic example can be found in Adrian Johnston's recent
Adventures in Transcendental Materialism (2014). Engaging with Johnston's text will be helpful in
exhibiting not only the constant misunderstandings of Schelling's relation to Spinoza, but also the
dominant mode of understanding the transcendental between Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in
microcosm.
In a chapter entitled “'Off with their thistleheads!': Against Neo-Spinozism,” Johnston aligns the
Naturphilosophilcal Schelling, and commentators on him, particularly Iain Hamilton Grant in
Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, with a contemporary group of neo-Spinozists, a group which
includes Jane Bennett, William Connolly, Michael Hardt, to name a few.62
Johnston claims that Deleuzianism is the 'master-matrix' behind Grant's text but without
mentioning Grant's critiques of Deleuze, via Schelling, in the closing two chapters.63 Johnston implies
that Grant unjustifiably argues that Schelling's work over time has general consistency and then argues
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that Grant's book overwhelming focuses on Schelling's work between 1794 and 1804.64 Johnston
claims that the Freedom Essay, as well as other 'later work,' does not feature in Grant's account
claiming that this work is more dialectical and speculative.65 For one, referring to work after 1809 as
'late' Schelling is not particularly helpful since Schelling's texts continue for longer after 1809 than
before.66 Next, Johnston implies that Schelling became more Hegelian after 1809 and hence this is why
the 'later' work is supposedly missing from Grant's book due to Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism.67 In
essence, Johnston is claiming that Grant's unacknowledged (though it is acknowledged and critiqued
within the book) Deleuzianism means he is anti-Hegel which means he must hide Schelling's later
'Hegelian' texts. Given that Schelling is increasingly critical of Hegel at least from his introduction to a
text of Victor Cousin (1834) as well as in The History of Modern Philosophy and The Berlin Lectures,
it is difficult to discern the basis for Johnston's claim.68 Despite the young Schelling's claim that he had
become a Spinozist in a letter to Hegel in 1795, it is not at all established in Schelling scholarship that
Schelling was deeply Spinozistic. While Dalia Nassar has expertly pointed out how Schelling utilized
Spinoza to escape Kant, and by association Fichte, Schelling was consistently critical of the limitations
of Spinoza's immanence, as well as his inadequate definition of the place of thinking within such a
system. This complex relation to Spinozism has been highlighted by Allan White as well as Andrew
Bowie, Dale Snow, and recently by Bruce Matthews.
One of the best antidotes to strong Hegelian-Žižekian responses such as Johnston's, which
seems to paint Schelling as a mere dogmatic Spinozist, is to note the more recent attempts at analyzing
the appeals to nature's form Schelling makes before, during, and after, his utilization of Spinoza,
namely that of a combination of Platonic cosmological realism, and Aristotelian biologically focused
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naturalism. But is this to admit to Johnston's critique orthogonally, to accept that Schelling is only,
after all, pre-critical? As I hope to show this is not the case because of how Schelling views the
problems of philosophy as cosmological. In essence, Schelling does not believe that the adoption of
methodologies closes problems, but only re-spatializes them, it re-locates them.
As evident following his reading of Plato's Timaeus, a one-world dynamics allows Schelling to
give idealism a physical utility in that, because the ideal is part of the real, continuity becomes not
merely an abstract geometrical artifact, but reorientates thought as part of a continuum with nature
(and, as I will argue, naturalizes geometry). Whereas Spinoza's immanence and substance left monist
philosophy a lifeless realism, Leibniz gives Schelling an overly lively idealism, but one that, despite its
errors, which, for Schelling, culminates in Leibniz's reliance upon God's morals to explain physical
necessity, demonstrates the power of idealism as a means of navigating and speculating as to what the
forms of nature might be in order to explain how nature proceeds as a self-lacerating form always
giving rise to new forms while still remaining physically continuous.69
It is here that Schelling's Identity Philosophy appears inseparable from his discussions of
nature. Although there is a continuity between thinking and nature, transcendental systems (what
Schelling takes from Fichte and Kant and transforms in the Identity philosophy) appear to behave
according to their own rules and problems. Given a dynamically productive nature, for Schelling
transcendental philosophy does not determine the inner workings of nature but only ever how our own
thinking can take in and think those workings through the mediation of experiment (through the detour
of the actual). While our thinking is caused, however strangely and indirectly, by nature, the way
thought functions is to recapitulate and copy nature according to its own terms. Whereas Kant's
systematic constraints were directed fundamentally to make sense of how we have experience at all,
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for Schelling the constraints on nature are skeptically constructed in order to explain how it is that
there are things at all given a nature which seems endlessly productive. That is, while Kant's
combinations of sense experience and intuition to create experiment does not sound far afield from
Schelling's view just outlined, it is the authority of reason to reclassify these combinations as to be
decided by reason alone, that separates Kant and Schelling. Put otherwise, Schelling sees limits to the
conceptual, in the face of nature that, for Kant, manifest only as a failure reason. Reason, as a juridical
function, is insufficient to investigate the depths of nature. This has been read as Schelling being an
irrationalist but this would be a hasty declaration. It is not that Schelling doubts reason's importance, or
the form of the transcendental for Kant, but only that the bound between thinking (in the form of
reason or otherwise) is more intimately bound to a dynamic nature that Kant can allow.
In Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Schelling writes:
What then is that secret bond which couples our mind to Nature, or that hidden organ through which Nature speaks to our
mind or our mind to Nature? We grant you in advance all your explanations of how such a purposive Nature has come to be
actual outside us. For to explain this purposiveness by the fact that a divine intelligence is its author is not to philosophize,
but to propound pious opinions […] For the existence of such a Nature outside me is still far from explaining the existence
of such a Nature in me; for if you assume that a predetermined harmony occurs between the two, indeed that is just the
object of our question […] Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible Nature. 70

Schelling's assertion that mind is invisible nature, and nature is invisible mind, is thus not an
adherence to a form of either crude realism or crude idealism, but addresses the continuity or identity
of both (on a natural level or according to nature) while admitting that a methodological, or descriptive
split, exists. That is, while reduction is explanation (at the level of nature) the ideal as description has
an efficacy (or a power following Schelling's language) because of the natural realm in which it has
emerged.
The strangeness of this claim can be reduced if one takes for granted the justificational
impenetrability of the empirical as Kant's starting point. Kant, by fully absorbing the fear of Hume's
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skepticism, by accepting there is no ground beneath us, allows him to justify reasons' self-originary
state following from the capacity, of the already-always conceptual, of empirically recognizing the
appearances floating about us with seemingly no final, supersensible, ground beneath them. Reason
must, for Kant, be able to draw final conclusions about all other forms of thought. As Iain Hamilton
Grant describes it, such a procedure, whether in Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or Brandom, can only seem to be
so much rational bootstrapping.71 Such a paranoid fear of the groundless can, of course, be covered
over, again following Grant's lead, by appealing to the practical. Reason, as immaterial or merely
normative boot-strapping, merely becomes so many cracked eggs to create the omelet of practical
reason. The other course, is that of Johnston and Žižek which is to ontologically, i.e., transcendentally
in a Kantian sense, privilege the form of the human subject as a symbolic rupture, or gap in the
world.72 In both cases, nature is excluded because either the necessity of the practical stops the creep of
skepticism, or, the inexplicability of human capacities means we represent the 'weakness' of nature.
1.4 - The Missing Gesture: Plato and Aristotle via Schelling
Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with
men, but with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as
well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute
some special experience to the store of wisdom, there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand
times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told
stories to one another and to the animals—such stories as are now attributed to them—in this case also, as I should imagine,
the answer would be easy. But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and
discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason why we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able
to get on. In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul
had completed its proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe
let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. 73
Some things are only actually, some potentially, some potentially and actually, what they are, viz. in one case a particular
reality, in another, characterized by a particular quantity, or the like. There is no movement apart from things; for change is
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is 'privation'; and as regards quality one kind is 'white' and the other 'black', and as regards quantity one kind is 'complete'
and the other 'incomplete', and as regards spatial movement one is 'upwards' and the other 'downwards', or one thing is
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'light' and another 'heavy'); so that there are as many kinds of movement and change as of being. There being a distinction
in each class of things between the potential and the completely real, I call the actuality of the potential as such,
movement74
The best course for a life devoted to philosophy is to have begun with Plato and to end with Aristotle.75

Schelling's transcendental naturalism, a naturalism which takes thought and ideas to be within
nature, can be pictured broadly in his augmentation of Plato by Aristotle, and, Aristotle by Plato. This
augmentation allows for a minority reading of both thinkers in that, for Schelling, Plato's treatment of
the idea only makes sense when it is within one world, a world composed of small naturalistic motions
described by Aristotle. In a parallel fashion, Aristotle's treatment of activity, or motion, denies any
notion of perfection to close, or contain, the collection of actions that composes and directs the world.
Thus, the movement of the idea is one example of a motion that seems uncontainable, as the very
notion of containment, moves beyond any notion of closure. How can this picture be articulated?
In his The Philosophy of Art Schelling writes:
A picture is symbolic whose subject not only signifies or means the idea, but is itself the idea. You can see yourself that in
this way the symbolic painting coincides completely with the so-called historical painting and actually designates the higher
potence of the latter. Here again we encounter distinctions according to the object, which can either be something
universally human that perpetually recurs and renews itself in life, or refer to completely spiritual and intellectual ideas.
The latter is represented by Raphael's Parnassus and The School of Athens, which symbolically portray the entirety of
philosophy.76

We can illustrate the Platonic-Aristotelian tension from within this very image. The reason why
Platonic images can exist in this world, and need not exist in their own ideal realm, and the reason why
naturalistically explained animal motion must exceed its roots and its future containment, is due to the
nature of potency, of powers that exponentially create, and yet are inexistent. Powers function by
having the qualities of being and becoming, but not necessarily, the status of things. Inexistence here
denotes the constructive amphiboly of being and becoming as that which is already but, may never be,
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in a way that we recognize as either being or becoming.77
Consequently, the inexistent can be taken as the un-painted movement in Raphael's The School of
Athens: the unseen fall of the hand from Plato's ideal-upwards finger, to Aristotle's actual-emphasizing
downward palm. Motion (here as gesture) is the continuum by which Schelling can make the claim
that Platonic abstraction and Aristotelian concretion are contiguous rather than oppositional. One
begins with Plato because thinking (for us) begins in abstraction, and only through abstraction can we
burrow down to the concrete. Yet, abstractions are the result of an augmentative procedure of
compounded actualities best understood in an Aristotelian vein. It is this open-endedness of thought,
focused through the locality of the concrete, in which Schelling's emphasis on motion highlights the
tension between the mobile and the immobile - of explaining the seemingly unlimited power of
thought via the unavoidable problems of localized action. Not simply of applying or transforming
thought into action but asking how thought and all motion are localized at all.
Or, in Schelling's terms, how do we pass from the Platonic first motion, the World-Soul, to
isolated forms of activity thereby allowing them to be animated yet perform their own motions? Or,
how does one move from Plato's account of the abstract as universality arising from nature's potencies
as becoming, to Aristotle's exploration of the actual in terms of the accretion of dimensionality
consequent on animality? In addressing motion and subsequently space through the question of world
in the ancient sense, Schelling is able to reintroduce nature as a problem since the Greek world is really
that of our modern cosmos, or the all, or nature in its fully creative sense.
A - Plato
For Schelling, the Timaeus functions as a philosophical Proteus, a form that he couples with the
assertion that only nature can be said to a priori and therefore philosophy is the attempt to think the
unconditioned all. In other words, against the parochial view of Plato as driving a wedge between idea
77
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and existence, Schelling argues for a Platonic nature (however thinly constructed in the Timaeus) as
that which must be capable of genetically producing both thought and thing. In always being mindful
of this ur-form of philosophy (nature as radical continuity without purely thinkable unity,) the question
becomes what is the presumed first motion of the world an abstraction of? As the young Schelling
pointed out in his essay on the Timaeus (1794), the motion that seems to be in matter, in the possibility
of an internal alteration of the world, is the notion of motion, or change, that requires the understanding
and thus is not original.78
It may appear anathema to claim that the World-Soul, one of the most abstract and ideal
components of Plato's system, should be considered an important part of a naturalistic view. Yet,
taking physics as a basic if abstract component of naturalism, the non-total absolutization of motion
appears less curious given a non-totalized or open-ended world.79 Taking the World-Soul of the
Timaeus as a one-world physics treated methodologically as two80, gives us basic categories of
sameness and difference which can exist in relation to each other in periods of motion and rest around
an axis. Thus, for Schelling, existence is the mystery whereas essence is a determination which leaves
the residue of ground as remainder. The non-totality of the world is not one justified solely by the
insufficiency of knowledge to classify, but by the errancy of production or, the fact that motion is
recursively added to itself. If the Timaeus provides the ur-form of philosophy itself, and if this form is
central to Schelling's Naturphilosophie, then Speculative Physics, in its present rudimentariness
outlined thus far, must apply to Schelling's own way of forming philosophy as such. Taking our
78
F.W.J. von Schelling, Timaeus, trans. Adam Arola, Jenna Jolissaint, and Peter Warnek in Epoche, v 12, Issue 2
(2008): 210-211.
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While it has become almost commonplace to lean on Cantorian set theory to emphasize the nonexistence of a set
of all sets, Schelling's mathematical interests lie in proto-intuitionist geometry and, particularly, in the importance of the
trans – an emphasis which the mathematician Fernando Zalamea has recently emphasized as typical of romantic era
thinkers. In this sense Schelling's interests lean more towards the categorical than the set-theoretical, more towards
transformation (or motion) than in belonging. I discuss Zalamea in Chapter 3.
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This was an open debate between specialists in Plato as late as the 1940s and seems to be closed after Arthur
Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936) and for a opposed Platonic realist view
see Constantin Ritter's The Essence of Plato's Philosophy (Memphis: Jackson Press, 2007).
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aforementioned themes in stride (dynamics, motion, space) we can say that Schelling's own practice of
philosophizing is a self-destructive or, perhaps more accurately, an ablative one.
While he is often himself seen as being too protean a thinker due to internal inconsistencies, it
can be readily argued that Schelling is in fact committed to a protean form of philosophy as such. This
is not to say that Schelling is consistently inconsistent, but that since thought, as a part of nature, is
dynamic motion in a continuous space, one can only ever hope to construct local meta-stable
constructions.81 In other words, there can only ever be systems and not one system. If there is a
personal motivation to this mode of philosophizing for Schelling it is not manic inconsistency, but
melancholy. As seen in one of the epigraphs from the introduction above, Schelling wrote at an early
age that nothing saddens the philosopher more than seeing their own system completed. This is also
indicative of the concerns leveled at Schelling, via the charge of Spinozism, addressed above in that
Schelling absorbs pre-critical metaphysical systems in terms of their demands and neither their forms,
nor methods. To ignore the desire and motives for metaphysics is to be less critical than to accept
Kant's system whole-heartedly.
Yet the functions of the categorical and the mobile are not divorced. The Platonic dialogue
most attentive to motion (after the Timaeus) is The Statesman, which attempts to flesh out the logic of
classification in how abstract or theoretical knowledge relates to practical knowledge. The Stranger
demonstrates the seemingly unending variety of classes before arguing that a certain fiction needs to be
entertained – that of the universe in motion, a motion which at times in the past has retrograded, so that
the material of the world is recycled.82 At its root the illustration functions to say that there is a
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In his text Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy, Bruce Matthews suggests a similar problem with Schelling's
thought but in hermeneutic, and not physical, terms: Matthews suggests that Schelling's proclaimed strategy for discovering
the singular thought of a given philosopher is a strategy that is difficult, if not impossible, to apply to Schelling himself.
82
As the Visitor says: “Remaining permanently in the same state and condition, and being permanently the same,
belongs only to the most divine things of all, and by its nature body is not of this order. Now the thing to which we have
given the name of 'heaven' and 'cosmos' certainly has a portion of many blessed things from its progenitor, but on the other
hand it also has its share of body. In consequence it is impossible for it to be altogether exempt from change, although as
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material at stake in motion that interferes at the level of the concrete in terms of “the due measure.”83
That is, the determination of a particular pragmatic skill (a knowledge coupled with a localmotion) is required to make order out of the spinning chaos of the world. In addition, the art of
measure (or determination) is especially important for hunting or tracking (as the visitor describes it)
those movements which are not readily visible thereby suggesting the importance of the being of nonbeing, or the existence of the inexistent, or the motion of the world-soul demonstrated in its products.
Schelling's utilization of the World-Soul is due to the abstraction (or de-potentiation) of thought itself
as an activity. But this activity, is consequent upon its discovery in thought which in turn is consequent
on animal motion.
The immediate problem for a philosophy of nature that Schelling recognizes is that the
unconditioned cannot lie in a particular product of nature, but that analysis can only work with
products. Transcendental philosophy, under Schelling's transformations, takes up the unconditioned of
nature as the process of speculative construction, thereby ungrounding the form of the transcendental
put forth by Kant. But, following Aristotle, this speculation has an ontologically naturalistic ground.
Yet, and as will be articulated in the chapters that follow, idealism is not about forces above the world,
but by being inexistent guarantee that the naturalistic world can function immanently without being
bound to a closed form of immanence.
B - Aristotle
That is, just as the human reason represents the world only according to a certain form, whose visible expression is the
human organization, so every organism is the expression of a certain schematism of the intuition of the world. Just as we
surely see that our intuition of the world is determined through our original limitation, without our being able to explain
why we are precisely limited in this way, and why our intuition of the world is precisely this and no other, so too the life
and the intelligence of animals can be just a peculiar (although inconceivable) kind of original limitation, and only their
mode of limitation would distinguish them from us. 84
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Schelling's 21st lecture from the Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy begins with a
critique of Kant's utilization of Copernican imagery and ends with the corpses of frozen mammoths.
Why? Schelling notes that Kepler, following Copernicus, wanted to end 'the ineffable celerity of the
world,' to bring things to a calm. Taking this as the model for knowledge as Kant famously did,
Schelling argues has the result of erasing the activity of nature (and the tension between motion
and rest) by placing it within reason.85 Schelling finds in the paleontological work of Georges Cuvier,
the opposite gesture, of saying that extinction is to be found in materiality alone yet, such
catastrophism erases the movement of forces. He writes: “From matter alone the Invisible that is
relentless and as it were knows no other principle that nothing possible remains, that in the place of the
disappeared, the now living ever more similar kinds constantly change.”86
Neither an internal idealization of absolute motion, nor a complete externalization of motion as
material contingency can do justice to nature, a nature which, according to Schelling, functions by the
law of the world: that all possibilities are self-fulfilling and everything deploys in equal measure. Yet
given this, how do we move in a well-spring of motion that is doubled (as both seemingly external and
seemingly internal). That is, how do we come to reason as a compass, a ground of dimension, caught in
(at least two) series of motions? Iain Grant addresses this in his text “How Nature Comes to be
Thought”:
The 'ground of dimensionality' can only be thought consequently upon dimensionality, or, in other words, dimensionality is
emergent, if it is at all, from what is not dimensional. This does not mean that there are no dimensions prior to their
thought, but that there are none prior to the operation of dimensions such that only such a thought is capable of thinking the
emergence of dimensionality from non-dimensionality as such […] since thought is that dimension of motion that causes
the problem of the ground of dimensionality to be a problem, it is clear that thought is amongst the dimensions of the
motions of bodies, or better, is precisely the totality of motions of which bodies are capable.87
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Grant's point not only re-emphasizes the importance of motion in Kantian and Post-Kantian
thought, but also points to a place for physics in terms of grounding reason beyond establishing the
physical conditions for the limitation of the senses, physics as speculation in this sense, becomes more
closely aligned with the way in which naturalism is utilized to probe the conditions for producing
reasons. It also introduces the importance of locality in addressing the relation of thought to nature. In
focusing on animal-centric movement (locomotion) we can begin to construct the relation between the
abstract and local account of motion in the previous section with and a speculative theory of the
numerous kinds of thought rising from basic animal navigations.
In his 19th lecture from the Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy Schelling investigates
these basic navigations via Aristotle. Schelling points out that Aristotle goes against his own
philosophy in indexing a universality (namely perfection) rather than attempting to derive animal
dimension from the progression of line, surface, and body.88 The progression of organic forms is a
development of trajectories both in an embodied sense, and in the way in which this very embodiment
allows for, and engenders, the ramifications of dimensionality. While external definition of
dimensionality (length, width, breadth etc.) is anchorless, Schelling points out that the ground of
dimensionality is one internal to species. The difficulty, which Aristotle attempts to avoid through
uncharacteristic appeal to perfection (or for our purposes here totality), is how to decide which bonded
pair or dialectic (back-forward, right-left) is first? This indecision valorizes the inexistent, or relativenon-being, of ground (again the reason why the presumed first motion is consequent but operates as
absolute) which is both origin and the past.89
Bemoaning both Aristotle's and Plato's obscures notions of matter Schelling writes: “The first
natural motion of what sinks into proto-materiality is to re-emerge as principles, by which means
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dimensions in fact arise.”90 From this motion, which we understand as length, posits a negative ground
to move away from and hence motion is the test of its potential escape from its abstracted origin. The
voluntary production of movement however requires a mapping of direction. It is the capacity to map
and to place, via dimensionality and direction, that Schelling argues is the fundamental meaning of
soul in Aristotle's work.91 Rationality is consequent upon an augmented series of motions built upon a
further series of motions – sentience (the ability to track motion and map dimensions) feeds into
sapience which pushes sentience behind it as a ground but always exploring the consequences of
sentience for sapience (the visual line of navigation becomes the mathematical line of construction).
In order to construct such entities, I will now move on to the relation of thought and sense as it is
constructed in late Kant, Maimon, and how Schelling's work follows indirectly from these figures.
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2.0 - Castles of Ether and Asymptotic Bridges: Kant, Maimon, Schelling, and the Relation of
Inner and Outer Sense
If, as we saw in the last chapter, Kant's Critique of Judgment (1790) showed the possible
escape routes from the critical system, routes which the German Idealists later explored, the Opus
Postumum (1804) is a work that appears to simultaneously break with, and yet shore up, the
speculative reach of the critical project. While one could engage The Metaphysical Foundations of the
Natural Sciences (1786) as the definitive text on Kant's sophisticated engagement with the physical
sciences, as fully determining the relation of inner and outer sense, I will address the far more
controversial Opus Postumum for several reasons.92 Centrally, the Opus Postumum is Kant at his
seemingly least critical, and most metaphysical, following the much vaunted Copernican turn. Kant's
Copernican turn, as is well known, placed the subject-as-observer at the center of the epistemological
cosmos. Or, for Kant, the forces and dynamics detected in outer sense should fit the forms of inner
sense in order for us to speak about the world at all. Whether this placement is a necessary assumption
for a modest epistemological stance, or, whether it amounts to a form of anthropocentrism in thinking,
remains a much debated issue. Confusion over the nature of Kant's revolution, I argue, stems largely
from collapsing a claim of position (from where do we know) and subject-object relation (what has the
final say on the judgment of the knower on the known, or the known on the knower). While Schelling
would be critical of Kant on the later point, he would fully appreciate the uprooting of humanity's fixed
place in the actual, and epistemological, cosmos.93
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While the tension of inner and outer sense may not be central to The Metaphysical Foundations, it appears in
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In the Opus, Kant touches upon Schelling's work (albeit slightly) and, more extensively,
engages with numerous Schellingian themes close to the project here: the importance of motion, the
continuity of nature, and the division between metaphysics and empirical physics.94 More specifically,
and to link the discussion to chapter 1, while, in The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant moved away from
absolutizing space to relying on an internal, and ideal, space of observation, he appears to swing back
towards something more like absolute space in the Opus.
The first two themes are addressed in the Opus through the notions of the ether and matter, both
of which are connected, and brought to bear on, the metaphysical/physical divide through a lengthy
discussion of space.95 Before discussing the Opus, however, I wish to examine a precise treatment of
space in Kant's critical thought. Kant's remarkable “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in
Thinking?” (1786) which additionally addresses the pragmatic navigational terms we will tackle
towards the end of this project. I use the term navigation as short-hand for the synthesis of motion and
space, between the numerous capacities of inner navigation (experience, intuition, reason, speculation),
and that of outer structure (space, horizon, direction, magnitude, etc). Or, the way in which navigation
is described in Kant, can be taken as a measure of the tensions between the inner and outer rooting of
space and motion, and, how the bridge from inner to outer is constructed, and, considered either
analytic (as self-evidently external), or synthetic (as provisionally internal).
Following this discussion, I will then address how Salomon Maimon's critique of the a priori
synthetic activity, supported by his discussions of mathematics, suggests that speculation breaks the
critical system but in a way that allows for a synthesis of the natural and mental in a fashion that
inspires Schelling's dynamic treatment of nature which I explore in the last two sections of this chapter.
94
As far as I can tell, while Schelling was aware the Opus existed following Kant's death, I can find no sign that he
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Maimon's work, as we will see, pushes the tentative dynamism of Kant's thoughts on nature
(from The Critique of Judgment), on which Schelling indirectly expands.96 This dynamic push centers
on the problematic relation of the qualitative to the quantitative primarily in terms of magnitude.97
Maimon's law of determinability, in what appears in a proto-Schellingian fashion, attempts to combine
a genetic, or asymmetrical creation of objectivity on the one hand, with a polarity between intuition
and conceptualization on the other hand. The notion of the genetic, which accompanies that of
determination, is imperative for maintaining difference in any case where dualisms (mind and nature,
inner and outer) are questioned. Maimon's attempt at being speculative, yet empirical, presents a
particularly helpful way of leaving the gravity-well of Kant's system, while still recognizing the
veracity of the transcendental beyond the merely schematic.
I wish to argue ultimately that a physicalization of Kant's perspectival mode, conjoined with
Maimon's discussion of magnitudes, creates a historically indirect, but conceptually fertile, ground for
Schelling's re-construction of nature via powers. That construction will be the focus of Chapters 3 and
4.
2.1 - Kant's “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”
Kant's essay “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” (1786) which shares its
general theme with the far better known “What is Enlightenment?” essay written two years prior (in
focusing on the Enlightenment as thinking for oneself) is Kant's answer to the pressure to speak to the
Pantheism Controversy raging in Germany at the time. In both texts Kant argues how reason must
subject itself to its own law unless it wishes to be subject to the yoke of external law. But, unlike
“What is Enlightenment?”, Kant's orientation essay works with the terms of geography and horizons,
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and seems more wiling to admit the possible pitfalls of reason, specifically, of reason as being
potentially dangerous in its somewhat arbitrary selection of a horizon, and, the subsequent navigation
towards it. Kant writes:
In the proper meaning of the word, to orient oneself [Bedeutung] means to use a given direction (when we divide the
horizon into four of them) in order to find the others - literally, to fix the sunrise. Now if I see the sun in the sky and know it
is now midday, then I know how to find south, west, north, and east. For this, however, I also need the feeling of a
difference in my own subject, namely, the difference between my right and left hands. I call this a feeling because these two
sides outwardly display no designatable difference in intuition. If I did not have this faculty of distinguishing, of the
southernmost point of the horizon, or whether I should complete the circle by moving north and east and thus back to south.
Thus even with all the objective data of the sky, I orient myself geographically only through a subjective ground of
differentiation; and if all the constellations, though keeping the same shape and position relative to one another, were one
day by a miracle to be reversed in their direction, so that what was east now became west, no human eye would notice the
slightest alteration on the next bright Starlit night, and even the astronomer - if he pays attention only to what he sees and
not at the same time to what he feels - would inevitably become disoriented.98

At first glance, the question of position and horizon suggests that the spatiality of Kant's
orientation is (unsurprisingly) neither purely empirical nor purely dogmatic. The insistence on “a
subjective ground of differentiation” reasserts the apparent (though tautological) formalism of the
critical system. As Schelling argues in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, the transcendental ideal
that motivates Kant's critical philosophy is only ever a negative philosophy in that it can only critique
from essentially nowhere, or, only from the non-location of its own conditions as the functioning of
reason outside experience. At the same time, “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”
demonstrates the shift in emphasis, suggested by Peg Rawes, regarding the relation of inner and outer
to the conceptualization of space. She writes:
Thus, in the development from the first to the third Critique, the relationship between experience and space undergoes a
dramatic shift in which external or transcendental understandings of spatial relations become internalised into the powers
of the sensing and reflective subject. Space and time are transformed from limited transcendental forms into indeterminate
cognitions or judgments that are constituted by the thinking subject: cognizing geometry and space become embodied
aesthetic judgments so that disembodied reason is transformed into a perceiving and embodied sense-reason.99

This transition is evident, in the above passage from Kant, as it becomes somewhat doubtful if
the notion of the transcendental, from The Critique of Pure Reason, can account for the articulation of
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“feeling” in the embodied sense it immediately invokes. An internal sense of space, referring to
external objects (the sun, Kant's hands), allows for one to retroactively accept “a given direction” as
analytically valid (the sun is there, so that is west). The act of extrapolating from chilarity (or
handedness), to an objective division of the horizon, would appear to be an act more synthetic than
Kant might feel comfortable with given the subsequent self-judging responsibility of reason. Rawes
argues that whereas in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” (discussed in the last chapter) Kant keeps
sense and reason closely related, by the time of The Critique of Judgment, and as already suggested in
“What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”, they have become more and more alienated
while, somewhat paradoxically, the synthetic power of orientation has become more internalized.
A whole nexus of issues can be investigated here, all of which, are too large for the project at
hand. What is important, however, is to note that Kant's uprooting of the subject, which risks falling
into a crude idealism, in fact, is coupled with a emphasis on navigation and locality. Inner sense, in this
regard, becomes obscure to the extent that Kant chooses to localize it, but arguably without
emphasizing any notion of embodiment. It is for this reason, and to return to the present stakes of this
chapter, that so much ink has been spilled regarding the status of space, and the relation of sense to
space, in The Critique of Pure Reason. While in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground,” Kant seems to
rely on some notion of embodiment, Kant, in the first Critique, abstracts, or idealizes, internality but
my carefully dividing kinds of thinking, and by relying on the separation of faculties, and careful
categorization.100
Beyond this reading, can the Kantian view of sense as orientation, suggest an attention to
perspective, one that de-emphasizes the groundedness of the empirical subject, and put in its place a
more aimless or abstract navigator? The tension, and one which I will explore both through Kant's
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wrestling with nature in The Critique of Judgment and the Opus, is brought into the open most directly
by Salomon Maimon. Maimon 'out-Kants' Kant in asserting that what Kant sees as analytic judgments
are in fact already synthetic. Maimon's emphasis on mathematics is particularly crucial here since,
whereas Kant downplayed the power of mathematics, the internalization of the power of navigation in
a more and more abstract subject, requires an extension of the descriptive power of geometry as Rawes
suggests.101 But, before engaging Maimon's critique, as well as Kant's turn towards physics of the
sensible (and arguably to Spinoza in the Opus Postumum), what can we make of Kant's use of
orientation? It would be easy to dismiss the potentially non-critical aspects of the piece as simply
adventures in metaphor, but the very opening line of Kant's essay seriously limits, if not completely
obliterates, such a possibility. Kant opens the essay with the following: “However exalted the
application of our concepts, and however far up from sensibility we may abstract them, still they will
always be appended to image representations, whose proper function is to make these concepts, which
are not otherwise derived from experience, serviceable for experiential use.”102
Kant goes on to argue in “What is Orientation” that image representations in thinking are
unavoidable, since how else would we give flesh to the bones of inner sense as logical argument? This
point is, of course, important for Kant as the universality of logics and heuristics comes about from
articulating the universal appeal of concepts with their contingently attached intuitionistic (or imagistic
content). It is not difficult to ascertain why Kant appeals to a practical image, such as orientation, in
order to avoid falling into what seems to be a vicious circle, on the one hand, and, to valorize his
project of immanent critique on the other. Images, as a conceptual gatekeeper, guarantee swift passage
from apparently external objects (horizons) to our already established intuitions about them ('this is my
left hand') and allow us to move back out to extrapolate further about the visible horizon. But the status
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of synthesis between these moments is the central question here. What both Maimon's critique, and
Kant's fleshing out of space-as-sense in the Opus demonstrates, is that the act of synthesis cannot be as
internalizable as Kant suggests in the first Critique, but Kant must reject this conclusion out of hand
given reason's (normative) responsibility to itself.
Kant argues that neither the vaunted power of speculation, nor religious faith, can be charged
with assigning the location of human cognition; only reason, as a formalized aspect of cognition's
capacity to judge itself can accomplish this.103 Following the afore-quoted passage above, Kant argues
that, in the last instance, what allows for orientation is a subjective ground, or understanding's feeling
for where it is.104 Kant writes: “it will be a concern of pure reason to guide its use when it wants to
leave familiar objects (of experience) behind, extending itself beyond all the bounds of experience and
finding no object of intuition at all, but merely space for intuition; for then it is no longer in a position
to bring its judgments under a determinate maxim according to objective grounds of cognition.”105
Yet what does Kant mean by objective ground here? If objective ground is a solidification of
cognition by understanding in relation to intuition, as a feeling supplied by external need, then how
does such a ground hold steady? While fixing the sunrise, for instance, points to the arbitrariness yet
necessity of, moving into the visual field in order to orient oneself, Kant ends his essay by reinscribing the necessity of following reason's internal rules in order to avoid getting swept up in
otherwise unbridled and reckless intellectual enthusiasm. Here I do not mean to critique the oscillation
between external force of intuition, and that of reason's functional rigidification, but to point out that
even here, in the last instance, Kant calls in the normative calvary to cut down even the possibility of
infinite regress resulting from an orientation affected by nature.106 Though Kant's warning against

103 Kant, “What does is mean to orient oneself in thinking?”, 8 (8:135).
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enthusiasm is apt in avoiding getting 'the authorities mixed up in the game,' i.e., in that normative
claims are important to avoid inviting meta-norms, such as state laws, from impinging on intellectual
freedom, this precaution does not seem to justify the means by which he limits the ramifications of
naturalistic analysis.107 The contemporary philosopher Reza Negarestani has a different concept of
Kant's Copernican navigator as being an advancement towards an imaginary and futural point of
scientific observation.108 As Negarestani puts it:
Rather than heralding the abolishment of the subject, the perspective operator cuts the subject loose from its immediate
foundation by mapping it from one domain to another. Once the subject’s reference point to any privileged instance or
position (first or last, particular or generic) is removed, it is finally possible to draw a non-trivial passage from the local
subject to the global structure, in effect realizing a continuity that defines an absolutized nature as a universal continuum.109

While ostensibly operating within Peircean language, Negarestani goes on to engage Gabriel
Catren's argument (and by extension and relation German Idealism) in stating that this passage of self
to nature incurs a thesis that reflections, judgments, and other forms of thinking can be taken to be
cases of nature relating to itself. As he goes on to state: “If the subject is now immersed in a
continuous global structure, the separation of the subject from nature is a required epistemological
distinction, not an inherent ontological severance. And if such separation is not ontological, then
instantiations of the absolutized nature cannot be measured, or scaled against, the subject.110
In Negarestani's functionalist reading, the structural or formal interiority of Kant-as-judge is
nature unfolding itself in the particularity of a generic subject. Yet what remains in question is the
status of the valences of the formal, and why particular forms or fields of the subject can be articulated
as nature relating to itself and not others But do Kant's normative worries not sabotage this radicality?

(Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).
107 In separate texts both Hegel and Schelling take issue with Fichte's musings on passports in On the Foundation of
Natural Right. For Hegel and Schelling Fichte falls exactly into the error that Kant warns about – of overly solidifying
the norms of thought into state sanctioned rules. On this latter point see Gregorie Chamayou, “Fichte's Passort: A
Philosophy of the Police,” trans. Kieron Aarons, Theory and Event, v. 16. 2 (2013): 16.
108 Reza Negarestani, “Synechistic Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” in Realism Materialism Art, Ed. C.Cox, J. Jaskey, and
S. Malik, (Bard: Sternberg Press, 2015), 333.
109 Ibid. 333.
110 Ibid.
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That is, if the normative or navigational mode of reason is continually set up as not ontological, as
merely a local or convenient determination, but one which closes down questions about ontology
beyond human activity. This negative condition of normativity becomes, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, a blank-check that absorbs all future consequences of normative actions back into the
normative space, back into the domain of inner sense's control.111 While the degree to which Kant is.
willing to un-moor the subject remains in question, what is more at stake, for our purposes here, is the
ideality of space-as-space in Kant's thought. While the Opus Postumum (1804) to which we now move
ends with an albeit incomplete doctrine of the self, most of its pages comprise a transformation of
Kant's views on space (and time) and, in particular, how they relate to sense and the role of the subject.
2.2 - The Ether Proofs: Crystallizing Space or Concretizing Ideality?
The question now becomes whether Kant's late work supports or undoes the suggestions made
in the last section with reference to the radicality of epistemological orientation regarding the interior
and exterior construction of horizons. Specifically, does the Opus physicalize space as an external
medium for sense, through which synthesis can occur, or, does the text only highlight the physical side
of the already present imagistic and intuitional aspects of Kant's treatment of space in the critical
system and in the “Orientation Essay” discussed above?
In some respects, Kant's Opus Postumum appears as a kind of panic in which his critical
system, critiqued at large for being 'too distant' from reality, becomes concerned with philosophically
reconnecting with the physical world by addressing Spinoza's legacy in particular. However, this view
is complicated by several factors. For one, it does not take into account Kant's pre-critical views in

111 It is telling that not long after the text cited was written and presented as a talk, Negarestani began to turn more towards
a Brandomian position. I will address the consequences of this turn in the final two chapters of this project. See for
instance Reza Negarestani's “The Labor of the Inhuman” #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, ed. Robin McKay
(Falmouth: Urbanomic Media, 2014), 425-466.
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which nature also seems to operate non-mechanically, if not outright dynamically.112 While these
issues are arguably clearer in regards to the notions of biological life, as Kant's separation of life and
freedom from nature, following their definite separation at the opening of The Critique of Judgment, to
the end pages of the Opus Postumum, how exactly dynamics fits into nature, as translated into sensible
magnitudes, remains somewhat unclear. The central issue for the moment, however, is whether the role
of representation in the Opus, whether drawing on Spinoza and/or the physical sciences, especially in
the so-called ether proofs, amounts to a fundamental reworking of the critical system or not. That is,
does Kant move to embody, or otherwise materialize sense, or does he even further abstract the subject
vis a vis the sensible outside of nature?
Setting aside the extensive problems with treating the Opus Postumum as a coherent text, Kant,
in the last work of his life, sets out to finish the critical work, to correct the failings of the Metaphysical
Foundations of the Natural Sciences, and to make the transition from a philosophy of nature, to
physics proper. As Förster argues, Kant begins by critiquing the Foundations' inability to address the
non-empirical a priori dimensions of physics in order to systematize physics' empirical endeavors.113
Immediately Kant's endeavor in constructing a physical bridge between the metaphysical and physical
worlds is problematic, in the Schellingian view constructed thus far, as the separation (in Kant's terms)
transforms physics into merely empirical observation obfuscating the very nature of the construction of
the hypothesis based on the import of physical data. In other words, the speculative content of the
hypothesis is kept at a distance in Kant's Opus. That is, as I will attempt to investigate further, and as
was just mentioned above, Kant appears more comfortable with the notion of construction in the Opus,
but only to degree the powers of such construction are inversely proportional to the embodiment of the
112 In particular see Immanuel Kant's “On Creation in the Total Extent of its Infinity in Both Space and Time,” trans.
Martin Schonfeld, in Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development, v.V, ed. Damian Veal (Falmouth:
Urbanomic Press, 2012). In this pre-critical text, Kant entertains the possibility of cosmological models which resemble
contemporary ones such as the 'big-crunch.' This kind of speculation is not permitted following The Critique of Pure
Reason.
113 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, trans. Eckhart Forester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), xxxxiv
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subject.
However, while this follows the letter of Kant's work, its spirit is troubled in at least two
aspects. Firstly, Kant's bridge-building between the metaphysical science of nature and physics, as a
systematized collection of empirical facts,114 relies upon a theory of the ether (or caloric matter) which
Kant argues penetrates all of space, and is the basis for the very possibility of representation.115 While
Kant entertains a similar line of argumentation in the opening pages of The Critique of Judgment, there
he focuses on reflection and the unity of experience for the subject whereas, throughout the Opus, Kant
goes to even greater lengths to discuss intuition, and its importance in probing the admixture of matter
and experience. In the Opus, Kant seems to physically harden the field of sense via the ether, while
still leaving the subject attached to it (via intuition).
The physical status of this caloric matter is questionable as it is not only material, and allpenetrative, but is also described, in more idealistic terms, as a hypostatization of space itself. 116 Thus,
in the Opus, it is hard to distinguish the critical, i.e., representational need for the ether from its
physical necessity. While Schelling, as we will see below, weighs heavily on the side of physical
necessity, he is able to do this by leaning on a dynamical physicality over, and against, Kant's reliance
on mechanics and kinematics, thereby keeping the dynamic philosophy separate from physics (such as
under the name of phoronomy, or the a priori study of movement).117 This difference could be
ultimately reduced to Kant and Schelling's respective use of form. Schelling is far more skeptical as to
the degree which humans contribute to the forms they find in nature, and yet, these forms make their
way into our very thinking. Kant, on the other hand, has a far more participatory model, since forms

114 Kant, Opus Postumum, 13 (21:387 – 21:388).
115 Kant, Opus, xl.
116 Kant, Opus, 71 (21:222).
117 In this sense, the sublime, as a kind of formless object, (operating in the matter-experience role of the Opus) shifts
between the mathematical and the dynamic whereas these domains are brought arguably closer together in the Opus.
See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2000), 128-134 (5:244-2:251).
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are indispensable for us to understand but their subsistence, beyond cognition, moves too close to
dogmatic idealism.
It is not surprising that many commentators have zeroed-in on Kant's apparent physicalization
of sense and argued that Kant is either falling back into dogmatism (particularly of the Spinozistic
variety) or that he is simply expanding the perspectival aspect of the critical enterprise to physics. That
is in the former case Kant is usurping schema with sense or, in the latter, 'perspectivizing' matter itself.
Paul Guyer in “The Unity of Nature and Freedom” argues that Kant's Opus is a return to Spinoza in
that for Kant: “Spinozism is right in its general form of seeing both nature or the order of causes and
thought or the order of reasons as modes of an underlying substance, but wrong in identifying God as
that substratum.”118
Jeffrey Edwards, in the same volume as Guyer's essay, disagrees and argues that the substance
of the ether (as a continuum of material forces) is only the object of intuition and nothing more.119
However, Edwards admits that Kant's text presents a serious roadblock to the separation of causality
and freedom.120 This separation, from which Kant sets off in The Critique of the Power of Judgment, is
particularly foggy given the somewhat ambiguous use of both dynamics and of the relation between
forces of movement and their translation into the motion of bodies. That is, while Schelling fully
entangles freedom and dynamics, in that freedom is a human mode of nature's dynamics, Kant
maintains the capacity for movement, separate from, any expression of that movement's deeper
underlying dynamism. These problems point to Kant's stake in the noumenal, a stake which Schelling,
alone amongst the German Idealists, held to and complicated.121 While we will engage Schelling in
this regard, for the moment it is important to fully explore the ramifications of Kant's final work.
118 Paul Guyer, “The Unity of Nature and Freedom,” in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy:Fichte, Schelling,
Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 45.
119 Jeffrey Edwards, “Spinozism, Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant's Final System of Transcendental
Idealism,” in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy, 59.
120 Edwards, “Spinozism,” 70.
121 Sturma, “The Nature of Subjectivity,” in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy, 220.
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While sense is a central term here, I will not address it directly in relation to the ether proofs
but, in keeping with the theme of this project, I will focus on the terms of motion and space.
Furthermore, I will address how sense functions as the ground of epistemology specifically in Chapter
5. For now I will attempt to place the Opus (and specifically the ether proofs) in relation to the physical
sciences on the one hand, and, the capacities of reason on the other. In so doing it is helpful to examine
Eckhart Förster's Kant's Final Synthesis and Beth Lord's Kant and Spinozism.
Förster argues in the closing of Kant's Final Synthesis that the Opus justifies a reordering of the
relation of understanding and reason; he claims that whereas the latter appears, at least in the first
Critique, as a ramified version of the understanding, reason, in the Opus, becomes more creative or
constructive, a creativity which is constructively constrained in the forms of understanding. In such an
articulation, reason becomes more like an ungrounded force and less a development of well organized
pre-existing cognitive systems. Yet Kant's reliance on sense to articulate this power troubles reason's
creative relation (or lack thereof) to schematicism, or formalism, as such. This is most apparent in
regards to mathematics, and in particular, the work of Salomon Maimon whom I will address below.
Largely in agreement with Förster, Lord sees the Opus as a continuation of the critical project
and not its undoing. But rather than putting it in terms of shifting the relations of understanding and
reason, Lord argues that the Opus was “an attempt to incorporate a principle of immanent genesis into
transcendental idealism.”122 Placing the text in a lineage including Maimon, and stretching all the way
to Gilles Deleuze, Lord argues that the Opus was an ambitious, albeit unsuccessful and incomplete,
attempt at incorporating difference into Kant's brand of idealism. Lord does an impressive job of
demonstrating why she believes this is the case given Kant's diagonal relation to Spinoza.
Complicating the accounts outlined above by Guyer and Edwards, Lord argues that Kant's

122 Beth Lord, Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011), 3.
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knowledge of Spinoza should be viewed as second-hand via the work of Jacobi.123 Kant, in attempting
to distance himself from Jacobi's attempt to combine the critical philosophy with Spinozistic
dogmatism, does not engage Spinoza directly, but only Jacobi's presentation of him. The Opus is
particularly interesting in this regard as Kant appears to be softening his view of Spinoza to some
extent.
Lord argues that in the Opus Kant needs to explain how particular bodies could arise from the
tension of forces and hence why the ether appears as both a material and a condition,124 or, “a single
continuum filling cosmic space through the oscillation of force.”125 Lord also argues that the ether
starts as more as a condition (of sense) but becomes more and more substantialized over time.126 For
our purposes here what is most striking about Lord's account of the ether proofs is that it demonstrates
Kant's admission, however slight, that a material unity, or continuum, must be asserted in order to have
even the most base account of thought. Whereas the central key of the critical project is often the much
lauded transcendental ideal, in other words, the distributive unity of experience that is achieved by our
understanding, or the fact that it is our thought which holds the world together ---in the Opus the object
of the collective unity of experience is given prior to the distributive unity of experience.127
The ether, as a simultaneously material and transcendental condition, seems to trouble not only
the normative dismissal of first nature, for the sake of second nature, but also troubles the very attempt
of positing of the ether as a universal condition from such a local place (that of the human subject) that
falls into the logic of orientation already outlined. The ether becomes the ocean of that navigational
project as well as the very capacity for a “dynamical horizon” to be detected as such. 128 Again, and to
follow Rawes' suggestion about the internalizing of space-making capacities, why would the ether need
123 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 16.
124 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 155.
125 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 158.
126 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 159.
127 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 162.
128 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 166.
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to function, even abstractly, as a medium for images, if the projective capacity of space were located in
the powers of the subject, if inner sense were the final judge?
Lord ends her text with a somewhat critical account of Kant: “Kant's transcendental and genetic
condition for the real is positioned alongside a transcendent subject that must still overlay it with those
'external' concepts not to be found in the ether itself.”129 In this regard, Kant fails to recognize the limit
of the subject, a failure which Lord opposes to the identity thinkers of German Idealism as well as
Deleuze who 'truly' appreciated difference. Yet, Lord's account of German Idealism is too unitary and
assumes that collectively the Idealists have no concern for difference and, in particular, the difference
between thought and being. This is not at all the case for German Idealism writ large and, especially,
not in the case of Schelling. That Kant's use of the ether could be read as keeping nature separate from
thought more so than Schelling's concept of nature, and its asymmetrical production of thought,
appears nonsensical.
In his Philosophies of Nature after Schelling Grant addresses Kant's ether proofs arguing that
Kant makes the ether, as an insubstantial body, into a broad notion of materiality130 that, in other
words, is the transition from metaphysics to physics that Kant sought in his twilight years.131 Rather
than Lord's emphasis on the ether as having to do with assigning a substratum of material cause, Grant
argues, following Schelling's critique of teleological judgment (to be addressed below), that Kant's
ether is endemic of the ontologization of access itself.132 Grant's account is convincing given, on the
one hand, Kant's indirect return to metaphysical concerns in the Opus and, on the other hand, his
continuous empowering and abstracting of the notion of subject. Arguably, Kant can avoid appearing
129 Lord, Kant and Spinozism, 174.
130 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006), 75.
131 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 76.
132 Grant emphasizes that Kant's last work marks a return to his earlier Leibnizan roots found in The Metaphysical
Foundations of the Natural Sciences rather than, as indicated often by the critiques above, a return to Spinoza or, at
least a version of Spinozism. But what seems more likely, given Forester's evidence, is that Kant recognized the
critiques of Maimon and of the then nascent movements of German Idealism as valid not in terms of their different
grounds but in that where they wanted to take reason's limitations pointed to territories Kant had ineffectively explored.
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to fall back into dogmatic metaphysics, as well as maintain his emphasis on the subject as a free and
self-regulating agent by increasing the uprootedness of the subject increases in the final pages of the
Opus, while strengthening the tether of sensibility between the subject and the manifold above which it
floats.
Yet this simultaneous abstraction and empowerment becomes awkward when those powers
include acts of construction such as mathematics since, in Kant's time, and soon thereafter, the grounds
of mathematics suggests, and necessitates, greater and greater acts of free creation.
In the Opus, and already suggested in “What is Called Orientation,” reason's self-policing has
to determine sense's externality in order to know the borders that reason is meant to police. Rather than
naturalizing sense for thought, as Kant does, there are at least two recognized alternatives: one is
Schelling's naturalization of thought as nature which is only subsequently, and methodologically,
accessible to us, while the other is Maimon's syntheticization of Kant's analytic realm. As we will
begin to develop at length in the following chapter, it is Schelling's insistence on naturalizing thought,
and arguing that the difference between thought and nature is one of degree, a degree that requires
methodological recognition, that maintains the greatest capacity for difference (or genetic construction
as such) as such, for philosophy. Arguing that an ontological distinction between the ground of the
subject and the ground of the real preserves difference only preserves the capacity to decide difference
at the cost of nature.
I will now move onto the work of Maimon to address how the synthetic power of determination
complicates the Kantian appeal to the given in the form of the ether as physicalized sense, as that
which makes space, as such, for us. This critique lies, generally, in Maimon demonstrating that Kant
cannot adequately articulate the synthetic a priori, things or facts that are universally and necessarily
true, things or facts that require the connection of concepts to pure a priori intuitions (such as Kant's
notion of space). Thus, for Maimon, judgment is far more modest in terms of its authority; it can only
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make determinations in a cautious and piecemeal sense and, cannot rely on, reason's self-certainty in
the same way. It is for this reason, most importantly, that Maimon's emphasis on mathematics is
critically different than Kant's.
2.3 - Magnitudes and Determination: Maimon's Polarized Ideality
Although mathematics is not a canon for the science of nature, it is, nevertheless, a potent instrument (organon), when
dealing with motion and its laws 133
[W]e should take into account the fact that mathematical concepts are not copies of anything, so that we would have to
compare them with their originals to determine their completeness; rather they are themselves the originals produced by the
understanding out of itself a priori. From this it follows that the completeness of mathematical concepts can be judged only
relatively, with respect to the consequences to be drawn from them 134

Before jumping into Maimon's particular critique of Kant's synthesis vis a vis mathematics, it is
necessary to introduce him generally as, unfortunately, he still remains a somewhat obscure figure.
Maimon's Essay on Transcendental Idealism (1790) was recognized by many Kantians, and Kant
himself, as one of the sharper critiques of the Kantian enterprise. Maimon suffered from relative
obscurity partially because of his economic hardships and also because of his style of writing and use
of language (purportedly due to his Lithuanian and Jewish background). Maimon's self-taught
philosophical knowledge, and reputedly bohemian existence, caused problems for him until Kant
openly praised him after receiving his work from Markus Herz. The central and fundamental aspect of
Maimon's critique, one that will reappear albeit in different form in Chapters 5 and 6, is that, for
Maimon, the forms discoverable by cognition did not consist in objects to be articulated through
sharper forms of inner sense, but were only ever the results of construction, or synthesis of forms,
carried out by the investigator. This asymptotic form of investigation, which is central to geometry,
involves endlessly approaching one's investigative goal without ever reaching it per se.135
133 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 63 (21:208 – 21:209).
134 Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Idealism, trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman,
and Merten Reglitz (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 46.
135 Maimon focuses on this in Chapter 5 of his Essay. For a discussion of asymptotic analysis in the broader context of
German philosophy of the time see John H. Smith “Friedrich Schlegel's Romantic Calculus: Reflections on the
Mathematical Infinite around 1800” in The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic Philosophy, ed.
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Now onto Maimon's more specific critique.
Maimon's emphasis on relation and difference (via mathematics) makes a dynamic, yet nondogmatic, articulation of nature possible, an articulation that indirectly opens the way for Schelling,
specifically, by sharpening the concepts of determination, and derivation, which both follow from
Maimon's attention to magnitudes. It is with these tools, and by focusing on magnitudes, that Maimon
addresses the problematic status of nature in Kant's thought. This indirect approach to nature occurs
through Maimon's focus on the notion of the synthetic a priori. Maimon's challenging of this notion
arguably makes a combination of transcendentalism and naturalism possible in thinking after Kant.
Maimon manages this by the analytic and the synthetic stem from a single root but one whose origin
cannot be discovered. Thus, Maimon skeptical doubts things lying outside the mind as absolutely
separate from it, but, at the same time, argues that the manifold of experience is only possible if a
minimal difference exists between two things co-determining one another.136 Paul Franks' excellent
essay “From Quine to Hegel” addresses how this logic of determination leads to a form of
methodological naturalism.137 Franks argues that this methodological naturalism cuts Kant so deeply
because Maimon argues that Kant's rejection of naturalism, via Kant's critique of Hume, does not
adequately separate explanation from justification.138 That is, for Maimon, Kant cannot justify Kant's
anti-Humean stance from within thought, i.e., that cause and effect must be in order for cognition to
properly function, but that naturalism infers that the relation we perceive must be more than we
perceive but not necessarily corresponding to a form for the sake of our cognition. Fundamentally,
whereas Kant builds magnitudes from within human conceptualization, Maimon argues that
magnitudes are discovered asymptotically by taking apart human experience.

Dalia Nassar (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2014).
136 Maimon, Essay, 114-115.
137 Paul Franks, “From Quine to Hegel,” in German Idealisms: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Espen Hammer, 51-53.
138 Franks, “From Quine to Hegel,” 53.
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Here we can take a look back at “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” On one
level Kant appears as dualist in regards to thinking and sense (or as he puts it feeling) in order to find
one's orientation. While this explanation functions in the practical 'go of things,' the ground by which
this occurs would seem to beg naturalistic explanation (hence our argument regarding Kant's late
appeal to the ether and his attempt at bridge-building in the Opus). It is when explanation (always
potentially speculative) encroaches upon rational justification that Kant can (and is) accused of
violating, or otherwise leaving behind, the critical project.
It is for these reasons that Maimon adeptly latches onto mathematics as existing in the pivot, or
hinge, between inner sense and outer sense. As Meir Buzaglo has pointed out, it is important to notice
how Maimon is concerned most precisely with how pure intuitions (and not empirical or sensorial
intuitions) relate to a priori material139 and, furthermore, how Maimon's emphasis on the division
between pure cognition, and a priori cognition, is collapsed into the question “How is synthetic a
priori knowledge possible?'140 Maimon questions the operational utility of Kant's axiomatic definition
of the co-synthesis of sense and understanding.141 The form of the question does not imply that
Maimon is disputing the connection between inner sense and outer sense or, intuition and concept, but
that he does not believe that the interactive dualism is self-explanatory. In order to combat this
apparently inert reaction, Maimon challenges the ideality of space-time in Kant (arguing that they
cannot be mere intuitions). At the same time, and as we saw in the Opus and “What Does It Mean to
Orient Oneself in Thinking?” neither does Maimon believe that the thinker as navigator can simply
'carry' space-time relations with them. For Maimon, difference and relation must dynamically
constitute objects (difference and relation are pressures which co-create, or construct).
139 Meir Buzaglo, Salomon Maimon: Monism, Skepticism, and Mathematics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2002), 31.
140 Buzaglo, Salomon Maimon, 44-45.
141 As we shall investigate in the final chapters, McDowell, following Sellars, argues that intuitions and sense must
always-already be conceptual by the time we can operate upon them. This relies upon a mediating third thing which,
for Kant, is that of the aesthetic dimension of judgment which will address in the following section.
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Whereas Kant remains agnostic as to construction's abstract functioning (at least beyond that
which can be schematically or, we might say, visually demonstrated) Maimon suggests that a degree of
speculation is necessary in order to maintain the possibility of difference (and, following Schelling, we
could say nature as dynamic productivity). Maimon attempts this through his discussion of
magnitudes. For instance, in order to say that 1 is bigger than 2, or that 3 is less than 5, Maimon argues
that difference and relativity construct number. The very operations of 'more than' or 'less than' suggest
that numbers are co-constituting and that there is nothing in the numbers themselves that suggests that
2 is bigger than 1. So whereas co-constituting relations can be carried on in the mind of the thinker for
Kant, for Maimon, such relations construct the very objects of thought.142 These relations are
composed of differentials, as the ultimate real unities,143 and hence, are not real or noumenal objects as
in the case of Leibniz's monads. Furthermore, whereas Kant is content to remain within the bounds of
Aristotelian logic as explanation, Maimon argues that the differentials, that derivation as such, is more
primal than logic, as logic is only manipulation of objects after the fact, and not, their production or
construction.144 Because of this fact, the operation of synthesis carried out in Maimon is an
amplification and not an equation, or operation, at the same level as that of mathematical operations.145
Logical identity, taken in the view of the differentials or magnitudes, means that a statement of
identity, a chain of subject and predicate, is one of amplification and not logical equation.146
How is it then that Franks ends his aforementioned essay by arguing that mathematics, which
was the central focus of Maimon, proves a 'hard case' for methodological naturalism?147 As argued in
Chapter 1, if the pantheism controversy can be taken as a question of 'what is the boundary and

142 Though, at the same time, Maimon does not abandon the navigational model of epistemology totally as he argues there
must be some permanence or unity to the I to explain our consistent relation to the shore line, Essay, 86.
143 Maimon, Essay, 15.
144 Buzaglo, Salomon Maimon, 40.
145 Maimon, Essay, 14-15.
146 I will explore how this works out in Schelling in the following chapter.
147 Franks, “From Quine to Hegel,” 65.
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location of reason?' then mathematical diagnosis, in its various means, can be skillfully manipulated to
speak to basic ontological conditions, i.e., nature as movement, as the engine of derivation on which
thought obtains, but does not exhaust. While Maimon was himself uncertain as to the ultimate
ontological status of number, he convincingly showed that the demonstrative aspect of mathematical
practices demonstrates that intuition and conceptualization can be treated as polarizations flowing from
one cognition. Whether or not there are real objects outside of consciousness misses the method by
which Maimon determines objectivity: the objective (as a concept) is objective because it has been
intuited singularly, and collectively, as a widely shared and thus stable object of interrogation.
To take a geometrical example, whereas the concept of line can serve as the formal ground of the
circle, i.e., the circle can be taken as the consequent of the line through the act of bending it, this does
not explain the particularity of the circle whatsoever.148 This is because the understanding finds the use
of the line as ground for the circle only when the line is taken as having a direction of movement. 149
Here we can see that the notion of amplification (as touching on magnitudes) has both qualitative and
quantitative valences.150
Or, put another way, whereas Fichte's groundless ground for the subject is a qualitatively
postulated magic circle, for Schelling, following Maimon against Fichte, the quantitative, all too often
taken as an abstraction or reduction of the qualitative, is in fact more constructively viewed the other
way around. For Maimon quantities simply are, and qualities, such as redness, are abstractions, or
extensions of existing differentials.151 The language which Maimon utilizes to describe differentials
matches that of Schelling's usage of actants in the First Outline as limit concepts. In terms of
magnitude, Maimon is claiming that what appears as vague qualitative expanses, whether extensive,
148 Maimon, Essay, 60.
149 Maimon discusses this relation in terms of asymptotics which we will approach in the last two chapters of this
dissertation.
150 For more on this see David Wood's Mathesis of the Mind: A Study of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Geometry
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012).
151 Maimon, Essay, 16.
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(plurality thought as unity), or intensive (unity thought as plurality), are in fact abstractions of an
expression of differences which, while they can only be accessed synthetically, are not themselves
solely synthetic.152
How does Maimon claim that synthesis is a part of this process of differentiation, yet, neither only
thought, nor, completely alien to it? He does this by giving determination, as an ideal operation, a
naturalistic slant (contra Franks cited above). Determination, or determinability, is the notion of
asymmetry which Maimon introduces into the ideal reversibility of subject and predicate. Or, as Oded
Schecter outlines it, determinable and determinant.153 The subject, (or the determinable) according to
Schecter, is that which stands on its own.154 The asymmetry of the determinable speaks to
metaphysical necessity in Maimon, in that only in formal logic can the predicate float freely away from
the subject.155 To return to a geometrical example, the line determines the circle but only when the
action of the lines creation remains following its creation.
The ideal reversibility of Maimon, while still maintaining a granulation of the real, is the
resistance of what a rationalist would call the metaphysical but, due to his skepticism, Maimon
transfers this grain to the limits of the mind. These limits are not intrinsic however; they are not due to
either noumenal withdrawal, nor to inherent human finitude, but are due to the very fact that
knowledge, as a picturing or spacing, allows Maimon to transform the schematic making these limits
into an outside.156 It is in this regard that synthesis (or construction) is the generation of new syntheses.
The consequence of this transformation is that the status of the noumenal is skinned of its

152 Maimon, Essay, 68.
153 Oded Schechter, “The Logic of Speculative Philosophy and Skepticism in Maimon's Philosophy: Satz der
Bestimmbarkeit and the Role of Synthesis,” in Solomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical
Assessments, ed. Gideon Freudenthal (New York: Springer, 2003), 20.
154 Ibid. 22.
155 Ibid.
156 Buzaglo, 23, 107.
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objecthood.157 That is, synthesis produces more syntheses and is due to a deeper process which is not a
world of inaccessible things, but a process which makes any notion of thing or world possible (hence
Maimon's minimal naturalism).
Immediately, one can see how Maimon's synthesis, in league with the measurement of
magnitudes, speaks to a mode of thought that is concerned with trajectories rather than objects, with
the use of concepts, and with how far they can be taken. As Schecter puts it, Maimon's notion of
reduction is a pendular motion: synthesis creates new concepts which move from the general to the
particular, while analysis creates new judgments in the move from the particular to the general. 158 Yet
Elhanan Yakira claims that subject and predicate are not equatable to general and particular for
Maimon since he maintains a skepticism which effectively exteriorizes knowledge from things
themselves.159 Thus it becomes difficult at times to determine the degree to which the synthetic is
exterior or interior. In this regard we may see ourselves approaching Kant's navigator again, staring at
her hands and then outwards towards the horizon. But while Maimon is critiquing Kant for often not
admitting the degree to which aspects of mind must already be synthetic, it is more difficult to
ascertain how this maps onto problems of location, i.e., in what sense the degree of construction relate
to its proximity in regards to interiority and exteriority. Hence, for Maimon, unlike Kant, the analytic
cannot be self-constructing but must be 'picked up along the way,' in the very course of thinking of
it.160
Yet, the difficulty for us here, is how this imaginative transference of limitations to the outside
is differentiated from the speculations of the German Idealists from which Maimon apparently

157 Schecter, 24.
158 Ibid. 27.
159 Elhanan Yakira, “From Kant to Leibniz? Salomon Maimon and the Question of Predication,” in Solomon Maimon:
Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments, ed. Gideon Freudenthal (New York: Springer, 2003) 79.
160 Schecter, 37.
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distanced himself.161 This transference seems to rest upon the degree to which the outside for Maimon
is to be read as an internal limit to thought, or, if it is the limit of thought, as Peter Thielke seems to
suggest,162 or, as Franks puts it, whether Maimon sees himself as committed to formal distinctions
whereas Kant's distinctions, such as that between sense and understanding, are real. 163 For Thielke
these distinctions are taken as formal, thereby aligning Maimon with the likes of McDowell.164
Furthermore, and to connect back to chapter 1, this issue is complicated by the apparently
massive role Maimon played in inspiring Fichte. As Frederick Beiser argues, the power of the
imagination, as the privileged engine of the synthetic, is what Fichte adopts and transforms into the
formal distinction of I and not-I, a distinction which Beiser claims is not merely ideal.165 In order to
dispute Beiser's claim, and to clarify the naturalistic tendency of Maimon's thinking, I believe that one
must return to nature and, specifically, to the notion of dynamics in Kant, to show how the negative
account of nature, (as not-I) or as inert only to be discovered as law), in Kant and subsequently Fichte,
is problematic.
Furthermore, and as the following section will being to develop, but will be addressed head on
in the closing chapters, I believe that Schelling extends Maimon's notion of determination to nature
itself in terms of the relation between spatiality and the purported immediacy of intuition. Schelling's
emphasis on Kant's third Critique forms the basis of Schelling's philosophy as it becomes that which
must ground the first and second Critiques, i.e., the schematic or normative space of reasons which
Kant's constructions in the first two critiques requires, for Schelling, the dynamic ground which Kant
161 In his introduction Gideon Freudenthal notes that while Maimon influenced the German Idealists that they represent the
opposite of their thinking. Gideon Freudenthal “A Philosopher between Two Cultures,” in Solomon Maimon: Rational
Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments, ed Gideon Freudenthal, (New York: Springer, 2003), 16.
162 Peter Thielke, “Intuition and Diversity: Kant and Maimon on Space and Time,” in Solomon Maimon: Rational
Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments, ed Gideon Freudenthal (New York: Springer, 2003), 90.
163 Paul Franks, “What should Kantians learn from Maimon's Skepticism?” in Solomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist,
Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments, ed Gideon Freudenthal (New York: Springer, 2003), 207.
164 Thielke, 119.
165 Frederick Beiser, “Maimon and Fichte,” in Solomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical
Assessments, ed. Gideon Freudenthal (New York: Springer, 2003), 241.
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provides in his later critical work. But, whereas Kant combines these dynamics with a notion of
teleology, Schelling relies upon middle-grounds of mediation which we find ourselves caught in within
any analysis. Or, as begins to become clear in Schelling's Essay on Human Freedom, and remains
central to all his work after that point, logic, or predication, is the becoming-of-being; it is how nature
functions and not a synthetic add-on. This problem leads to the question of how natural sense, or
imagination, as a middle-ground, behaves in Kant's Opus.

2.4 - Schelling's Dynamization of The Critique of the Power of Judgment
Kant's project in the Opus Postumum can be read as an attempt to make thought as natural as it
can be, without abandoning the explanatory power of the transcendental method. As Grant puts it,
Kant's unsolved problem is “How, if at all, is a non-dogmatic account of the relation of reason to
nature possible?”166 Through mathematics Maimon demonstrates not only the possibility but also the
necessity of approaching the dangerous territory of dogmatic speculation but Kant will not give
mathematics the power to tightly lace sense and intuition that Maimon does yet, as we saw in our
analysis of the ether proofs, he may make conceptualization more developmentally primitive
(following Eckhart Förster's reading) in order to grant reason more synthesizing powers. If this is the
case, the question I wish to engage in this final section is the question of what happens to Kant's
attempt in The Critique of Judgment to quarantine nature if we read his augmentation of sense in the
Opus back into it.167
To begin, it will serve us to return to what it is that Schelling does with (or to) Kant regarding

166 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism,” in Collapse: Philosophical Research and
Development v. V (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2009) 421.
167 Here I am extending even further a suggestion made by Iain Hamilton Grant at the Naturphilosophie Summer School in
Pittsburgh in August of 2013 where it was suggested that, for Schelling, Kant's critiques should be carried out in
reverse order. Here I am stating that the Opus should even precede The Critique of Judgment as attempting to discover
the emergence of conceptual sense. While Schelling was apparently aware of the Opus at the time of Kant's death, I
have found no indication that he engaged with the text at any length.
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the latter's dynamic theory of matter. Simply put, whereas the connection between experience and
matter is a regulative unity for Kant, unity, better rendered as productive continuity for Schelling, is
the producer of problems namely in terms of nature as Prius, as something which thought always lags
behind.168 Buzaglo's central point is that Kant's split between sense and understanding is particularly
problematic when you take the succession of time into account. Schelling's continuity is not a
homogeneous continuity but a dynamic one. A dynamic continuum produces actual things because
nature itself is polarized between being and becoming, between creative expansion and productive
contraction.
One methodological consequence here is that Schelling can be seen as reversing Kant's
critiques – in that in recognizing the power of nature in The Critique of the Power of Judgment one
should restructure the apparatuses of The Critique of Pure Reason. The dynamic or de-substanializing
possibility, which lies in The Critique of Judgment (against the stratifications of the ether proofs), is
that of Kant's ascribing teleology to nature. In so doing, in expanding a teleological aspect to all of
nature as such, Schelling effectively argues for the decomposibility of all things and asserts, as we saw
in the introduction, the primacy of movement, or the Prius of motion in nature.169 Here, for Schelling,
teleology is less about the setting up of definite beginnings and ends for nature, and more about
arguing that while nature is purposefully creative, i.e., it creates particular things, we cannot ascertain
why this is in a fundamental way. Just as modality only partially captures the ramifications of potency,
teleology only partially captures nature's punctuated stability in the incalculable volition of its
creativity.
Whether or not nature functions teleologically is central to Kant's second Critique, as its initial
168 Dalia Nassar in her essay “The Absolute in German Idealism” makes this clear in distancing Kant's regulative unity
from the non-substantial yet not strictly regulative concept of the absolute in German Idealism writ large. See Dalia
Nassar “The Absolute in German Idealism,” in Edinburgh Critical History of 19th Century Philosophy, ed. Alison
Stone
169 This is not a cut and dried issue as some have argued that Kant argues against teleology here.
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and broadest concern with the separability of freedom from nature (or in the terms we have been
utilizing, the importance of demonstrating that our motions are our own). This is complicated by Kant
as he insists that, though nature behaves mechanically, (an assertion which Schelling will destroy), it
appears to act intentionally.170 It is especially at the level of the organic, or of biological plasticity, that
Kant argues that nature appears to have something akin to a dynamic freedom (putting it in
Schellingian terms for the sake of comparison).171 Beth Lord argues that Kant's main motion here in
supplanting nature's force with judgment's power, is to counter the philosophical moves of Herder's
speculative thesis that nature had organic powers.172
However, dynamics is not only a biological concern for Schelling since, as early as the First
Outline, he is critical of over-determining biological life as conceived by vitalism. Dynamics,
expressed by both physics and chemistry, have grounds which must affect everything from inorganic
formations to human freedom. Why mathematics is important here, despite Schelling's scant explicit
treatment of it, lies in the fact that the kind of abstract dynamism he discusses, both outside the domain
of human knowledge, and within it, is best represented by the exponential model of the potencies, a
concept which is as mathematical for Schelling (as diagrammatic) as it is organic. Thus, Schelling
wishes to avoid both merely taming nature with understanding's stability (via Kant), and giving nature,
or particular parts of nature, inexplicable creative, or vitalist, tendencies (a la Herder).
Furthermore, the movements on which Kant so heavily relies in “What is Called Orientation in
Thinking?” appear straight-jacketed in The Critique of Judgment. This is due largely to the fact that the
degree of mental movement, particularly that of self-isolation, takes precedence in order to separate the
horrible from the sublime.173 Kant describes the division of mathematic from dynamic sublimity in

170 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 20-22 (20:217 – 20:220).
171 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 36 (20:235).
172 Lord, Deleuze and Spinozism, 78.
173 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 128-129 (5:244-5:245).
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terms of a “movement of the mind.”174 This movement must be both of, and from, the mind for Kant
yet in a way that is not ungrounded by the mind in its movement whereas, for Maimon, the depth of the
synthetic reach cannot be erased. Again, Kant translates the depth of synthesis into the language of the
aesthetic in that nature, as an external power for Kant, must be fearfully rejected or, its infinity must be
recognized as one inferior to the infinite capacity for reason.175 To return to our opening section, and to
Peg Rawes' suggestion that Kant focuses the projective power of space starting with “Concerning the
Ultimate Ground” and moving till The Critique of Judgment,” the analytic is an exterior space of selfevident law that emerges prior to any sense or act, and yet, the act of finding or creating such laws is
subject to reason yet analytic, it effects sense and can be re-done by reason, but it is not of reason, it is
exteriorized. One ramification of this is that any substratum is an idealistic instrument for directing the
activity of thought and cannot be objectified as part of nature, or, as a necessary condition itself not
revisable by nature's forces. It is this worry that leads Maimon to rely upon the 'fiction' of infinite
mind, thereby highlighting the impossibility of trying to self-ground the ideal, as well as, to
simultaneously ground the real, or nature, as removable from the space of reasons.176
In his remarkable “Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process” (1800) Schelling argues that
Kant illegitimately attempts to assert a purity of forces by subsuming forces to logical rule, a rule
which, following the assertibility of nature over logic, is only possible because of nature. Kant must
rely on forces, Schelling argues, even to construct the very notion of synthesis. Schelling writes:
A great deal of the incomprehensibility of Kant's dynamics has its ground principally in the fact that he thinks them as pure
so long as he constructs only logically, but as soon as it comes to real construction (to an encounter) he always takes them
bound up with matter which of course for the substrate-seeking imagination power which finds it difficult to think a force
without something to inhere in, can be quite comfortable, but which constantly distorts the speculative outlook. 177
174 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 131 (5:248).
175 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 144-145 (5:261-5:262).
176 The problem becomes one of measure, the quantitative appears completely arbitrary in relation to quality. One
attempted solution, as Iain Hamilton Grant has shown, is to attempt to substantialize the number as was done in the
work of Lorenz Oken. I will investigate this treatment of number in relation to Schelling's utilization of algebra in
Chapter 3.
177 F.W.J. von Schelling, “Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process,” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (unpublished, 2013),
16-17.
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It is here that the various themes of this chapter can be brought to a head. On the one hand,
Kant seems to argue that the abstract subject must have the capacity of determining the time-space
relation (as a kind of navigator) in that, if we follow Förster, reason must be a projective capacity prior
to the synthesizing of the understanding. But the sensible must be of a matter following the ether of the
Opus, and thus a tension must remain in order for Kant to not fall into absolute idealism. Maimon
complicates this picture by inserting movement into nature (or more cautiously we could say spacetime) as well as the asymmetry of determinability but, at the end of the Essay, he also holds onto some
notion of substantiality. At least, he does so insofar as objectivity is constantly, yet asymptotically,
approached by the infinite intellect. The infinite intellect, as Buzaglo argues, is itself nothing but a
fictional propellant for the act of thinking.178 The opening lines of Maimon's Essay are telling in this
regard:
If it is true that every being strives as much as it can to persist in its existence, and if it is true that the existence of a
thinking being consists in thinking (in accordance with the Cartesian identity claim [identischer Satz]', cogito, ergo sum):
then it quite naturally follows from this that every thinking being must strive as much as it can to think. It is not difficult to
prove that all human drives (in so far as they are human drives) can be resolved into the single drive to think; but I shall
save this for another opportunity. Even those who despise thinking must admit this truth, if they would only pay careful
attention to themselves. All human activities are, as such, simply more or less thinking.179

So what is the middle-ground of mediation, and how to properly create a space for the relation
of space, intuition, and thought, if there is no ether, and, if space is not merely dead or formal matter?
Given a seemingly overly formal notion of matter, what becomes of the substantiality of Schelling's
determinations after Maimon? Or, put otherwise, if reason (or thought more generally) is an
exploratory procedure, what is the place of nature if we are to avoid lapsing into the FichteanMcDowellian isolation of the practical and its derivations (or explicit giving of reasons following

178 In some ways this demonstrates the connections between Fichte's 'magic circle of consciousness' and Maimon's infinite
mind in that both serve as justification for the conceptualization of thought itself as a closed circuit of investigation.
But while Fichte's circle emphasizes the non-being of the not-I Maimon's infinite mind emphasizes the the consistency
of determination.
179 Maimon, Essay, 5.
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Brandom)? Or if we can never 'leave' nature, as I have suggested in the last chapter is argued
throughout Schelling's work, then what then becomes of judgment?
Judgment, for Schelling, becomes more like Maimon's determination through the ideal isolation
of experiment, in that judgment is always-already occurring in terms of predication, in an intentional
sense, and, as spatial intuition, in an immediate sense. The determinability of an intuition's
concreteness can be exported to a community of other thinking beings in a normative sense but,
particularly in regards to the sciences, this must have some adherence to a logic (or we might better say
a geometry) of physical invariants. Whereas Maimon appears more of an idealist than Kant, in that
determinability is a product of the activity of the mind (behaving under the auspices of the fiction of
the infinite intellect), the limitations of thought are less a priori decided and more pragmatically
discovered. In order to further elaborate the pragmatic yet speculative nature of Schelling's thought
(and, if there is one theme to remain constant throughout this project, it is that pragmatism is practical
thought with speculation built in) I will, in the following chapter, pursue a Schellingian philosophy of
mathematics, particularly geometry, in order to move towards a more focused engagement between
Schelling and the formalization of nature and the nature of formalization, as it applies to space.
Through his abstract utilization of geometry and the exponents of algebra, Schelling is able to present a
notion of difference (or quality) that is neither against, nor without, formalization. While Kant required
greater and greater powers to be located in more and more abstract, or disembodied, notions of the
subject, as a mere 'X' in the Opus, Schelling instead elaborates what subjectivity is both for us, and,
without us. Judgment becomes a diagrammatic and experimental tracing and working out of aspects of
nature that have invaded our minds and not, as it is for Kant, an attempt to isolate the rigor of our
capacities from increasingly unstable grounds on which they rest and navigate.
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3 - The Force of the Continuous: Schelling's Naturalization of Mathematics
While much attention has been paid to Kant's, Fichte's, Hegel's, and Maimon's philosophies of
mathematics, little to no attention to has been given to the function (and importance) of mathematics in
the work of Schelling. In the following, I argue that Schelling's flirtations with geometry, in
conjunction with his utilization of K.A. Eschenmayer's notion of Potenz as algebraic exponential,
speaks to an early form of intuitionist mathematics180 which is important to Schelling's thought in (at
least) two areas: one, in discussing the relation of quantity to quality, and, two, in constructing and
describing thought as a species of motion. These pursuits, in different but bound ways, illustrate the
complex form in which Schelling integrates human thought into nature by naturalizing that which
seems most artificial: the synthetic creations of mathematical intuition.
Furthermore, by focusing on the quantity-quality relation, one can demonstrate Schelling's
difference from Fichte, and the later Kant, while also pointing out Schelling's importance for
contemporary thought and, subsequently, for the renewed significance of Naturphilosophie. By
addressing Schelling's Identity Philosophy, which immediately concerns not only the mathematical
through its focus on the logical form so important to Fichte (A = A), his Naturphilosophie, the core of
Schelling's thought is expressed when it comes to the addition of quantities and qualities and,
subsequently, to the deeper issue of the continuity of nature.
Schelling's Identity Philosophy, which is often considered only slightly less of a dead-dog than
his Naturphilosophie, is commonly viewed as nestled in the shadow of Fichte's influence while,
simultaneously, attempting to break free from it. In Schelling's Presentation of My System (1801) and
Further Presentations of My System (1802) the themes of both motion, and quantity-quality, are
evident, as Schelling writes in an Fichtean style (one of geometrical proofs, lemmas, postulates), while

180 While a whole different project in itself, there are identifiable traces of Fichte and Schelling's influence in the work of
Brouwer who fathered intuitionist mathematics in the early 20 th century.
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pushing beyond the strict activity of the I. Yet, to regard these writings as simply amateurish, or as
attempting to keep up with Fichte's demonstrable mathematical prowess, does a great disservice to
Schelling's thought even at such an early stage.181
Such critiques often rely upon the well-worn thesis that Schelling's protean nature led to his
thought being a series of unrelated systems and approaches. These critiques risk making the claim that
Schelling was inconsistent, which, in my view, damages the very subject of one's study to an unhelpful
degree. If we take the aforementioned continuity thesis seriously, which Iain Hamilton Grant has
convincingly articulated, i.e., that Schelling's work is continuous yet varied, then the Identity System
becomes 'de-isolated' from the Naturphilosophie and from the later work on freedom, myth, and
beyond.182 In relation to this, the mathematical themes of Schelling's work are amplified, I would
argue, because they concern the very notion of continuity as such, a notion which appears from
Schelling's earliest diary writings to the very end of his life. The general form of this continuity,
however, can read differently, whether it be a productive model of nature, or the form of myth, or
Schelling's theological concerns. This general sense of continuity is indicated in Schelling's particular
form of monism discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 1. For the project at hand, this continuity
has to do with the inability to separate mind from nature ontologically while indicating the difficulty,
yet necessity, in creating methodological islands within that monism from which thoughts can
coherently operate.
As we will see below, Schelling's 'trajectorialization' of algebraic powers, that diagramming of
powers to equate qualitative change with the trajectory of a geometric line, functions to strike this
balance. Before addressing the Presentations and Further Presentations in detail it will be helpful to
181 See for instance Michael Vater “Fichte's Reaction to Schelling's Identity Philosophy in 1806,” in After Jena: New
Essays on Fichte's Later Philosophy, ed. D. Breazeale and T. Rockmore (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
2008).
182 Grant is not alone in this, both Bruce Matthews and Jason Wirth similarly argue that Schelling should not be viewed as
a divided figure.
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examine Schelling's explicit comments on mathematics and particularly geometry in his other texts.
3.1 - Schelling on Mathematics in General
Mathematics is not the rigid and uninspiring schematism which the layman is so apt to see in it; on the contrary, we stand in
mathematics precisely at that point of intersection of limitation and freedom which is the essence of man himself. 183

Setting aside Schelling's pursuit of geometry in the Presentations for the following section, the
question of his general view of the science of mathematics will be addressed. Schelling studied
mathematics in Jena in 1796 and then in Leipzig until 1798, while also delving into examinations of
physics and medicine. Concerns about the mathematical appear, albeit somewhat obliquely, in his early
work “Of the I” (1795) where Schelling makes reference to mathematical properties as only ever
following from dynamical categories particularly in reference to magnitudes.184 Schelling argues that
qualities are prior to, and different in kind from, mathematical categories. This early foray is not
altogether promising and lends itself to a reading of Schelling's approach in the Ideas for a Philosophy
of Nature (1797) as anti-scientific or, at least, as against the mathematization of nature as it appeared to
him at the time in the form of Newtonian mechanics. But Schelling's attitude towards mathematics is
anything but naïve. It can be mistaken as such, because in “Of the I,” Schelling does not thoroughly
define dynamics in a scientific context, and his claim is that some notion of dynamics defines the
contents of mathematical categories, may therefore appear, as idealist excess.
In an attempt to clarify Schelling's particular approach here, one could see his appeal to
dynamics and trajectories, as an attempt to cut across Kant's division in The Critique of the Power of
Judgment between the aesthetic and the mathematical treatment of magnitudes. While Kant states that
mathematics can measure the greatness of a magnitude to an infinite degree, it cannot grasp the feeling
of the sublime, of the overwhelming of a subjective aesthetic dimension reflecting upon the object of

183 Herman Weyl, The Open World (Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press, 1932), 61.
184 F.W.J. Schelling, “On the I as a principle of Philosophy,” in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early
Essays (1794 -1796), trans. F. Marti (Lewisburg : Bucknell University Press, 1980), 114-115.
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nature.185 Here it should already be clear that Schelling cannot share this separation since the activity
of the I cannot be a priori separable from the dynamics of nature. And, as with Maimon in Chapter 2,
the removal of this separation in turn affects the analytic-synthetic distinction that calls for a more
exploratory approach to the very notion of construction, i.e., any kind of thinking's capacity to build,
whether reason, intuition, or the understanding, is never constructing only from mental material, but
from extra-conceptual sources. Thus, whereas certain mathematical truths for Kant are analytic,
mathematics' true power lies in its construction of construction, in how enacting what appears as a selfstable measurement of the exterior is itself an effect of exterior powers moving through the purportedly
interior I, or self, that is thinking.
This does not mean that one abandons all divisions, but that one accepts the consequences of
exactly making and maintaining such divisions and constructions. This is immediately evident in how
Schelling attempts to relate philosophy (as that which attempts to construct construction) via the
natural sciences. Throughout the Ideas Schelling tries not only to make a place for philosophy amongst
the natural sciences but to also keep open a place for nature's productivity within both domains.
Schelling critiques and builds off of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786)
following his concerns with Kant's bracketing off of teleology as was discussed in Chapter 1.
Schelling closes the preface of the Ideas in the following manner: “It is true that chemistry teaches us
to read the letters, physics the syllables, mathematics Nature; but it ought not to be forgotten that it
remains for philosophy to interpret what is read.”186 The majority of Schelling's early comments on
mathematics generally appears in the 1803 supplements to various chapters in the Ideas. In the
supplement to the introduction, Schelling connects the equation of the absolute real and the absolute

185 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000),
134-135 (5:251 – 5:252).
186 F.W.J. von Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. E. Harris and P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 5.
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ideal to the necessary ground for any science, singling out mathematics and specifically geometry.187
Put directly, any science or practice which centers on the generation of abstracta must, in the gesture of
that generation, sublate the difference of real and ideal. The production of a line, or the production of a
concept is, on the face of it, a demonstration of that generation's own capacity.
It is this equation of ideality and reality in the passages in the 1803 Ideas that, as we will see,
exemplifies Schelling's particular notion of identity borrowed from Fichte in the logical form of A = A.
To say that absolute reality = absolute ideality is not to say that there is no difference between them,
but to say that the one follows from the other, i.e., that the two are bound as variables, that they are in
an equation. They follow in the structure of the equation and are thus only differentiated by their
sequence. To say this A equals that A notes a difference of location between two things, things which
are not absolutely separated since there is the bridge of equation, and that the first and the second are
related in that determination whereas they may or may not be absolutely first and second. It is only by
understanding identity in such a manner that Schelling can insist that absolute ideality and absolute
reality must have a dependency if the construction of the geometer is to have any effect in the world.
As is clear in the supplement to the introduction, the validity of such an equation is itself
constructed, it must be posited as a necessity, albeit as a consequent necessity. Relating this fact to
mathematics more broadly, Schelling writes:
In the Philosophy of Nature, explanations take place as little as they do in mathematics; it proceeds from principles certain
in themselves, without any direction prescribed to it, as it were, by the phenomena. Its direction lies in itself, and the more
faithful it remains to this, the more certainly do the phenomena step of their own accord into that place in which alone they
can be seen as necessary, and this place in the system is the only explanation of them that there is. 188

I will address the way in which direction can be read quite literally below, but for now it is
important to see how Schelling celebrates the pure rationality of mathematics as the model of
demonstrative systematized construction. While the very structure of finding causes and effects is an

187 Schelling, Ideas, 45.
188 Schelling, Ideas, 53.
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endless circular game,189 Schelling advocates for a peculiar form of constructive reduction in which
one can reduce a phenomenon to a placeholder, but a placeholder which is an ideal foothold for
explanation. That is, in the context of the quote above, any thing is an act of creation but the
consequences of this creation have to be ideally traced in its consequences. Or, in other words, the
certainty of principles is a wager, a foothold, and what they create, in the form of direction or
trajectory, is the ongoing proof of that certainty. The systematization of creative acts and consequences
is locked into place, but only temporarily, by its location or place in relation to other principles and
consequences.
It is this logic that motivates Schelling's critique of Le Sage's usage of particles: Schelling
celebrates Le Sage's ingenious use of the mathematical to move beyond experience, but argues that
such a supposition is threatened by an appeal to a body or substance, thereby undermining such
speculation in demanding explanation. In other words, and in a logic that will reappear in Schelling's
adoption, yet alteration, of Kant's physical monadology via the actants in the First Outline, atomistic
thinking lies at the bleeding-edge between explanatory entity, and a reliance upon substance as
universal explanans.190 The constructed real-ideality of number in Schelling's work most intensely
illustrates this critique of substance, while also distancing him from a purely or naively Platonic take
on mathematics.191 This position can be made clear in reading Schelling's fellow Naturphilosoph
Lorenz Oken who argued that number was constituted by the very accretion of substance, where base
substance is represented by 0. Oken's 'organification' of number can be read as one alternative which
makes Schelling's position more clear in comparison, and, in relief.

189 Schelling, Ideas, 53.
190 This pivot is also essential for understanding Schelling's mixture of harsh attack and excited praise when it comes to the
mechanism and immanence of Spinoza's philosophy. While Spinoza's use of immanence holds the promise of a
complex understanding of identity that Schelling begins to entertain in the Ideas and develops more rigorously in the
System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling is damning of Spinoza for being too mechanical.
191 By naively Platonic, I mean the view that numbers exist separate independently of the manifestations of matter in the
cosmos.
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This difference, regarding the Okenian thesis concerning the substantive nature of number, can
be detected in Schelling's First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature. Like Oken, Schelling
begins with an unconditioned nature and argues that polarity can best explain the complexity of
nature's products from the simplest, or most basal, form of our speculations about nature,--i.e., that
nature is polarized. Iain Hamilton Grant argues that Oken's substantilized zero amounts to a proto-field
theory whereby antecedents and consequents (or the higher and lower forms of nature) become
regionalized and relative to one another.192 The zero, on the line of a tracing of a power, becomes a
hinge (or indifference region) where different intensities, or polarities, cancel each other out. However,
whereas Schelling's actants of the First Outline are logical footholds, Oken's slime-points are, as Grant
argues, fundamentally substantive.
Grant demonstrates in his essay “Being and Slime” that Oken's thought follows a path by which
logical or rational forms (such as numbers) entail ontological consequences.193 More specifically, Oken
is concerned with how something derived its existence from nothing,194 a derivation which Oken
illustrates as the repetition of zero. The question, Grant argues, is to what degree this zero which is
repeated is substantive, or formal or, to what degree substance only makes sense as a logical foothold,
therein pointing again to the copulation of the real and ideal.195 Whereas Oken relies on the zero as the
point of indifference (which could be aligned to the copula or equal sign in Schelling) this zero of
Oken's is endowed with substance.196 As Oken puts it in the first page of his Elements of
Physiophilosophy (1809), mathematics describes the spirit of the cosmos while nature exhibits its
material manifestation.197 Or, as he puts it a few pages later, physiophilosophy is mathematics

192 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Being and Slime”, in Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development, v. IV (Falmouth:
Urbanomic, 2008), 308-309.
193 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 289.
194 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 290.
195 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 291.
196 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 300-301.
197 Lorenz Oken, Elements of Physiophilosophy, trans. Alfred Tulk (London: The Ray Society, 1847), 1.
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endowed with substance.198
A non-obvious, and somewhat controversial aspect of Grant's reading, is whether slime (or
mucus) is the proper name for all of substance in Oken's work generally, and, in his Elements
specifically. Grant argues that because Oken clearly aligns the biological with that of the process of
individuation of matter as such, this contributes to Oken's 'organification' or 'animalization' of the
cosmos in general.199 This is evident in Oken's Elements when he discusses the processes of the
cosmos as occurring within “an aetherial globe of mucus.”200 Furthermore, while Oken distinguishes
inorganic from organic in a classificatory sense, he subsumes all forms of creation, regardless of their
category, under the notion of life.201 How, and to what extent, the inorganic and the organic are both
considered life is somewhat unclear, as both are subject to motion and comprised of the repetition of
zero. And, because mathesis is best at simply schematizing the motion and creativity of life, Oken
argues that science must be a materialized arithmetic. However, since Oken emphasizes the biological
sciences as the central organizational paradigm, it is difficult to disentangle how biological, or material
mathesis, as such, exists in a context independent manner.
As Grant points out, Oken equivocates between zero or substance (as slime) as having priority
– mathematics is a description of the agglomeration of substance and yet its formal power preexists
humanity. But, how does one explain human access to mathematical capacities in a non-trivial
manner? Either substances accreted to the point of mathesis or mathesis was, from the start, potentially
accessible by creatures capable of thought. From this Oken argues that numbers represent the direction
and motion of zero – zero is a primary act and numbers are its repetitions.202 The zero is the impossible
respite between the polarities of nature whereby the expansive and contractive tendencies (which
198 Oken, Elements of Physiophilosophy, 4.
199 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 299.
200 Oken, Elements of Physiophilosophy, 201.
201 Oken, Elements, 27.
202 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 305.
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correspond to positive and negative integers) fight against one another endlessly. Nature, including
human thought, is the repetition of this combat as substance. Thus, the lateness of human thought
implies its evolutionary greatness for Oken and explains how it is we can discover the mathesis
implicit in all of nature's working. But Oken's emphasis on the domain of life is not situated properly
methodologically, nor does Oken justify how non-biological entities and processes benefit from being
described in biological terms (other than a claim to common sense experience in that biological
ontogenesis is more recognizable to us).
Oken's zero is an act of creation; it names the points which move and congeal into materiality
(as an original mathesis we discover after the fact). Furthermore, it names a place that must be
assumed in order to measure the motions and intensities of these creations (as the zero on the number
line). While at the end of his Elements Oken asserts that spirit and mind are merely blossoms of nature,
the act of speculating that mathesis is, in a material sense, that which preexists the emergence of mind,
can appear to over-idealize the initial Naturphilosophical move of naturalizing zero as a slimy building
block. So while zero precedes slime, or the primoridal ooze from which all life sprang, the questions
remains how does one argue that mathematics is throughly material without overly, and retroactively,
biologicizing mathematics, or number? Again following Grant, Oken's mathesis is akin to the
repetition of identity in Schelling's system; it is a repetition of the logical copula (das Band) in a
logical sense, or the tension of direction or dimension, in the geometrical sense, whereby form leads to
neither dead formalism nor to naïve idealism.203
Thus the inter-mixture of real-ideal is again highlighted: the boundedness or logical
connectivity found in the world cannot be merely ideal if its discovery tests the very limits of thought
and ideality. Yet, at the same time, Oken's emphasis on arithmetic, and on the anchoring aspect of zero,
demonstrates how the zero as an act, demonstrates, in equal measure, its self-sufficiency as zero, as a
203 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 312.
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point of observing more and less intensity, difference, magnitude et cetera, as well as the cost of any
given demonstration. Oken's zero is thus a more complex account of the traditional philosophical
decision, of the subject/object or mind/world starting point since the act, retroactively recognized, was
already occurring and, in so recognizing its particularity, produces the problem of materiality (in terms
of where one places the decision in the world). For Oken then, ideal and real correspond to intensity
(or contraction in Schelling) and extensity (or expansion) of the number series.204 Thus, the zero and
the copula approach one another in that Oken's use of the former, and Schelling's of the latter, both
refuse the absolute separation of real and ideal while necessitating an act which appears to enact such a
separation. However, as I will attempt to argue below, Schelling differs from Oken in that the
difference between the qualitative and quantitative orders, for Schelling, is greater than Oken would
allow.
While Oken's polarization of the zero introduces fields within an otherwise immanent nature,
Schelling seems to argue that the exponential (or contractive and expansive) status of the Potenz is not
adequate to explain the arithmetic of dimensionality. This requires a brief summary. For Oken,
mathesis occurs materially which requires treating zero as both building block, and observational post,
between intensities or magnitudes. Because of this, movement or activity for Oken motion is captured
as acts which are more or less intense from where they are measured while being fully materially
constituted.
However, for Schelling, the zero as notion and anchor is a powerful case of the demonstrative
capacity of mathematics, but it over biologicizations these determinations. Thus, every determination
of zero, whether as building block or indifference point of magnitudinal observation, is always-already
within the restraint of life as Oken understands it. Because of this, the organic, or slimy point, leans too
close to a reliance upon substance, it appears too close to functioning as an explanatory substratum.
204 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 315.
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This is why, for Schelling, the notion of Potenz functions as the least assuming meontological solution
to the emergence of things and the position from which one thinks them.
That is, whereas Oken's mathesis explains the intra-Potenz logic, Schelling argues in his
Presentations of My Philosophy (1801) that the adding of dimensions demonstrates a qualitative
change of a different order. While the zero, or exponential nature of the Potenz, demonstrates how the
direction of the real and the ideal can be reversed (in terms of what is contained within, and what can
explain what through the recapitulation of forces) the arithmetic of dimensions, or directions, appears
to reinforce the asymmetry of being preceding thinking. Or, put another way, Oken's exponential
model, without a corresponding diagrammatic one, can tend toward a materially immanent model of
the cosmos, as the exponent, or repetition of zero, is just more of the same however ontologically
potentiated. Or, to relate more specifically to mathematics, the generative formalism within
mathematics has yet to be grasped by the mathematical navigations of human brains which leaves
room for further discoveries about mathematics, as well as, the real ramifications (consequents) of
mathematical knowledge.
Schelling keeps mathematics close to philosophy in his System of Transcendental Idealism
(1800), where he reasserts the one-sidedness of knowledge (read: not the ideal dominance of the real)
in that “the lamp of knowledge only points forward.”205 Since knowledge cannot properly uncover the
past, but can only extend what little we know of it outwards, mathematics as a formal science of
demonstrative abstracta, remains imperative. Schelling discusses the difference between mathematics
and philosophical knowledge as the difference between the knowledge of the act of construction as
intuition – philosophy only trumps mathematics as a form of pure reasoning by investigating the act of
construction itself, and mathematics as the more pure, yet unreflective form, of this construction.206

205 F.W.J. von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 17.
206 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 13.
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Yet, this distinction becomes harder to maintain given the fact that for Schelling, unlike Kant,
mathematical intuition cannot be said to be contained only within the mind, given Schelling's
naturalistic account of thinking. This naturalistic account appears in relationship to intuition later in the
System.
It may be worth pausing here to how exactly Schelling's notion of construction relates to both
naturalism, and the naturalization of cognition, and mathematics, and the naturalization of the schema.
For Kant, the schema function to link non-empirical concepts with sense impressions. In this regard,
and to point back to the “What is Called Orientation,” Kant emphasizes the difference between schema
and images. Whereas concepts in “What is Called Orientation” are built and connected to sense
impressions, and are a posteriori, schemata are always incompletely captured by sense impressions
and are therefore a priori. For example, any triangle one encounters will fail to live up to the concept
of a triangle.207 Much ado has been made about how cognition generates schemata, particularly as their
generation appears to erode Kant's already mentioned apprehension regarding the limits of
construction, and the limits of intuition. That is, the power and necessity of schemata, for Kant,
troubles his general claim that intuition is limited in how it can construct, or be productive, without the
constraints of sense. Schelling, in naturalizing cognition, can offer an evolutionary explanation for the
generation of diagrams, schemas, postulates, and the like, by arguing that they stem from basic
capacities of motion, beginning with bodily motions and subsequently genetically informing thought as
species of motion, as outlined in Chapter 1. Michael Vater, in his introduction to Schelling's System of
Transcendental Idealism suggests that Schelling saves Kant's notion of the schema by attaching it to
the importance of time in the development of consciousness.208
For Schelling, the schema is a basal form of intuition that draws the border between concept

207 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 273 (A141/B 180).
208 Michael Vater, “Introduction,” in Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, xvi.
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and object in thought, thereby allowing the activity of thought to reflect upon itself, to divide the
internal, and the external.209 It is basal, or particularly abstract, because it does not bring forth an
object, but merely embodies a rule. Schelling emphasizes that this embodiment of a rule is bound to
the very act of bringing an object into existence, such as in the example of a craftsman. Intuition, in the
sense of the function of the schema, is necessarily productive, and tied to actual generation.
Following the embodied nature of productive intuition, which is necessary for the self to
recognize its own activity, and what appears as almost a nod to the qualitative difference of a different
order (contra Oken), Schelling argues that mathematics does not often recognize the difference
between absolute and relative negation.210 While the schema informs materially production, it becomes
difficult to separate the function of higher level abstracta, such as that of magnitudes or forces, from
the models we generate of them. This confusion is at risk in the very form of an equation. In the
equation, there is no recognition whether the equal sign means a return to a previous balance of forces,
a previous capture of one force by the other, or the annihilation of those forces. For Schelling,
philosophy and physics recognize that the sequence of positivities and negativities says something
about the underlying tendencies, tendencies which he believes are erased in the operations of
mathematical formulas. Yet, mathematical progress allows for the light of knowledge to be extended
ever forward as the advent of decimal fractions allows for better approximations, for instance, of the
movements of the stars.211
Setting aside Presentation of My System to which we will soon move, Schelling's attention to
mathematics seems to largely disappear only to emerge later in life in the Darstellung or lectures on
“Exhibition of Pure Rational Philosophy” (1847-1852), particularly as a form of geometry of motions,

209 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 136.
210 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 80.
211 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 119. It is here along with several moments in the First Outline that
Schelling appears to be involved in some form of proto-asymptotic thinking in the vein of Peirce, Weyl, and others.
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or geometry of dimensionality. I have saved, for the end of this section, Schelling's most direct
commentary on mathematics as a science. In 1803 Schelling gave a series of lectures on the method of
university study in which he devotes a lecture to the purely rational science of mathematics.
In his On University Studies (1803), Schelling appears to reiterate his sentiments about the role
and place of mathematics vis a vis philosophy that he expressed in 1800 – namely that philosophy is
almost as adept at setting the conceptual stage for mathematics, as philosophy is at pure rational
thought. In his fourth lecture, Schelling rehearses the identity between absolute ideality and absolute
reality in order to move to discussing space as the intuition of the negation of activity (or for our
purposes here we might say trajectory or dimension.212 Space is both activity, and the arresting of
activity, just as a dimension, or trajectory, is a movement in space (as activity) and a measuring of that
movement (as being). Following this Schelling argues that mathematics presupposes the intuition of
pure space and pure time as reflections of a deeper unified being (a being which, following Schelling's
divide between philosophy and mathematics must be being as self-inhibiting becoming). Or, in order
for mathematics to be a demonstrative science of abstraction, it needs to presuppose a continuum in
which its demonstrations can occur with proper impact.
Mathematics, for Schelling, rests its laurels on its surpassing the law of causality213 in that it
intuits the idea as such by equating construction and demonstration (again, only philosophy peers into
the act of construction itself). Perhaps hedging his earlier statements about the use of mathematics in
astronomy, Schelling argues that pure rational mathematics can abuse evidence, and create empirical
laws as if they were absolute laws.214 It is worth quoting Schelling at length as he closes the lecture:
Philosophy and mathematics are alike in that both are founded upon the absolute identity of the universal and the particular.
Hence, both are purely intuitive, since every relationship of this type is perceived through intuition. But whereas
mathematical intuition is a reflected one, philosophical intuition is rational or intellectual intuition and identical with its
object—with primordial knowledge itself. Philosophical construction interprets what is grasped in intellectual intuition. The
212 F.W.J. Schelling, On University Studies. trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), 45.
213 Schelling, On University Studies, 47.
214 Schelling, On University Studies, 47-48.

102

particular identities, which like the universal identity, express absolute primordial knowledge can be grasped only in
intellectual intuition, and in this sense are Ideas, Philosophy is therefore the science of Ideas or the eternal archetypes of
things. Without intellectual intuition no philosophy! 215

It is worth briefly articulating a broader account of Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition.
Following from the above outline of Schelling's methodology as construction (in 0.3), productive
intuition is construction embodied in a sensate and mobile subjectivity. This model of intuition has
very particular consequences for construction in that mobility conditions and localizes intuition, but in
a sense that is initially, and continually, apprehended in higher, or more abstract forms, such as
intellectual intuition. This latter form of intuition comes from an indifference point, or a seemingly
unconditioned place yet, as soon as that intuition encounters any form, its testing of that form's
extensity, will demonstrate the locality of any given happening of intuition.
Setting aside the more specific role of intuition to be fully addressed further on, what is
important here is the emphasis that mathematics can reconnect to its more primordial roots, a project
which I believe Schelling himself pursues in the Pure Rational Philosophy lectures. Before proceeding
to those lectures and then to intuitionist mathematics, the continuity of Schelling's concern with
mathematics should be demonstrated in terms of the centrality of the distinction between quantity and
quality. To reach that point however, I believe one must reexamine the possibilities that lie in the
purported limits of mathematics' diagrammatic inventions.
3.2 - Schelling's Extensity/Intensity Relation
There is one absolute magnitude (= 1) which, though continually annihilated in this series, continuously recurs, and by this
recurrence produces, not itself, but the mean between itself and nothing.--Nature, as object, is that which comes to pass in
such an infinite series.216

While Schelling repeatedly noted the interchangeability of analytic and geometrical thinking,

215 Schelling, On University Studies, 49.
216 F.W.J. von Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. K.R. Peterson (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004), 205.
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he appears to fancy the latter over the former.217 Formally the two are compatible as triangularity, for
instance, is taken to be the diagrammatic expression of the interrelation, and (relative or consequent)
totality of, nature's dynamic processes which corresponds to the triplicity (or we might somewhat
oddly say the temporal triangularity) of the copula and its bonded antecedents and consequents. Or,
simply put, the labeling of the geometrical with a, b, and c allows for a translation between the figure
and the formula. Yet, as I have argued, it would appear that the repetition of number as intensive
difference cannot be simply mapped onto the addition (not multiplication or 'exponentialization') of
trajectories. This is why the point from which intensities are measured is not a trivial issue as it is not
only a question of perspective, but also of the potentiality of different materials and actualities in a
particular horizon. Qualities, or excessive intensities, cannot usefully be said to be intense for their
own sake but only to better articulate the limits of knowing and navigating.
Previously I mentioned that Schelling's interest in mathematics seems to wane following 1803
yet one can argue that Schelling moves away from the geometrical and simply focuses on the logical
structure of predication. This is evidenced in Schelling's increasing attention to temporality and the
form of the copula in the language of unground and ground. Temporality allows Schelling to
demonstrate the logic of unground and ground in that the generation of any thing is dependent on its
ground but only becomes what it is in ungrounding its point of genesis. In terms of space, Schelling
complicates any notion of determination as always being a co-determination, as always occurring in a
web of co-determining entities. Ground and unground thus become problems of deciding the
boundaries between things. As Oken will subsequently argue, Schelling attempts to naturalize formal
structures, but, whereas Oken attempts to attach mathematics to the generation of substance as such,
Schelling attempts to explain mathematics as a second order form of intuition, one that demonstrates
and formalizes how abstracta behave given a continuous space and time as established by philosophy.
217 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 143.
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This occurs across Schelling's work, but is most evident in Presentation of My System of Philosophy
(1801), and Further Presentations of My System of Philosophy (1802).
While the reflective delay of mathematical intuition can be taken as a weakness, I believe that it
is mathematics' strong suit to act as the engineer of conceptual isolation. Throughout Schelling's texts,
but particularly in the First Outline, Schelling points out the necessity of isolating a product of nature
to think it. This operation renders the object inert and disconnects it (in an ideal sense) from nature.
This isolation is necessary, however, in order to perform experiments, in order to test how many
antecedents and how many consequents this singularity may highlight. In effect, isolation makes the
product into an abstract entity whereby its production and productivity can be held in temporal and
spatial isolation. It is logic that speaks to the former whereas geometry speaks to the latter. This would,
however, assume that logic is over and above the geometrical as the copula connects the object to
logical forms over geometrical ones. Or, in other words, the very notion of Schelling's connection is
logical, not geometrical. However, I would argue that this imbalance is undone by the geometrical
nature of trajectory. Whereas the extensity test is one of temporal stretching, it is equally an intensity
test in the object's field-theoretical gravity (where does it want to go, and what is drawn to it) referring
to the relation of ground and unground mentioned above. This form of experiment is clarified in the
relation of quantity (usually associated with the extensive) to quality (usually associated with the
intensive).
If this is the real dimension of mathematical intuition, one could argue that it is reversible as an
ideal series – the extensive as spatial, and the intensive as temporal (both thought in organicity – the
possibilities of the body in the former, and the particular temporality belonging to the form of life in
the latter). Again, referring back to Oken, whereas the material reality of mathematics appeared in
different biological forms, for Schelling biological forms and limitations alter the sense and perception
of dimensions which inform and contaminate their mathematical codification. We could tentatively say
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that, for Schelling, logic approximates the cause and effect relation complicated as a naturalized
transcendentalism, whereas geometry is the attempt to diagram the horizons of co-determining things
in a given field. This can be brought back again to the division of quantities and qualities.
In Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801) Schelling makes a striking statement about
the relation of geometry to arithmetic and quantity to quality. Arguing diagramatically, Schelling states
that the triangle is the formal character which represents the totality of the dynamic processes (being
composed of the line and the angle which represent magnetism and electricity respectively). Rather
than a pure formalism, Schelling's demonstration of the triangle is one of the co-dependence of
motions of otherwise unrepresentable potencies, or Potenzen. As mentioned above this demonstration
seems to suggest a difference in kind, or that the difference between the potencies is different than
those within the potencies. The extension of a shape in space is, on the face of it, radically different
from, the creation of an altogether different form. Schelling writes:
The schema of the three basic forms of the dynamic processes is, as is known, the line, the angle, and the triangle, or in
addition, these three processes are equated with the first three prime numbers of the arithmetic series. Just as 2 results only
from the addition of 1 + 1, and three from the joining of 1 to 2 (so therefore these numbers are not powers of 1), so too,
therefore, the three stages of the dynamic process [result from successive addition] 218

An immediate concern is raised: how are the potencies (whether formulaic as a, b, c or
geometrically as line, angle, triangle) themselves isolated non-arbitrarily within the ideal? Or, how are
the stages of the dynamic process themselves not merely ideal footholds? Or we could say, that
Schelling appears close, on first glance, to Fichte's infinitesimal calculus (as a form of practical
worlding).219 For Fichte, the I is an auto-positing force which sets itself against the inert materiality of
nature (which, since it is internalized, is merely seen as the non-I) by introducing smaller and smaller

218 F.W.J. von Schelling, Presentation of My System of Philosophy, in J.G. Fichte and F.W.J. The Philosophical Break
between Fichte and Schelling, trans. M. Vater and D. Wood (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 189.
219 Here it would be prudent to address the relation of Maimon's injection of rationalism into the critical project via
mathematics to Fichte's utilization of calculus. Like Schelling's actants in the First Outline, Maimon's infintesmals
operate on the border between real entities and ideal footholds and hence opposing claims as to whether, via the
infintesmals, Maimon is maintaining a concept of the in itself or a more rigorous notion of the synthetic.
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cuts (as infinitesimal calculus) into the material of the world. While I investigate this connection more
in depth below, it is here that Schelling's continuous nature is the central concept by which quantity
and quality interrelate without eliminating, or supplanting, one another. In the Introduction to the First
Outline (1799) Schelling argues that nature must be continuous since it is neither mere being nor mere
becoming, but the ongoing attempt to be both. The continuity of nature cannot be directly accessed to
the degree which Fichte seems to argue that the practico-ethical can world at nature's expense as we
saw in chapter 1.220 Schelling writes: “As long as we only know the totality of objects as the sum total
of all being, this totality is a mere world, that is, a mere product for us. It would certainly be impossible
in the science of nature to rise a higher idea than that of being if all permanence (which is thought in
the idea of being) were not deceptive, and really a continuous and uniform reproduction.”221
The substantial difference between Fichte and Schelling here is that the continuity of intuition
for Fichte can only come from the source of thought which itself must be cut out of, and isolated from,
nature. For Schelling this makes no sense. While Fichte leaves the connection between thought and
world intact, in that the world must be 'out there' in order for the actions and speech of the I to hold
together, how this notion of world relates to nature is not too clear. There is no quarter wherein thought
can isolate itself from nature and furthermore the positing of activity in the act of positing (I = I)
cannot be formal-practical as there would be no motor (no productive difference) by which thought
would come to be thought at all.222
To return to the mathematical, and to quality and quantity, this speaks to why the second order

220 As Grant helps make clear, it is not the method of artificial isolation which is damnable but that such a method of
isolation in Fichte makes the practical as such causally immune from nature. See Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of
Nature after Schelling (London: Continuum Publish Group, 2007), 82.
221 Schelling, First Outline, 202.
222 Markus Gabriel makes a similar argument towards the end of his Transcendental Ontology by equating das
Unvordenkliche (the unprethinkable) with the analytic concept of logical space. See Markus Gabriel, Transcendental
Ontology: Essays in German Idealism, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011). As I will discuss in
Chapter 5, Gabriel's account too easily erases Nature as a constraint in his articulation of the engine of predication as a
factual necessity and not a natural one.
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status of mathematics as a form of productive intuition must be reflective to the extent that it
recognizes, and can artificially construct, the heterogeneous from the homogeneous, or to how
mathematics makes the composite out of the continuous. If it does this in an ideal sense, because of the
reversibility of the ideal = real copula, we could say that it is through qualities as trajectories
(expressed through the geometrical) whereby the arithmetic of qualities makes the heterogeneous out
of the homogeneous (where the transcendental obtains its naturalized status as a symmetry 'break' in
nature) in a non-trivial sense. Furthermore, the spatial exploration of the exponential is a navigational
exploration whereas every trace of expansion and contraction is registered in the real as condition in
the ideal as possible ground for future consequent (in the form of speculation).223
It is in this latter sense that Schelling spends so much time foregrounding his discussion of
mathematics with a sense of space as absolutely real and absolutely ideal. The divisibility of space is
prominent in both the First Outline and the Ideas. The unconditioned, the purported Ungrund of all
qualities, is both the intensity by which the procedure of ungrounding, or isolation, could take place
(again pointing to how Schelling's notion of derivation and determination differs from Fichte's) and the
intensity which produces qualities. Or, in other words, the unground is the engine of both nature's
productions and our constructions224 since “Beyond space only pure intensity is thought.”225 The
reason why qualities cannot be constructed is due to the fact that they are pure action.226
This statement reinforces the two-pli duality of thought and world suggested by Oken. One can
state that there is an unground, or that there is pure action, but this would only add the concept without
potential consequences. But, as soon as one pursues the consequences they would move on the
spectrum of ideality and reality. To state that 'the unground ungrounds' is not mere definitional

223 I elaborate this in Chapter 5.
224 Schelling, First Outline, 207-209.
225 Schelling, First Outline, 208.
226 Schelling, First Outline, 209.
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tautology when the antecedent (or ground) is so abstract as to transform following the thinnest
occurrence of instantiation. Thus, the quality of qualities as pure action noted above, is not
explanatory, per se, but forces she who would think them to pursue other means, to decompose, or depotentiatie, in order to understand.
Or, in the Ideas: “For mathematics proceeds, for that reason [the inability to physically ground
particles] to dwell upon the infinite divisibility of space, and philosophy, though it may be wary of
saying that matter (considered in itself) consists of infinitely many parts, does not cease, on that
account, to insist upon an infinite divisibility, i.e., the impossibility of any completed division.”227 Or as
Schelling emphasizes a few pages later, such divisibility is an ideal procedure which cannot rely upon
a physical substratum if that substratum is exempted from physical explanation.228 Schelling's very
notion of ideality and construction contribute to a naturalism and are far afield from a naïve idealism.
Or to quote Schelling at length once more:
Space is conceptless intuiting, and thus in no way a concept that might have been first abstracted, say, from the
relationships of things, for although space arises for me through abstraction, it is still no abstract concept either in the sense
that categories are, or in the sense that empirical or specific concepts are; for if there was a specific concept of space, there
would have to be many spaces, instead of which there is but one infinite space […] space is merely an intuiting
throughout.229

To take Schelling at his word in saying that space = intuiting means that since being precedes
thinking, since nature is intuiting through us, then intuition, in this productive regard, is space. Here,
against Kant's limiting of intellectual intuition because of its temporal immediacy, we might say that
intuition, in Schelling's sense, can be taken as a spatial immediacy, a snap-shot of the proximal
territory.
It is difficult, for these reasons, to define space. On the one hand it seems to be an effortless
production (conceptless intuiting) but yet, following Kant, space is prior to thought in that it cannot be
227 Schelling, Ideas, 161.
228 Schelling, Ideas, 163.
229 F.W.J. von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 1978), 140.
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conceptually differentiated in an abstract sense, yet, it is also purely constructed by our moving in it.
Philosophy and mathematics both gain ground as they maximize the degree to which ideal construction
obtains upon real production. While philosophy and mathematics are not substantively different, they
are different in their methods due to the transcendental symmetry breaks through which nature endures
before producing the organ of human thought. But this break is not pursued by only testing a
correspondence, since the very nature of nature is to invade thought (in addition to producing it).
Nature constructs products through thought, products with varying degrees of impact in the world due
to the freedom of logical modality which is a simulation of nature's actual potencies.
Finally, we can proceed to the meaning of a quality's trajectory. Pursuant to this is how
Schelling, in his later work, approaches a so-called lived, or positive, philosophy. However, this is a
lived philosophy not in Fichte's sense whereby life must be given productive autonomy from nature to
guarantee the construction of its own ethical stability, but a philosophy in which only by testing the
bonds of the real's relation to the ideal do we get some sense of the law of the world and the capacities
of our own thought as a peculiar form of dimensionality.
3.3 - Potencies and Trajectories
A thought experiment does not set out to predict a fact or to transform this or that object, but rather to stage the physicist
himself grappling with his mental habits, and above all to lay bare the imagery that he uses when he claims to be merely
'commenting on' or 'verbalizing' the operative power that is supposed to be buried in the calculations. We know that
Einstein liked to imagine himself being dragged along in a chariot at the speed of light or totally isolated in a lift: to have
shown that there is no innocence of intuition is certainly one of his most decisive contributions to the community of
physicists.230
The interlacing of romanticism and transmodernity is perhaps surprising at first, but less so when we notice that many great
romantics – Novalis, Schelling and Goethe in particular – have taken up, with technical instruments far less robust than the
contemporary ones, extensive studies of the trans-.231

If the potencies are the addition of different trajectories, then quantitative difference appears in
between two operations of qualitative difference – the original ground of qualities, which can only ever

230 Gilles Châtelet, Figuring Space: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics (London: Springer, 1999), 56.
231 Fernando Zalamea, Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics, trans. L. Fraser (Falmouth: Urbanomic,
2012), 374.
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be ideally posited (and never constructed) and the symmetry-breaks, which result from the nonmerging addition of direction, and kinds in motion. Here again we see why space is so important for
Schelling – while space is “conceptless intuiting,” this does not mean that intuition creates space in
itself, but that intuition moves through a space and fills it as intuition is one of nature's intensities. It is
only when such intensity is turned on itself (as when nature thinks itself through us) that space is
occupied by intuition: “What occupies space is not matter, for matter is the occupied space itself.”232
Furthermore, whereas absolute quality may exist, we only experience relative quality, quality as
forces acting between those sites of self-investigation (the entities which, by their very nature as
entities, are experiments).233 But these experiments have trajectories of their own, and so how are we
to map the space of the experimental as well as the space of our own navigation?234
One can reexamine not only the Ideas and the First Outline but also, with an eye to specific
treatments of mathematics, take Schelling's discussions of dimensionality into account. By taking
dimensionality seriously in these earlier texts, as well as noting Schelling's attention to it in his later
work in the Darstellung lectures, one can see how the intuitive and constructive aspects of geometry
are ramified as a lived (or navigational) philosophy. But, whereas for Fichte this lived philosophy is
taken in predominately practico-ethical directions, for Schelling it results in a focus on a form of
pragmatics, or, what we might call a mechanics, or kinematics, of reason.
What is ultimately at stake is whether, by addressing the embodied nature of dimensionality,
Schelling is softening his critique of somaticism, or of substance, (pointing back to Oken's zero), or
whether the reflective, or second-order, status of geometry is undone by the embodiment of animal
232 Schelling, First Outline, 207.
233 Schelling, First Outline, 210.
234 One can relate this shifts back to the realm of knowledge in terms of what Robert Batterman has emphasized as the
importance of inter-theoretic reduction. Batterman argues that asymptotic thought is important for understanding the
way in which reduction functions within a field as opposed to across fields. Or, in other words, asymptotic thinking
signals the quantitative/qualitative split as operating differently within immanent abstraction and inter-theoretic
abstraction. See Batterman, Robert The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and
Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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dimensionality or of viewing thought as a species of motion. Furthermore, if quantity is a result of
quality's self-affection (or auto-affection) as opposed to a Fichtean auto-positing (of the I extracted
from nature), then how is one to account for the plethora of trajectories in the world? Or, put another
way, if the apparent difference in motion is one of more motion (of quantitative increase), then how
can one account for the conditions specific to species that determine the kinds of motions of which
they are capable?
Against Fichte's divisional derivation, Schelling's naturalistic derivation attaches to the
primordial status of human thought. This move, while initially stemming from his earliest
investigations of the Timaeus is later accelerated by his interest in Aristotle's De Anima. Following this
investigation into the ancients, mathematics appears as the demonstration of the free construction of
reason, of thought playing openly in the constructed space of intuition which is itself then transversed
by intuition. It then seems sensible to tie the naturalistic derivation of mathematical capacity to
movement. How does this map back onto Schelling's geometrical reading of the quantity/quality
relation?
In his remarkable Les Enjeux des Mobiles (translated as Figuring Space), Gilles Châtelet takes
up Schelling’s focus on the indifference point (earlier examined via Oken's kin-concept of the zero) as
itself the producer of two symmetries.235 In attempting to avoid both the ineffective calm of Spinozism,
and the overly-confident idealism of Leibniz, Schelling sees indifference as a point of analysis between
two operating powers, or polarities. The indifference point is less about nullifying difference, and
simply upon establishing an intuitive place from which differences in kind can be recognized.
Schelling’s productive intuition is what makes possible, and in turn is made possible by (though on a
different scale), the description of the universe as polarities which can only be adequately described in
the diagrammatic register. Where Schelling’s concept of the Potenzen is often reduced (such as by
235 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 75-76.
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Beach) to Spinozistic power and nothing more, Châtelet recognizes that it speaks to an original tension
of powers in Schelling that exponentially produce and spin out of control producing more and more
stages of being (Stufenfolge).236 Or, as we have already put it, the arithmetic of qualities gives rise to a
different order of quantity (or fields). This is why just as identity, and, subsequently powers must be
plural but univocal, powers add qualities in such a way that not only are magnitudes, or intensities of
their own kind, but also the metric of reading such multiplication, as an addition of quality, in respect
to to the production of the ideality of nature on the whole.237 An intensification can, at the same time,
be a new intensity, but both of these measures must be related to the continuum of nature which the
various powers constitute. As Châtelet’s description of the Naturphilosophical project as “feeding on
the specificity of the singular to reach the plane where the intuitive and the discursive are born
synchronously” illustrates this keenly.238
The inhabiting of an exponential, or a potentiated, being, as in the thought experiment of
Einstein imaging himself riding of a photon, of becoming the photon, creates a productive tension (or
delirium as Châtelet has it) between the quantitative and the qualitative, as this intuitive inhabiting
produces a potentiatation of both, as well as, an intensification of the unknowability of the relation
between them. This unthinkable qualitative change again points to the unreflective nature of
mathematics regarding the act of construction as such, and as a positive condition, and speaks to the
asymmetrical difference of one's own sense of motion detected in the intuitionistic move to another
potentiated body (a photon).
To put it more directly, intuition allows us to put ourselves in the place of another kind of
intensity to try and imagine what moving, and operating, according to that intensity would be like. This
is not a fool-proof action, however, as the very act of intuition, and its aforementioned lack of
236 See Beach's Potencies of the God(s) as discussed in chapter 1 as well as below in chapter 4.
237 See Grant, Philosophies, 169.
238 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 101.
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innocence, skews the setting down of oneself into another place. But, by taking up the potential
motions of another intensity, the very capacity of intuition itself becomes contaminated by those
potential alien movements. It is in regards to this later point that Schelling's focus on dimensionality is
fundamental particularly in the Darstellung lectures.
In his essay “How Nature Comes to be Thought” Iain Grant writes:
The 'ground of dimensionality' can only be thought consequently upon dimensionality, or, in other words, dimensionality is
emergent, if it is at all, from what is not dimensional. This does not mean that there are no dimensions prior to their
thought, but that there are none prior to the operation of dimensions such that only such a thought is capable of thinking the
emergence of dimensionality from non-dimensionality as such […] Since thought is that dimension of motion that causes
the problem of the ground of dimensionality to be a problem, it is clear that thought is amongst the dimensions of the
motions of bodies, or better, is precisely the totality of motions of which bodies are capable. 239

Thought, taken as motion, creates for us the problem of dimension. Or put otherwise, if thought
is a seemingly open-ended motion, then it presents us with an enormous version of “where do we go?”
Here Zalamea's point in the above epigraph is taken seriously: Schelling's approach to the
mathematical is one whereby he attempts to understand how the isolation of a field of space is related
to motion or, put otherwise, Schelling's mathematical interests are proto-category theory (concerned
with transformation) rather than proto-set theoretical (or concerned with belonging).
In the 13th lecture of Pure Rational Philosophy, Schelling notes that Kant's inability to move
beyond Aristotelian logic bears one positive aspect – that of assuming the simultaneity of time in the
idea, and that number is the temporal designation of moment; numericity co-evolves with
dimensionality.240 In the 16th lecture, Schelling engages the primordial nature of science, a
primordiality that numerous forms of mathematics always points to, if only indirectly, through the
formation of diagrams. This primordial nature is “the movement resting in what has being is also a

239 Iain Hamilton Grant, “How Nature Comes to be Thought: Schelling's Paradox and the Problem of Location,” in
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol 44, No. 1, 2013.
240 F.W.J. von Schelling, “Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie,” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, (Unpublished
Manuscript), 8-9. An avenue worth exploring but not possible in the space provided would be investigate Schelling's
influence on intuitionist mathematics more generally and particularly in relation to Leopald Kronecker (who studied
with Schelling) and his proto-intuitionism coupled with finitism which could draw light on Oken and Schelling's work.

114

movement of reason.”241 Movement is an arithmetic of qualities where the polarized is not negated, but
added as different potentialities in the actual thereby appearing as different trajectories. This marked
polarization guarantees that “the antecedent has its actuality in the consequent” as this antecedent is
what science separates (or in the language we have been using isolates) as Potenz. Following this ideal
reversibility, Schelling argues that mathematics is a potential science which demonstrates the
conditional necessity of space-time's interrelation.242 Or, in other words, mathematics is the potential
science which diagrams the capacities of being, whereas philosophy looks one step deeper into the
possibility of such a potentiality. In Schelling's 19th lecture on Pure Rational Philosophy, he addresses
the ground of dimensionality mentioned above by Grant. Schelling attempts to demonstrate how
dimensionality, as a problem, exists in the non-living world, or, how it is that dimensionality can be
derived at all243
In one sense, dimensionality is the result of the polarity of nature manifested in organic beings
(the arbitrariness of right and left for instance) which is species specific. For instance, Schelling
celebrates the utility of height for human experience over breadth, whereas breadth dominates in
inorganic nature in the layering of the strata, to take one example.244 In order to explain voluntary
movement, Schelling argues that one must invoke some notion of drive (or the Aristotelian soul) as a
cause of movement within particular directions according to species' embodiment.245 Schelling traces
the development of animal life to the successive addition of the manipulation of dimensions.246 Again,
what results is an arithmetic of qualitative change whereby trajectories give rise to more than mere
dimensions, they produce an altogether different law of worlding within nature. That is, the sum total

241 F.W.J. von Schelling, “Darstellung der Rein Rationalen Philosophie” Lecture 16 Excerpts, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant
(Unpublished Manuscript, 2014), 2.
242 Schelling, “Darstellung 16,” 3.
243 Schelling, “Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy, Lecture 19,” 3.
244 Ibid. 8.
245 Ibid. 9.
246 Ibid. 10.
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of the capacities of motion a species constitutes a consequent all, or abstract range, of motion.
Consequently, it is thought that is that species of movement which condenses all antecedent, and
material, dimensions.
Dimensionality offers an abstract, yet more concrete, form to thought than intentionality, or
other strictly phenomenological tools. However, the organic capacity for motion is not a necessary and
indelible mark on the world, nor a domain of infinite freedom, but that which tests avenues of
dimensional, and environmental, exploration often failing and/or going extinct. But in their constrained
freedom, life-forms change their environments, they redraw, albeit superficially (in the context of the
depths of nature), that which conditions their embodied freedom. At the same time, the gestures which
discover, and are discovered by, dimensionality suggest the synthetic capacities of reason are
unbounded, and bounded, in a productive (or we might say copulating) sense as in the very form of
synthesis, or Schellingian identity (A = A).247
3.4 - (Re)Constructing Continuity or Folding Math into Nature
The question with which I would like to close, to fold the mathematical back into the
philosophical is: what happens to mathematics if its productive blind-spot (of its incapacity to look into
the act of its own construction) is revealed by philosophy; i.e., what happens once you apply
Schellingian Naturphilosophie to mathematics? This problem is compounded by the fact that, if we
take the continuity thesis seriously, then the philosophy of mathematics is a species of
Naturphilosophie. And, furthermore, if Schelling ascribes to neither a strictly Platonic, nor
instrumental (nor Okenian substantialization) approach to number, what exactly is the status of
mathematical synthesis such that it is not purely ideal? Or, simply put, how do we situate, and
measure, the consequences of mathematics in nature?
Mathematics' limited sense of self-reflection is a positive constraint that consequently produces
247 In relation to gesture and mathematics I am heavily indebted to numerous conversations with Reza Negarestani.
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the capacity of simulation – of feeding constraints forward as apparently unbridled construction, or
ideal synthesis. As a consequence, productive intuition is not a revelatory immediacy that conceals
such synthesis, but its jumps and leaps highlight the qualitative differences which location, and
navigation, engender. Mathematics is closest to its intuitionist philosophical roots as it recognizes a
limit, and attempts to manipulate the construction in an unbound space, a space which is the ongoing
result of nature's intensity interpenetrating itself through us.
Here, following Châtelet amongst others, post-Kantian thought is not a crude return to
metaphysics, or dogmatic rationalism against the Kantian critical spirit, but various attempts to bring
Kant to the unstable, and moving ground, of either a unified ideal activity (Fichte), a polarized but
productive nature (Schelling), or the productive logic of the absolute spirit (Hegel). While the first and
third have been admitted to the realm of mathematical thinkers, Schelling remains cast out and yet, I
would argue, that his adherence to the problem of nature makes his thought all the more relevant for
thinking mathematics. Ultimately, Schelling's mathematical contributions amount to an arithmetic and
a geometry which attempt to incorporate, not only differing quantitative and qualitative magnitudes,
but to show that the very structure of a series, of the series that is the dynamic stages of nature
(Stufenfolge), must admit to an addition that cannot be erased in the progression of such a series.
One avenue that demonstrates this influence, which has been explored by Marie-Luise Heuser, is
Schelling's influence on the mathematician Hermann Grassmann and his father J.G. Grassmann. Both
Grassmanns began to formalize the Naturphilosophical self-organization of nature in mathematical
terms by studying why various matters of nature extend in particular ways. Heuser argues that
Hermann Grassmann attempted to develop a theory of extension that took dimensionality and, in
particular, the notion of a non-trivial infinity, into account to describe the non-linearity of the
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development of matter across time and in space.248 Similar to, but different from Oken, both
Grassmanns attempted to diagram the inner forces of nature as they then appear as phenomenal
products. The difference lies in the formal separation between dimensionality, or direction, and
quantity since, for the Grassmanns', quantity is the necessary but a posterori division of a universal
continuum of nature under constant morphogenesis. Far more work needs to be done to further flush
out these historical connections.249
Heuser traces this influence not only in the strictly mathematical world, but also to the history
of crystallography and, in particular, the work of C.S. Weiss. Weiss, under the general influence of
Naturphilosophie, developed a theory of continuous, i.e., non-atomized crystalline matter to explain
inorganic growth, and made the transition from Naturphilosophie to the mathematics of Grassmann
possible. Weiss, in an essay entitled “A Dynamic View of Crystalization” (1804), argued that
crystalline matter developed dynamically, and that the faces of a crystal were determined along axes
offset by non-material polarities.250 Weiss' emphasis on polarity, in turn, allowed him to describe the
faces of crystal formations as snapshots of the movement of polarities, of the forces acting according to
their vectorial nature. In this sense Weiss can be seen as following Schelling, where Oken differed
from him in relation the the generative nature of the zero, or the indifference point. In the
aforementioned essay Weiss writes: “All of nature can be thought of as a development of opposing
magnitudes (in the pure sense of mathematics) out of zero or null. One must not attribute an absolute
existence to any material substance; each is nothing but a magnitude, a pole which is separated from its

248 Marie-Luise Heuser, “The Significance of Naturphilosophie for Justus and Hermann Grassmann,” in H.-J. Petsche et
al. (eds.), From Past to Future: Graßmann’s Work in Context (Basel: Springer, 2011) 55-56.
249 Various commentators have suggested that Grassmanns' alliance with Naturphilosophie may have led to the poor
reception of his work at the time. For a summary of these views see Michael J. Crowe, A History of Vector Analysis:
The Evolution of the Idea of Vectorial System (Mineola: Dover Books, 2011).
250 See Andre Authier, Early Days of X-Ray Crystalography (London: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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opposite and which exists at all solely in that separation.”251 Weiss later developed this theory in a
mathematical notion of crystal growth in his essay “An Improved Method for the Identification of the
Various Surfaces of Systems of Cyrstalization, combined with Observations on the State of
Polarization of the Surfaces of the Lines of Crystalline Structure” (1816-1817).252
The tension between location and direction speaks not only to Schelling's emphasis on the
physics of his time but also to Schelling's unwillingness to abandon neither the importance of form in
Plato, nor the messiness of soul-as-entelchy in Aristotle. Or, against Fichte, mathematics and
Naturphilosophie are contained in the same world of worlds (or we might simply say nature). Whereas
Fichte's intuition is taken as inspiration for L.E.J. Brouwer's intutionist approach to mathematics, it is
unclear, given the intuitionist's thrust towards establishing the existence of mathematics, why they
would steer away from Schelling.253 Whereas Fichte's brilliantly argued self-generating form of the I is
clean of nature, it seems doomed in its isolation.254 It is not the intensity of the I's activity which
divides the continuity of nature into non-continuous realms of inert matter (not-I) but nature, in not
reflecting, operates on its own intensity thereby spreading out the ideas and concepts of mathematics
into the continuum. This is why the philosopher must look into the act of construction itself or, in other
words, engage in the realm of activity which makes up the form and the trajectory of thought. 255
Yet, at the same time, the free construction and wild synthesis of mathematics is a remarkable
example not only of a means of suspending (without obliterating) reflection but also the non-trivial
importance of intuition; that it does not reduce but fully acknowledges the pressure or momentum of
the abstract. It is for this reason that philosophy, as Naturphilosophie, must be ultimately concerned
251 C.S. Weiss, ““Dynamische Ansicht der Kristallisation” quoted in Kenneth L. Caneva, “Physics and Naturphilosophie:
A Reconnaissance,” in History of Science 1997 35: 35, 55.
252 See John G. Burke, Origins of the Science of Crystals (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
253 For such a treatment of intuition and its historical relation to mathematics see Roberto Torretti's Philosophy of
Geometry from Riemann to Poincare (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978).
254 Grant, Philosophies, 90.
255 Grant, Philosophies, 178.
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with forces, and more primordially, with the Potenz. Our enacting of the ideal does not mean only we
are capable of it but only that we are caught in its force and, as a result, the world of measure does not
stand apart from nature just as we do not stand apart from nature.
Ultimately, and as Michael Vater has suggested, Schelling's emphasis on the trajectorial nature
of mathematics as an additive procedure, is what separates him most sharply from Hegel and Hegel's
speculative logic.256 While Vater argues that this shows Hegel's dazzling conceptual breadth as over
and above Schelling's dusty formalism, I would argue, and hope to show in the following chapters, that
it is in fact Schelling's restraint about philosophy's capacity of determining conceptual content, that he
sees as the core of his later project of positive philosophy.
Or, put otherwise, Schelling attempts to describe the embodiment and conceptual weight that
the structures of nature engender without fixing their effect to particular concepts. The crux of this
attempt, as we will explore in the next chapter, is Schelling's development of the Potenzen. The
Potenzen, I will argue, are Schelling's attempt to create the leanest structure of nature possible in order
to determine both transcendental, and immanent conditions, for, and beyond, human cognition.

256 Addressed in Vater's notes to F.W.J. von Schelling, Bruno, or On the Natural and Divine Principle of Things (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1984).
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4 - The Red Threads of the World: Potenzen, Construction, and Inexistence
Everything, absolutely everything, even that which by nature is external, must have already become internal to us before we
can present it externally or objectively. 257
First of all, everything that is in Nature, and Nature considered as sum total of existence, is not even present for us. To
philosophize about nature means to create Nature.258

The following chapter provides a historical outline of Schelling's theory of powers otherwise
known as the Potenzen. Schelling's Potenzen emerge following his explorations of dynamics via Kant
and Spinoza, on the one hand, and from attempting to place human thought properly in the world
following the constraints of identity, and the capacities of construction, following Fichte, on the other
hand. Between these theoretical poles, Schelling's Potenzen, I argue, function as a structuration of
freedom-as-dynamics thereby crossing the mind and world boundary. For Schelling, an unavoidable
tension of this naturalized form of freedom, particularly concerning philosophy, arises between the free
construction of philosophical systems in general, and the totalizing form of philosophy as such. As was
already suggested in Chapter 1, this tension manifests itself in that the philosopher is to never complete
a final system, a final container for all being and knowing, but to always provisionally create systems
which attempt to do justice to the open-ended world. This open-endedness disavows any heavy
reliance upon either origin, or goal, as either ontological states, or normative imperatives.
The immediate problem that arises, and one that should be evident following the discussions of
space and sense in Chapter 2, and space and motion in relation to construction in Chapter 3, is how to
locate such constructive activities, and the results of such activities, if there are no knowable contours
of the world. The immediate temptation, and the reason why I believe Schelling utilizes the cosmology
of Plato alongside the biology of Aristotle, is to metaphysicalize dogmatically, or to ontologize
enthusiastically. Schelling recognizes, in philosophy at large, what could be called the metaphysical257 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans. Jason Wirth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000),
xxxvii. Translation modified.
258 F.W.J. von Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004), 14.
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ontological demand. This demand is simply the fact that philosophy aims at the all, it attempts to
explore the totality of things and each and everything equally. Regardless of one's stated philosophical
aims, goals, or methods, Schelling seems to suggest, particularly in the advent of the so-called positive
philosophy (arguably beginning after 1809, and surely by 1815), that philosophy will unavoidably
explore, and generate, errantly. Philosophy, according to both the early and late Schelling, should not
create for the mere sake of creating, nor can it ignore the creative impulse of philosophy as such in the
form of the metaphysical-ontological demand.259
The uncertain spatial bounds of Schelling's conceptualization of nature, as having no beginning
and no end, pointed to, but not fully explored, in Chapters 2 and 3, necessitates his utilization of the
Potenzen. The Potenzen meet the metaphysical-ontological demand while reasserting nature's
autonomy, but simultaneously acknowledging, our high, or highly augmented, place in nature. As a
result of this complexity, the Potenzen are one of the least understood (and often outright ignored)
aspects of Schelling's philosophy on the whole. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that Schelling
is not given much, if any, theoretical autonomy, and is seen as either simply agreeing with Kant,
Fichte, Spinoza, or being a transition point between Fichte and Hegel that does not warrant deeper
investigation.260 Yet, as seen in the last chapter, taking only Schelling's view of constructive
knowledge via mathematics into account, the degree to which a powers-based ontology sets Schelling
apart from his contemporaries becomes clear. In relation to Chapter 3, the transition from the Fichtean
activity of the 'I,' or a general notion of intellectual intuition, does not over-determine nature (such as
suggesting that nature is merely the unconsciousness of the I only), but further buttresses the strength
of Schelling's abstract, and formal, approach to the quantitative vis a vis the qualitative. This approach

259 F.W.J. von Schelling Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 11 and F.W.J. von Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as a
Science.”
260 In the editor's introduction to The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy for instance Sedwick notes that Schelling is
basically consistent with Kant but provides no textual evidence, 1.
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allows Schelling to assess what the structure of nature is in how thought is productive with, and not of,
nature in a straight forward sense. Or, put otherwise, Schelling's powers-based ontology allows him to
navigate the pitfalls of both mechanism and dynamism in physics, via a non-naive notion of
construction; a mode of construction which must epistemologically and ontologically maximally
obtain in terms of the diversity of individuation, and the stability of nature as a world system over
time.261 Construction by nature, and by us, does not differ in kind, but only in location and degree.
Schelling illustrates this continuity by simply arguing that thought is the field in which we
experience the Potenzen, or powers, as thought. That is, our relation to thought demonstrates the
ungroundedness, or inexistence, of nature at both temporal and spatially 'ends.' If one asked 'Where are
you thinking in relation to the start and end of thinking, or even a single thought?' a feeling of both
positive and negative freedom would result; a feeling of seemingly unlimited creativity coupled with
an apparently unassailable blockage at locating the thing that thinks in relation to the process of
thinking. This question demonstrates the apparent unavoidability of the Potenzen as an active
oscillation between being and becoming.
Furthermore, overlooking the ungroundedness and constructive account of Schelling's nature
also serves to straw-man Schelling's notion of freedom as a naïve form of faith,262 or as demonstrating
an impossible immediacy of conceptual acquisition (of over-emphasizing the capacity of intellectual
intuition, a tendency I hopefully dispelled in Chapter 3). The immediacy of Schelling's articulation of
intuition is not one of content (since the very concept is only ever a recapitulation of the real series),
but an immediacy of form which Kant utilizes in simultaneously connecting the analytic to the
synthetic, or matter to experience in the ether proofs of the Opus Postumum. As we have seen, this

261 Karl Jaspers, in Reason and Existenz (1955) refers to the Potenz as indicating a “construction field.” Quoted in Grant's
“Remains of the World” Edward Beach affirms this but in terms of Schelling's notion of will in Potencies of the Gods,
115
262 Sedwick, Reception of Kant, 13.
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raises numerous questions in terms of whether Kant's final synthesis is dogmatic, Spinozistic, critical,
or something else altogether. What separates Schelling from Kant in this regard, however, is the
ungroundedness of such powers. On this point, Schelling is also seemingly close to, and distant from
Spinoza, as discussed in Chapter 1. As Schelling makes clear on numerous occasions, he views
Spinoza's system as too realistic in a mechanistic sense, or as lacking in dynamics, thereby restricting
any sense of contingency or freedom.263
Schelling's emphasis on dynamics, and a powers-based ontology, suggests a broadly
Aristotelian orientation whereas ungroundedness, as such, is distinctly Platonic in that it functions, like
the Platonic idea, as a real universal condition.264 That is, the Aristotelian view that powers inhere in
particular natural kinds, or essences, is abstracted, via Platonic cosmology, by a general creation or
motion to the world as was highlighted at the end of Chapter 1. For Schelling, essences are always
bifurcatory, moving in two directions between their Aristotelian naturalistic basis, and their structural,
or abstract capacities following a Platonic conceptualization of the World-Soul, of that which is taken
as the first motion of the world. Since, as we saw above, Schelling states that the philosophical life
'should begin with Plato and end with Aristotle' it is not surprising that the Potenzen, as a concept used
throughout Schelling's work, would attract both historical valences. Put broadly, Schelling's theory of
the potencies allows him to simultaneously assert the importance of a nature 'outside us,' while
acknowledging our limited ability in understanding it because it is already within us. Or, put otherwise,
the Potenzen are created to appease skepticism, as well as the metaphysical-ontological demand, in
order to avoid the limitations of a brute mechanical philosophy, and, to navigate through a possibly
mystifying dynamic atomism, by asking 'why is there neither merely being, nor merely becoming?'
263 See F.W.J. von Schelling, “Stuttgart Seminars,” in Thomas Pfau, Idealism and the Endgame of Theory (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994), 214 as well as F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy,
trans. Andrew Bowie, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 65-66.
264 Frederick Beiser suggests this in his article “Dark Days” in Dark Days: Anglophone Scholarship since the 1960s’, in
German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives ed. Aspen Hammer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 81-83.
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Schelling does not achieve this delicate balance by asserting human finitude in the face of
nature, nor by over-determining nature's capacity for infinitude. Most importantly, nature is that which
precedes and produces us but is, in itself, incomplete, or open, in that anything that it could be said to
contain actually determines its borders. To flesh this out I will attempt to construct a history of
Schelling's development of the Potenzen beginning with the dynamic forces in his work prior to his
formal presentations of them before moving onto the discussion of the Potenzen proper in the
Presentations and Further Presentations.
My more specific goal in producing a historical survey of Schelling's Potzenen is to
demonstrate how Schelling attempts to construct, and maintain, a minimal difference between motion
and space or, more generally in the terms of the Potenzen, between creation and structure. This
difference lies in determining the status of the Potenzen as an inexistent necessity.265 While I will
return to this in the conclusion, I would state briefly that inexistent necessity, or the contingent
necessity of necessity is Schelling's argument for a consequently original momentum to creation which,
because of its inexistence, is necessarily ungraspable (or unprethinkable) for us, yet, is the condition of
all forms of creation noetic and otherwise. This does not mean nature as such or the Potenzen as such
are the unprethinkable (thereby making the unprethinkbale into an entity), but that finding them in
thought, has potential ontological consequences. But, just because we discover the Potenzen in thought
does not mean that thought contains nature, or the Potenzen, but rather that the construction of the
Potenzen (as always being in thought) is how we have a provisionally minimalistic ontology. Thus, to
say a Potenz or power is, only means that there are general classes of can-be-states (or dispositions, or
tendencies) that function across numerous dimensions.
265 I choose the term inexistent with some trepidation as it has roots in Anslem's ontological proof of God's existence as
well as Brentano's theory of inexistent-intentionality neither which I wish to directly address. However, both of these
usages lend some coherence to Schelling's Potenzen as inexistent. In terms of Anselm, Schelling can be seen as trying
to argue that existence does add something to being (contra Kant) and, in relation to Brentano, inexistence functions as
an intentionality in terms of the momentum of creation in Schelling's concept of nature.
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Given the necessary, yet minimal, ontological consequence of thinking, the fact that Schelling
is conscripted to both anti- (or post-) metaphysical camps, and high- (or ultra-) metaphysical camps at
once is not surprising given that Schelling attempts to create a lean metaphysics of modality as such or,
put otherwise, to construct a theory of how construction occurs with, and without, human participation.
For Schelling, modality is the merely ideal expression of the concept of potency. As he puts it in 'On
the I' – modality is not, pace, Kant, synthetic, but merely sylleptic. I return to this point in the
conclusion of this chapter.
Furthermore, this is why it is difficult to cleanly parse Schelling's epistemological claims from
his ontological claims. While the next chapter will deal with the former, the following pages attempt to
trace the development of Schelling's notion of the potencies over his career treating them as minimally
ontological. Approaching Schelling's use of powers or potencies historically, I have two subsequent
aims: firstly, to uphold, and do justice to, the continuity thesis, i.e., that Schelling's work is not
fractured into periods conceptually, but only in focus. Secondly, by moving historically through
Schelling's use of the Potenzen, I hope to demonstrate how their lack of domain specificity (whether in
thought, art, production, natural processes etc.) exhibits their basic functional use as opposed to being
viewed as metaphysically domineering, or ontologically superfluous. Finally, discussion of texts that
briefly mention the Potenzen, have been relegated to footnotes in the relevant time frame.
4.1 - Schelling's Dynamics as Proto-Potenzen in The First Outline (1799), The Ideas (1797, 1803),
System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)
Perhaps the most important contribution of Schelling to the development of field theory was his recognition of what was
only implicit in Kant. If matter and material phenomena could be seen only as the results of attractive and repulsive forces,
then it seems obvious that all phenomena should be reduced to those forces. 266

In her text Schelling and the End of Idealism, Dale Snow argues that Schelling's earliest
discussion of dynamic forces sets the stage for the later development of the potencies. Schelling's
266 L. Pearce Williams, The Origin of Field Theory (New York: Random House, 1966), 46.
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adoption of dynamic forces serve as a lineage from Kant, that allows Schelling to simultaneously break
from Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza.267 To begin, one must distinguish Schelling's Potenzen from Spinoza's
powers. At the most basic level, Spinoza's doctrine of powers is one ultimately ruled by divine adequation. That is, regardless of Spinzoa's pantheism a power, or potency, is always measured by how it
would be in the mind of god, i.e., powers are ultimately under the rule of the One-All or, put otherwise,
potencies for Spinoza function as measures within a domain of pure immanence. For Schelling, the
potencies are torn between being additive trajectories and exponential qualities (as we saw in the last
chapter). They are additive in their geometrical dimension (as first to thirdness is due to adding degrees
of freedom in a physical sense) but exponential in that they are always increasing in intensity, as the
function of thinking them, of construction itself, is one of identity-as-intensification. Or, put another
way, since conceptual space and actual space are inseparable for Schelling, because of the primordial
continuity of nature, more of something means more of something in space and more intense than it
was.
The rudimentary source-material for Schelling's generation of the Potenzen also separates them
from a Spinozist provenance. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Schelling's notion of the Potenzen
combines mathematical and organic notions of power (taken from Eschenmayer and Kielmeyer
respectively). Where Schelling seems to down-play the mathematical aspect of the Potenzen, and playup its biological aspects in terms of how recapitulation is deployed in his notion of natural history for
example, I argue that the mathematical (and particularly spatial) aspects of the Potenzen guarantee the
historical dimension of the Potenzen but in a futural, rather than historical, sense.268
Given this, how can Edward Beach assert that Schelling's Potenzen are similar to, or even the
same as, Spinoza's powers? Beach emphasizes the Spinozistic quality of Schelling's potencies given

267 Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism (Albany: State University New York Press, 1996), 155-156.
268 Grant, Philosophies, 122.
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the fact that he reads Schelling as relying heavily on the potencies to give determination conceptual
rigor against Hegel's reliance upon the conceptual as being capable of capturing the totality of the
world thus determined.269 That is, Beach suggests that Schelling uses the potencies primarily to
contradict Hegel's utilization of, and reliance on, logic following Schelling's temporalization of being,
or, in other words, the potencies are how Schelling justifies the inadequacy of logic to grasp being.270
In terms of their purely negative, or critical function, Beach's account seems adequate. However, once
he begins to discuss the positive explanatory function of the potencies, I believe the discussion suffers
from an over reliance on viewing the potencies in an anti-Hegelian, and at times, pseudo-Spinozist
fashion. Beach, following Snow and others, claims that not only do the Potenzen function in a
dialectical, albeit modified form, but that they are ultimately manifestations of a primordial will. While
the discussion of will indexes the need to explain the creativity of the world in time, which can be
related to the metaphysical-ontological demand above, it is overly psychologized, or spiritualized, in
Beach's text.271 Furthermore, this move substantializes the potencies more than Schelling would allow.
While the potencies act to transform the possible into the actual, and subsequently treat the possible as
material, they themselves cannot be said to be merely, or even primarily, material in nature in a
substantive manner. I will discuss Beach's work more at length below given that he largely focuses on
Schelling's work after 1815. His general suggestion regarding Schelling''s Spinozism, however, seems
to require addressing Schelling's earlier phases given the general assumption that Schelling is
functioning under a largely Spinozist mode from 1797 until 1802.
Schelling's repeated critiques of Spinoza, already noted in Chapters 1 and 2 above, indicate that
a substantialist reading of the Potenzen does not comply with Schelling's general call for substratum-

269 Edward Allen Beach, Potencies of the God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1994), 117-127.
270 Beach, Potencies, 111.
271 Beach, Potencies, 114-115.
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independence in both philosophy and science. Furthermore, the temporal unboundedness of the
Potenzen which rely neither on limited, nor total being (pure immanence a la Spinoza), nor on pure or
unruly becoming (a la Bergson or Deleuze), break Schelling out of the purely Aristotelian trajectory of
philosophy. The notion of inexistence, which has roots in the medieval philosophy, better fits the status
of the Potenzen and of Schelling's conceptualization of nature in general: that of always coming to be
but affected by what it already is. Thus, I argue that taking the Potenzen as part of a metaphysical
holism, which leads many commentators back to Spinoza's immanence, is the wrong move. As
mentioned above, Schelling sees any notion of origin or end as provisional, hence why he utilizes the
term Prius and Posteior. Therefore while everything exhibits the all, or the cosmos, no claim can be
made that this all is a closed whole.
Schelling writes in the Ideas that: “form and matter are inseparable […] every organization is a
whole; its unity lies in itself, it does not depend on our choice” but, at the same time, unity is a
concept, and something constructed by us through reflection.272 This relation of the absolute ideal, and
the absolute real, is a lynch pin to philosophy itself, and philosophy as a science.273 Or, as Schelling
puts it earlier in the Ideas: “we require to know, not how such a Nature arose outside us, but how even
the very idea of such a Nature has got into us; not merely how we have, say, arbitrarily generated it,
but how and why it originally and necessarily underlies everything that our race has ever thought about
Nature.”274
The use of “originally and necessarily” should give some pause given the opening statements of
this chapter, namely, that necessity is always consequent for Schelling, and that origin is always
provisional. Nature allows the processes by which we come to have a concept of nature, a concept

272 F.W.J. von Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol Harris, and Peter Heath (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 31-32.
273 Ibid. 44.
274 Ibid. 41.
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which leads us to posit an origin only if it functions as an ideal starting point to organize our thoughts
about a nature that has long pre-existed us as a race. Yet, the being of nature is what makes it impress
its limits on us, which, since these limits are at least discoverable orthogonally by us conceptually, then
particular concepts can be taken to be structurally, i.e., maximally consequential.
Thus, there appears to be some resistant granules, some traces of structure, which do not
disappear in the creative folding and unfolding that are the processes of nature. These entities are not
origins but are more original than other products so far discovered. This is evident in Schelling's early
interest in chemistry which arguably foregrounds his construction of the Potenzen. Chemistry, as an
early combinatorial model of dynamic nature, helps justify the use of the original actant in the opening
sections of the First Outline. He writes: “The individuality of the original actants however, strives
against this universalization. The individuality of all actants ought to be maintained in the absolute
product together with the most complete combination.”275 Towards the end of the First Outline
Schelling writes: “This idea of pure intensity is expressed by the idea of the actant. It is not the product
of this action that is simple, but the actant itself abstracted from the product, and it must be simple in
order that the product may be infinitely divisible.”276
The specificity of the relation between terms here foreshadows the particular contours of the
Potenzen to come later. The actants can participate in universality, and in all combinations of nature's
products, but something of their individuality must remain. This individuality is then later connected to
pure intensity, but pure intensity is an idea which is expressed by the actants. The simplicity of the
actant is not that of a decomposable object, or product, but that which allows any given product, any
collision of forces which registers as a Scheinprodukt, to be viewed and measured quantitatively,
because its being depends upon the intensity of the powers which compromises it.

275 Schelling, First Outline, 28.
276 Ibid. 208.
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Iain Hamilton Grant takes issue with the articulation of actants as natural monads in his
Philosophies of Nature after Schelling: “The units of activity' or natural monads effectively recover the
Kantian project in the Physical Monadology, and do not serve to buttress the identity of forces in
nature (the identity of which in any case lies in the construction of matter) but rather to identify unites
of natural activities with those of transcendental ones.”277 Here I believe Grant's anti-Kantianism,
mentioned in Chapter 1, is overemphasized, albeit slightly. It is less the case, I would argue, that
Schelling is transcendentalizing action in nature as such, andis instead problematizing the question of
access between the transcendental position, and that of Naturphilosophie, while taking into account
that the transcendental perspective is throughly natural. In making cuts into nature, in treating the flow
of nature in a punctuated fashion rehearses, in utero, the difference between potencies to the extent
they can be detected in thought. Thus, the dynamic atoms, or actants, are expressions of intensity as an
idea, i.e., as another potency translated into thinking as a kind of interference pattern, or distortion,
which requires an asymptotic, or otherwise highly experimental, approach. The notion of the Potenzen
in relation to real patterns, and thus to Plato's ideas, lead us to Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of
Nature.
Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1799, 1803)278
Schelling's introduction of the potencies ties them immediately to both Leibniz's monadology
(therein linking them, albeit slightly, to Schelling's actants of the First Outline just discussed) as well
as to the proper means of reading the Platonic ideas (Idee). Throughout Schelling's Ideas, experiments
in the physical sciences, particularly regarding magnetism, light, and gravity, are attached to
discussions of how nature is conceived transcendentally. In this regard, the Ideas can be taken as the
277 Grant. Philosophies, 151.
278 The fact that the Ideas was written in 1799 and revisited in 1803 creates difficulties for my chronological attempt here.
Especially given the fact that the explicit mention of the Potenzen occurs in the 1803 Supplements and not the original
text. I leave the discussion of the Ideas here, however, since he relates the Potenzen to the natural sciences, and is thus
in the same spirit as the First Outline.
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reverse image of the First Outline in which transcendental philosophy is set into nature, where, in the
Ideas, nature makes transcendental philosophy, as such, possible. This latter point is further unfolded
in The System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) while the former is worked out in the Presentations
(1800-1802).
In relation to the Platonic ideas, the potencies function as a means of explaining how a
hierarchy of difference emerges from within nature's unity without relying upon holism or pure
immanence. The infinite is embodied in the finite, but this finite is added to the unity that is nature. In
this sense, nature is best viewed not as a whole but as an extensive all (or the whole-so-far). Thus,
nature creates by adding its failure to recreate itself, to reflect fully or to contain itself as a finite entity
thereby expanding outward.279 Potencies function as a way of particularizing types of unities that
contribute to this expansion in that Schelling is attempting to explain how nature unfolds itself through
particularities ,which are always relative infinities, or unities.280 He writes:
These unities, each of which signifies a definite degree of embodiment of the infinite into the finite, are represented in three
potencies of Nature-philosophy. The first unity, which in embodying the infinite into the finite is itself again this
embodiment, presents itself as a whole through the universal structure of the world, individually through the series of
bodies. The other unity, of the reverse embodiment of the particular into the universal or essence, expresses itself, though
always in subordination to the real unity which is predominant in Nature, in universal mechanism, where the universal or
essence issues as light, the particular as bodies, in accordance with all dynamical determinations. Finally, the absolute
integration into one, or indifferencing, of both unities, yet still in the real, is expressed by organism, which is therefore once
more the in-itself of the first two unities.281

This organism, or living unity, enters ideality as reason reflecting upon itself, as complete but
ongoing creation by reason. But, this process is not mere reflection, as it is expressed by something out
of it, the unity, and indifference of, the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite. It is important
to note that the whole is a presentation of a series (pointing back to the expression function of the
actants above) while the particulars also can be extrapolated as demonstrating their place in the all. In
the language above it is important to note the potencies are neither things, nor even processes, but
279 Schelling, Ideas. 49.
280 Ibid. 49.
281 Ibid. 51.
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second-order tendencies which appear as unities, but they are unities which are always imperfectly
captured because of their mediated expression. However, this image is slightly complicated, as
throughout the rest of the text, the potencies are used in a plural sense as if they are powers, i.e.,
chemical or magnetic potencies as opposed to the strictly structural sense that Schelling seems to
emphasize earlier. Later on in the supplemental texts to the Ideas, the potencies are further broken
down into a three step system as is commonly done in his texts: The first dimension, also known as the
formative principle, is discussed as the repetition of the same process in the attempt for stability (where
matter emerges as the first existent), while the second is the contraction of such irritability represented
by electricity, and the third step is the emergence of sensibility via light (the expansive force). 282
It is important to note once again that while the First Outline can be read as a transcendental
account of the Naturphilosophie, i.e., a discussion of nature from the view of thought (as the epigraph
about thinking nature being a mode of creation suggests), the Ideas attempts to view nature in terms of
particular physical theories and experiments. What remains the same, however, and what Schelling
will formalize most directly in the Presentation of My System, is that either in a transcendental or
empirical sense, the Potenzen are those tendencies which seem identifiable as individuals but, at the
same time, are infinite in their particularity. Pursuing the transcendental view in the following years,
Schelling develops this particularity as infinite in kind in terms of a self, thereby modifying the
Fichtean inspiration of activity as we saw in Chapter 1.
It is worth returning here to Beach's aforementioned emphasis on will and its relation to the
potencies above. Given the notion of self, of self as an activity which is particular, yet seemingly
infinite, in its expressibility, it would seem that the notion of primordial will is even more likely a
means of discussing the potencies. Yet, the notion of the self, or of the subject, must be taken in its
fully complex Schellingian articulation. This does mean subjects in a Kantian sense, or as personality
282 Ibid. 137-138.
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rooted in a particular soul, or person, but self as a particular whose expression is particular but,
importantly, this particularity, and what the self is expressing, is not of it alone. This will become clear
in investigating the Potenzen further in The System of Transcendental Idealism and how this relates to
Schelling's use of the concept of identity.
The System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)
In The System of Transcendental Idealism the discussion of the potencies seem to shift, at least
in terms of describing them as potencies in nature, as opposed to potencies or powers that are integral
to the development of consciousness as such. In the text, Schelling is attempting to relate Fichte's
exacerbation of Kantian self-hood to some account of an external, or natural, world. This requires
addressing the relation of a subject to an object in such a way that preserves that capacity of both. In
discussing the Fichtean proposition 'self = self' or 'A = A,' Schelling argues that this is not a statement
of identity traditionally understood, but one of synthesis.283 Schelling claims that synthesis and identity
are synthetic and identical together, most obviously, when spoken about in terms of a self. Schelling
states that this is because the notion of self clearly, at least for us, nominates that which is a duality
within identity, or a subject-object, a thing that is simultaneously a thing and a process, or activity.
Schelling then brings this in relation to the Potenzen in the following way:
Natural science proceeds arbitrarily from nature, as the simultaneously productive and produced, in order to derive from the
concept the particular. The identity in question is an immediate object of knowledge only in immediate self-consciousness;
in that the highest power of self-objectification, to which the transcendental philosopher raises himself at the outset-not
arbitrarily but through freedom; and the fundamental duality in nature is itself ultimately inexplicable only inasmuch as
nature is taken to be intelligence.284

Thus, the potencies are discovered necessarily in the very structure of thought thinking
something, of some content being taken as a thing at all. The immediacy of knowledge here is not one
of full understanding, but a structural necessity that states in order for a self (an activity particularized)

283 F.W.J. von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University of Virginia,
1978), 30.
284 Ibid.
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to interact with another activity, a form of self-objectification is accomplished by a power, a power
that, while encountered by intelligence, must be other than intelligence but not so other (not outside the
unity) as to allow these activities to interact. At the same time, the above quote serves as a metaphilosophical, or methodological, note on Schelling's own approach to the Potenzen in his earliest
work.
But the raising of the philosopher's consciousness mentioned above, and the importance of
Potenz for synthesis is not merely a bridge of communication, but a means of augmentation. The selfobjectification of the philosopher can be taken to be 'higher' in the sense of viewing conceptual space,
as placing the conceptual space beneath her to view critically, thereby connecting the exponential
nature of the Potenzen as having a quantitative increase coupled with a direction (and not an arbitrarily
'better' or, a more abstract qualitative shift in and of itself) as seen in Chapter 3.
As Schelling writes:
I find that the consciousness of an objective world is implied in every moment of my consciousness, and conclude,
therefore, that something objective must already enter from the beginning into the synthesis of self-consciousness, and must
again issue from the latter in its developed form […] The self, once transposed into time, consists in a steady passage from
one presentation to the next; yet it remains, after all, within its power to interrupt this series by reflection.285

This interruption, which activity has the power to do, is not an ontological break in the fabric of
things, but an ideal series that treats the break as if it were an origin, even though origins cannot be
found and are always artificial (to be discussed in more epistemological detail in chapter 5). In treating
the necessary, or the original as free, as a choice, it becomes a new series of acts (at least for us) but
this does not entail a 'blank check,' or, an easily won form of freedom. The imitation must be exact in
order to do justice to the real which forms the basis of the ideal copy, and yet, the ideal copy is an
addition to the real only insofar as the consequences and investigations of the real, via the ideal, allow
for more about the real to be discovered.286 Again the exponential nature of the Potenzen should be

285 Ibid. 48-49.
286 Ibid. 49.
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evident – it is a sameness with an addition of a trajectory that may or may not add to that from which
the power issues as ground.
The testing of whether or not the ideal methods of the self-as-activity obtain on the world
results in the self, once it limits itself via intuition, and appears as a being caught between constant
expansion and contraction. The self-as-activity must encounter its own limits in order to expand
beyond them otherwise idealism, and the very notion of the ideal, simply makes all the world
illusory.287
Whereas in the First Outline Schelling encounters, and begins to sketch, the actants (or pure
qualities) as having a distinct dynamic power, in the System, Schelling engages productive intuition in
order to explain how the very notion of potencies come to be for us. Both terms exhibit the synthetic
identity of the real and ideal series in that actants, are speculative entities which make thinking about
intensities, or the world outside of us possible, whereas in the System, the pure activity of the self is
only possible through the invasion of an outside world in us.
Once again, the tensions and difference between the transcendental and Naturphilosophical use
of Potenz is reflected in the arguments over whether the Potenzen are derived more from mathematical
(algebraic) sources or organic sources. In the System, Schelling defines transcendental philosophy as
such as the power of raising the self to a higher power which, in the history of the genesis of
intelligence, means the re-drawing of the origin of a decision from being rooted in blind necessity to
free choice. This choice, or general act of intelligence, however, does not mean that human decision
ruptures the ontological fabric of the world pace Johnston and Žižek as discussed in chapter 1, but that
methods which trace the consequences of a particular world at least appear as freedom, appear as
redirecting the succession of the activities of a self.288 It is more the case, as Schelling puts it in

287 Ibid. 76.
288 Ibid. 118.
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relating human intelligence to that of animals, that it is the recognition of the 'naturalness' of the
succession of representations and intelligence's hand in moving them along, or, of reflection effecting
the natural capacities of sense for instance, that a different direction, or act of free choice, occurs.289
Here Schelling appears to be shifting back to the notion of the Potenzen discussed above in the
First Outline. As Schelling argues organization, and the individuation of nature, is simply nature
operating on itself thereby leading to the emergence of things from a dynamic and relative oneness. 290
This self-operation has fascinating consequences for the analysis of nature, and makes a spatial and
motive account of natural processes embodied in their particularities an interesting avenue of analysis.
But this is not the direction that the System pursues. Schelling entrenches the raising of the self-asactivity to the higher power in stricter and stricter human terms in the closing pages of the text.
While this is recuperated in the Philosophy of Art, for the years following Schelling is more interested
in discussing the Potenzen in ways less directly applicable, it would appear, to the internal functioning
of human consciousness. In the so called Identity philosophy to which we now turn, Schelling attempts
to abstract the notion of the Potenzen to their formal and natural limit. This is evident in the next phase
of Schelling's use of the potencies applied to physics, art, and geometry particularly in regards to
Platonism most evident in the Bruno.
4.2 - Schelling's Potenzen in the Universal Deduction (1800), Presentation (1801), Further
Presentations (1802), and Philosophy of Art (1804)
Whereas our discussion of the potencies in the last section relates to Chapter 2 in terms of
relating the actants, or proto-physical singularites, to the transition problem of moving from the
conditions of physics to physics as such, the break with Fichte, which occurs in the letters and in the
Presentations (Presentation of My System of Philosophy and Further Presentations from the System of
Philosophy), demonstrates a more geometrical or spatially-constructive approach. In a broader sense,
289 Ibid. 124.
290 Ibid. 126.
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the second phase of Schelling's utilization of the Potenzen (from 1800-1804) appears split between
diagrammatic and Naturphilosophical means (the Presentations and The Universal Deduction) and
more artistic, or generally creative, attempts to express them (The Philosophy of Art). The reason for
this is already evident in the above discussion, that is, it is Schelling continuing to struggle with
identifying creativity, and separating expression from nature, or being itself. The diagrammatic
becomes a way to discuss abstract expression of quality, vis a vis quantity, whereas the Platonic style
of Bruno, and the litany of examples in The Philosophy of Art, attempt to demonstrate a unity through
continuous creativity.
Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process or the Categories of Physics (1800)
Following both the style and content of the Ideas, Schelling begins his abstraction of natural
processes, via the diagram, in the Universal Deduction. Schelling states that in order to understand
nature one must speculate as to the universal properties of it, even if investigating these properties, is
an infinite task. Schelling speaks of these “primitives” (thereby echoing the language of the First
Outline) as “the self-construction of matter repeated at different levels.”291
Construction is the overwhelming theme of the Universal Deduction as it follows, generally,
the language, and method, of the Ideas but addresses the nature of the Potenzen through a geometrical
mode also found in the First Presentation and Further Presentations. The Universal Deduction also
makes references to the Potenz as types of forces in nature as exhibited in the First Outline. These
general motions can be detected from the fist line of the text “The sole task of natural science is to
construct matter” to just a few paragraphs later “Our entire endeavour [4] can therefore be restricted
only to seeking out the universal principles of all natural production; but it must also treat their
applicability, which runs to infinity in all dimensions, as a non-finite task. – Just as the astronomer

291 F.W.J. von Schelling, Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process of the Categories of Physics, trans. Iain Hamilton
Grant (Unpublished Translation, 2013), 1.

138

knows the general laws governing the motions of the universe, without for that very reason penetrating
to the very depths of the heavens.”292 Here the transcendental goals of the First Outline are expressed
in the applications of knowledge within their particular field (which, while present in the First Outline,
is closer in its specificity to the Ideas). A few pages below Schelling introduces the use of points and
lines in order to explain how magnitudes of different kinds of forces are in fact in the same
continuum.293 Schelling repeats this theme, half-way through the text, but in direct relation to the
Potenzen. The Potenzen turn out to be the key to uniting forces which appear dynamically opposed, yet
united, in the intuition of the natural scientist or philosopher.
He writes:
We will arrive at a resolution of this problem through an exact determination of its consequences. The two forces are to be
exhibited as opposed in one and the same intuition. When the two are opposed and separate, then just as in the preceding
moment, each will produce a surface for itself (§§18-19). But the two must again be posited as identical for intuition. Since
the antithesis of forces itself must persist, this is only possible only when their productions are exhibited in a common third,
and since, as was said, each of these forces produces the surface for itself, the common force (which must be thought not as
a mere addition, but rather as arising through an actual penetration or multiplication of products by one another) must be the
surface to the second power, or the cube. With this reciprocal potentiation of production on either side, the construction first
breaks away from the merely geometrical, the third is added to the first two dimensions, and the genuine mediating link by
which the two forces may be posited as simultaneously non-identical and yet as united in intuition, is (not the line or the
surface, but rather) space itself, i.e., magnitude extended in three dimensions. 294

Thus the question remains whether Schelling's discussion of the Potenzen shifts from the
biological to the mathematical, or, whether it was always already something else altogether. The
biological impulse appears in the movement that allows the diagrammatic to occur at all, whereas the
compact mathematical expression of such motion, to be extended outward in an abstract sense, is the
consequence of the diagram. In either case, the Potenzen appear as the least noetic account of
Schelling's philosophy, they appear as the most real, or maximally consequential, components or
perhaps the only non-sheerly ideal components of nature. This is evident as early in “Of the I” where
Schelling claims that the unconditioned, which is comprised of the potencies, is not effected by

292 Schelling, Universal Deduction, 1.
293 Schelling, Universal Deduction, 3-4.
294 Schelling, Universal Deduction, 18-19.
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modality (possibility, necessity, etc) and therefore determines logical categories rather than being
defined by them.295 As he writes in a dense note a few pages below:
The result of these deductions is that only the forms of being, of not-being, and of not- being determined by being can
belong to logic, since they precede all synthesis and are the basis of all synthesis, and since they contain the original form
according to which alone any synthesis can be performed. It also follows that the schematized forms of possibility, reality,
and necessity, made possible only by an antecedent synthesis, -belong to logic only because they themselves are determined
by those original forms. Thus, for instance, problematical theorems do not belong to logic insofar as they express objective
possibility but only inasmuch as they express objective-logical possibility; not insofar as they express a being-posited in the
synthesis as such, but only inasmuch as their logical thinkability has been transmitted at all through this synthesis. 296

Arguably, Schelling's reliance on the Potenzen put him in a difficult situation; that of
attempting to argue that a determinable structure of nature can be detected, but one that is not logical
per se. While we will investigate the epistemological difficulties of this claim in the following chapter,
for the argument following, I will attempt to demonstrate how Schelling's Potenzen minimally
formalize creativity as such. It is the difficulty of trying to formally, but non-logically, present, or
exhibit creativity as such, that Schelling will rely more and more heavily on the diagram, and the
algebraic expression of the Potenzen. Schelling's most direct expression of the Potenzen can be found
in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801).
Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801)
Following from the above section, Schelling's introduction of the Potenzen in the Presentation
is tied to questions of individuation in nature. Schelling writes:
Each individual is certainly not absolute, but it is infinite in its kind. It is not absolutely infinite, since there is something
outside it and it is determined in its being by something external. It is infinite in its kind, however, or, since mode of being
is determined by the quantitative difference of s.[ubjectivity and o.[bjectivity], and since this difference is expressed in the
potency of one or the other, it is infinite within its potency, for it expresses absolute identity for its potency under the same
form as the infinite. Therefore the individual is itself infinite within the scope of its potency, even if not absolutely
infinite.297

How the Potenzen grow out of the difficulty of thinking abstract dynamics processes on the one
hand, and how to represent factors or actants within such processes, becomes clear following the above
295 F.W.J. von Schelling, “Of the I as a Principle of Philosophy,” in Four Early Essays, 114-115.
296 Schelling, “Of the I,” 118.
297 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence
(1800-1802), trans. Michael Vater, and David Wood (Albany: State University of New York, 2013), 156.
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paragraph. Schelling identifies the Potenzen as localizations of the infinite in terms of kinds,
tendencies, or qualities. Localized in a particular way, that is, relative to their proper Potenz, kindinternal infinity does not appear ontologically, or epistemologically, strange. Taking the example of the
color blue can be instructive here. That a shade of blue is infinitely blue according to its kind (that is,
according to its color) is quite different from saying this or that instance of blue is infinitely blue.
There is a quantitative measure of blueness but it cannot be said to be infinite, or absolute, in a way
that would eliminate, for instance, all other colors. One of the connected footnotes to this passage is
crucial and is the closest Schelling ever comes to defining what a potency is outright: “The concept of
power or potency can be most accurately understood in the following way. What is in existence is
always [and] only indifference, and nothing truly exists outside it: but it exists in infinite ways too, and
it never exists otherwise than under the form A = A, i.e., as cognition and being.”298
One again, and to return to the above discussion of the Potenzen being discovered in thought,
this means that the meta-stability of phenomena, is due to the fact that subjecting and objecting
tendencies have reached a point of indifference. This indifference is not an absolute indifference since,
if absolute indifference occurred, then all creation would cease. As I will explore in Chapter 5, the
indifference point can be treated as a hinge, or point, from which new bifurcations can be measured.
In The Philosophy of Art (1804) Schelling attempts a quite different way of expressing how raising
things to a higher level can manifest without assuming the change is necessarily qualitative.299
Philosophy of Art (1801-1804)
298 Ibid. 252.
299 Here I am skipping over Schelling's Bruno (1802). It must be immediately noted that given that the form of the Bruno
is that of a Platonic dialogue, it is difficult to count it in the progression of Schelling's thought in the same fashion. For
one, Schelling does not speak in his own voice but in the titular character of Bruno (named after that of Giordano
Bruno). This fact itself however indexes the importance of the potencies in an interesting sense. The Platonic style of
the Bruno allows Schelling to place the Potenz in a cosmological context, something that will remain important for the
rest of his career. That is, instead of oscillating between discussing the Potenz in Naturphilosophical or transcendental
terms (although the limits of the latter are strained in the Presentation) Schelling makes the Potenz as abstract as
possible within the Bruno. As will be clearer in Schelling's later works and is first detectable in Of the I, the Potenz are
a means of explaining the modality of existence as more than merely cognizable modality.
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In the introduction to his lectures on The Philosophy of Art, Schelling introduces the potencies
as if for the first time. In discussing the construction of the forms of art, Schelling discusses the
potencies, in the highest sense, as the battle between necessity and freedom.300 Yet, throughout the
Philosophy of Art Schelling discusses the potencies as “ideal determinations” referring to the 1804
Wurzburg system as a secondary account.301 What is striking is that Schelling discusses the potencies
as the flight of creation from mere matter. As he writes:
The essential nature of art clothes itself here, as does the pure essence of nature, completely in matter and body. That matter
becomes ideal through the second potence: in nature through light, in art through painting. Finally, in the third potence, the
real and ideal potences become one. That which is bound to or informed into the real or into matter becomes sonority or
sound; within art it becomes music and song. Here, then, the absolute cognitive act is more or less freed from the fetters of
matter; positing that matter as a mere accidental, it becomes objective and recognizable as the act of the informing of
eternal subjectivity into objectivity. 302

At least two points are worth emphasizing here. One, given Schelling's emphasis in the
Universal Deduction on matter, and the construction of matter as a Platonic problem, it is worth noting
what it is that Schelling means by matter, in that it appears to be a question of material construction,
and not of existence, or being, more generally. The second point, which follows, is how this appears to
be an almost mirror reflection of the way in which Schelling will talk about matter in the Freedom
Essay. Once again, this relates to Schelling's concept of the potencies being individuals yet infinite in
their kind, i.e., the potencies are infinite powers interior to their organic consistency, or algebraic selfreferentiality, but are limited by one another. Again, the trajectorial or vectorial/spatial emphasis
explored in Chapter 3 shows why Schelling emphasizes that the adding of potencies create formal
differences, or what appear as, qualitative changes. In the Philosophy of Art, for instance, the potencies
correspond to different kinds of art. However, since Schelling refers to potencies as unities (note the
plurality here), the notion of ideal determination is not one that supervenes on real creation. This is

300 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglass Stott and David Simpson (Minnesota: University of
Minnesota Press, 2008), 247.
301 Ibid. 281.
302 Ibid. 200.
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particularly evident in the following lengthy passage:
One can extract the individual potence out of the whole and treat it in and for itself, but only insofar as one really presents
the absolute within it is this presentation itself philosophy. In every other case, where one treats the individual potence as a
particular and presents laws or rules for it as a particular, it can only be a theory of a specific object, such as a theory of
nature or a theory of art. One can comprehend this in a more general sense by noting that all antitheses and differences are
merely different forms that are nonessential within those differences. Only in their unity are they real, and since the unity of
all cannot itself be a particular, they are real only to the extent that each in itself represents the absolute whole, the universe.
By basing laws on the particular as particular, one thereby removes the object from the absolute, and science from
philosophy.303

Much can be gleaned from this passage. For one, Schelling demonstrates, once again, how the
Potenzen can be treated as individuals in the form of a useful fiction (again indexing the actants of the
First Outline) and, furthermore, the general notion of Schelling's theory of knowledge can be taken in
that individuals are articulated as ideal determinations, or extensions, which must be treated as
representations, or mirrors, for the entire cosmos. I will address this in Chapter 5. But, for now, I wish
to focus on the use of extraction in regards to the question of matter and unity. As argued above, I
believe that the multiplication of unities, coupled with the fact that an object, or an individual, can be
real or ideal, that realness, or the absolute, underlies every ideal determination. But it is not that case
that we can finally discover the singular absolute realness, since all notion of singularity is relative to
the location of it, and, the means of its expression. Thus, when Schelling speaks of matter and thought
escaping it, its arbitrariness is that of the choice of expression which matters far less than what it
represents. Realness is determined by how maximally consequential the representation is, or, how
universal it is, and not by what it is made of.
4.3 -Philosophy of Religion (1804), Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human
Freedom (1809), Stuttgart Seminars (1810)

In his short text that serves as a response to C.A. Eschenmayer, Schelling focuses largely on the
concept of the absolute as it relates to reason and faith as capacities capable of determining the
absolute and whether it has an outside. Schelling argues that the only way the absolute is known is
303 Ibid. 282.
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through intuition in that the process of intuition is continuous with the absolute whereas both faith and
rationality address the absolute in a different register.304 Schelling struggles to define the absolute as on
the one hand, 'the only actual'305 and yet, on the other hand, as something from which, and in which,
creation occurs without the absolute containing all that is created (thereby falling back into Spinozist
immanence) or by the absolute decaying via the ancient and medieval doctrine of emanation.306
Both these concepts of the absolute predetermine an origin for the absolute that overly determine what
follows from it. Schelling argues, in a line of thinking that will reappear shortly thereafter in the
Freedom essay, that one can apply neither finitude nor infinitude to the absolute or the universe
because we cannot grasp to what it is that predication (cause and effect or antecedent and consequent)
is applying.307 This feeds directly into the aforementioned darkness of Platonic matter which he
explores, particularly in regards to predication, in On the Relation of the Ideal and the Real in Nature,
or, Development of the First Principles of Naturephilosophy from the Principles of Gravity and Light
(1806). But before moving onto this text, Schelling's short text The Philosophy of Religion must be
addressed.
Philosophy and Religion (1804)
Schelling begins his text by noting that it should be read as a continuation of the failure of the
Bruno, or On the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things (1802) to launch a series of new
philosophical dialogues. Just as the Bruno attempted to demonstrate the movement of the potencies in
various works of art, and, in the formulation of the capacity to produce art as such, the Philosophy of
Religion attempts this by separating philosophy's treatment of the absolute from faith's relation to God.
Philosophy and Religion does not address the Potenzen in the Naturphilosophical fashion, or the more
304 C.A. Eschenmeyer and F.W.J. von Schelling, Philosophy and Religion: (1804), trans. Klaus Ottman, (Putnam: Spring
Publications, 2010), 18.
305 Ibid. 26.
306 Ibid. 24.
307 Ibid. 36.
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formal Identity philosophy mode but, in the letters to Eschenmayer following the text, Schelling
addresses the Potenzen in relation to the concept of the absolute as such. He writes to Eschenmayer
“the Absolute is not a potency since it comprehends and dissolves all potencies within itself. This
Absolute is what you seem to call God.”308 The dissolution of the potencies is not one of a great being
containing them but here Schelling means the principle by which the potencies are to the extent that
they do not override other potencies in their determinations. The absolute in question is not a big
object, or even an infinite process, but the indifference of all the creative powers of the cosmos. For
Schelling, the absolute as absolute, cannot be equated with God since this absolute is structurally prior
to, or above, all unities or composites. The absolute cannot be the unity of unities, nor merely their
indifference, but that space which makes both unites possible as open yet coherent structures. 309
The question that is begged by such an articulation however is how to account for the particular Potenz
or, even, the particular experience of creation for us. This is what Schelling attempts to address in the
Freheitschrift (or Freedom Essay) of 1809.
Freedom Essay (1809)
In regards to the role of the potencies, Schelling's much vaunted Freedom Essay is concerned
with the Potenzen as they relate to the problem of individuation, and the non-totality suggested in
Philosophy and Religion, which in turn is tied to issues of predication or, the bond and the bonded, in
On the Relation. Schelling attempts to reconcile the experience of freedom, of the capacity to perform
seemingly free acts, with the notion that every consequence, every purportedly free agent, is dependent
upon a ground. Schelling attempts this by arguing for a non-modern concept of identity, which,
appeared in direct relation to the Potenzen in his Presentation.
These themes are all immediately evident in the opening pages of the text. For instance,

308 Ibid. 60.
309 Ibid.
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Schelling argues that the statement 'the body is blue' does not of course insinuate an identity between
having a body, and having blueness, but that the notion of 'a' blue body follows.310 Thus, the statement
individuates in that it determines a thing that has bodiness and blueness, but does not equate the
qualities, nor even the level of having them. Thus, for Schelling, 'the body is blue' means there is here a
thing which has blueness and, in a different way, has bodiness.' Furthermore, the making of the
statement itself admits a perspective, as does the 'the' and the 'is' which exhibits the ontological cost of
making determinations as such. Or, put otherwise, the blueness unfolds from the body, whereas the
notions of bodiness and blueness unfold, but in a different sense, from the determinator's
determination.
Through a subsequent engagement with the pantheism controversy (addressed in Chapter 1)
Schelling arrives at the problem of freedom within identity. Schelling's point is that identity, that even
tautegorical statements, or seemingly lifeless unities, are creative in the act of making them. 311 To
quote Schelling at length is helpful here as the following passage encompasses the aforementioned
issues:
“In the relation of subject and predicate we have already shown that of ground and consequence, and the law of the ground
[Gesetz des Grundes] is for that reason just as original as the law of identity. Therefore, the eternal must also be a ground
immediately and as it is in itself. That of which the eternal is a ground through its being is in this respect dependent and,
from the point of view of immanence, also something contained within the eternal. But dependence does not abolish
independence, it does not even abolish freedom. Dependence does not determine its being and says only that the dependent,
whatever it also may be, can be a con-sequence only of that of which it is a dependent; dependence does not say what the
dependent is or is not. Every organic individual exists, as something that has become, only through another, and in this
respect is dependent according to its becoming but by no means according to its Being.” 312

Freedom is thus not a container of ontological liberalism, nor is it a specifically human, yet
ontological, capacity.313 Furthermore, on the other side, Schelling argues that the one (which is not)
cannot be created from the combination of things deriving from the original into the original, or, put

310 F.W.J. von Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love, and
Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 13.
311 Ibid. 17.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid. 28
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otherwise, the all cannot be made into the one and yet, the all is the closest form to the one.314 Thus,
there is a freedom which in part entails treating sets of alls as if they are ones, or absolutes. An easy
but incorrect path to take here would be to assert that, in the vein of Žižek, that Schelling is asserting
that human freedom is ontologically exceptional, that human freedom is a rupture in the absolute or in
the ontological fabric of being, that the non-all or, more accurately in Schelling's account, the non-one,
is not due to the status of human subjectivity, but is the status of the world as such.
Schelling argues that human freedom cannot be different in kind from the freedom that is
nature's dynamics. This is evident in the fact that Schelling states that idealism's task is to demonstrate
the difference of human freedom in the absolute. Yet, since the potencies demonstrate there is no first
nor last, no alpha nor omega that can be found, but only asserted, then freedom within the absolute
cannot be viewed as an exception to it since it is only possible as a consequence of what came before,
and because there is no boundary, that we know of, that freedom could be said to be rupturing.315
An overemphasis on freedom, or any particular potency, can lead to misrepresenting the absolute.
Hence why Schelling warns regarding the erasure of nature316 and furthermore, Schelling is critical of
those who would assert the priority of the understanding who “attempt to make smoke from
lighting.”317 As already mentioned, and as Schelling will further elaborate in the Ages of the World,
Schelling articulates potencies as individual unities which are infinite in their capacity yet specific or
determinable from one another.
Stuttgart Seminars (1810)
In the Stuttgart Seminars Schelling has a long digression on powers focusing on the real and the

314 Ibid. 13.
315 Ibid. 28.
316 Ibid. 26.
317 Ibid. 29.
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ideal as subordinate unities, subordinate forms of the absolute.318 Powers are outlined as periods of the
absolute that move in a series where the ideal must logically follow the real. The first power takes
logical precedence but this does not cancel the balance of the powers in the absolute. The real
difference which emerges between the two unities, which is so important for the aforementioned
capacity of freedom discussed above, is that of position or location (which will be discussed in Chapter
5).
Real difference between unities, between the real and the ideal as methods, sets value
judgments against ones of existence. The relation of real and ideal begins to shift to that of actual and
potential as the actual becomes the position from which the real and ideal are treated as either actual or
potential.
Positing is the procedure by which the potencies are identified as powers for us.319 The point of
engaging in an analysis of powers means retreating into one of them which, for us, is often that of
reason. This retreat is not a reduction but the only means of forming a position from which to
distinguish powers, to formulate priorities and a chain of consequences. These chains are only
methodologically useful and cannot simply override the bifurcation of matter and spirit which
necessarily takes place in nature320 of which humans, as a relatively recent development of nature, are
at a threshold.321
In some ways, Schelling's presentation of the Potenzen in the “Stuttgart Seminars” is rather
318 Schelling, “Stuttgart Seminars,” 203.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid. 216.
321 Ibid. 217. See also F.W.J. von Schelling, Clara, or, On nature's connection to the spirit world, trans. Fiona Steinkamp
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 79-80. The particularity of human existence in relation to the
potencies is taken up in Schelling's Clara (1811). Schelling's strange pseudo-novelistic text places the potencies as both
characters (foregrounding the connection of potency to personality present in the Ages) and as marking the transition
from the natural world to the spiritual world. This transition is not absolute as the worlds are of one world or one unity
and are different only in the position (or character) from which they are articulated. Furthermore the process of
transition or transcendence (the movement of development) individuates or turns inward in the form of a conflict.
Clara can be read in conjunction with Schelling's scattered remarks on philosophical anthropology found in his
writings on mythology in particular. At the same time, the concepts and characterization (thought of in a more literal
narratological sense) preview the emphasis on the potencies being modes of expression in Schelling's work to follow.
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condensed and matter of fact, in comparison to the Bruno, or even the diagrammatic version in the
Presentations and Further Presentations. That is, Schelling merely describes how the powers ground
themselves in one another as the exponentially augment one another, passing from the form A = B to A
= B3 through the asymmetrical dialectic by which nature natures.322 While it may simply be that the
lecture structure forced Schelling to present the Potenzen in such a form, it is there he appears to be
falling into simply a return to dogmatic metaphysics.

4.4 - The Ages of the World (1813, 1815), History of Modern Philosophy (1832-1833), Introduction
to the Philosophy of Mythology (1842), The Grounding of Positive Philosophy (1842-1843),
Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy (1847-1850)
In the 1813 version of the Ages of the World, Schelling engages with material quite similar to
that in the opening pages of the Freedom Essay, namely, identity and predication. Although the text
sets out to address temporality more specifically, Schelling quickly moves from the past as a necessary
concept for philosophy to recognize its own history, to notions of the unconditioned and contradiction
in order to demonstrate how the past can be known in a way that is not merely that which was the
present.323 In essence, Schelling argues that that which is, and that which has existence, are the same
which he refers to using the Naturphilosophical term of the unconditioned.324 Repeating language from
Philosophy and Religion, Schelling attempts to articulate that which is, and that something is, with
unity and eternality respectively. This relates to Schelling's view of contradiction following Plato, as
contradiction is not absolute but merely a difference that has not yet been properly articulated.
Or, in other words, the continuum which allows things to be is the base of being, or whatness,
whereas the emergence of particularities has to do with the continued attempt at unity, or continuity, at
322 Schelling, “Stuttgart Seminars,” 216-218.
323 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Abyss of Freedom/Ages of the World. Slavoj Žižek, and Judith Norman (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press. 1997), 123-125.
324 Ibid. 126.
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constantly being produced. For Schelling, unity can only be unity by producing particularities.
Thus, time and contradiction are bound together because the mobility of the unconditioned, or the
eternal, appears as time because the eternal cannot be being, and existence, simultaneously. 325 By the
same logic, unity must appear as heterogeneous continuity in order to appear at all.
The key term for Schelling, in regards to these conditions, is that of expression. An expression
cannot express contradiction as such, but only equally express two active powers in a statement.326
This leads Schelling back to the formula of identity expressed in the Freedom Essay. He writes: “The
true sense of each judgment – for example, that 'A = B' – can only be the following: THAT which is =
A IS THAT which is = B, or, THAT which is A and THAT which is B are as one.”327
Schelling goes on to say that the 'is' is the ground of being which is the unity of unities in that all
expressions are expressions of this ground.328 Thus, anything resembling a contradiction must in fact
be merely a tangled, or lost connection, and not an absolute breakage given that that which is
expressed, is only expressible, because of an underlying unity.329 As already mentioned, what is
difficult is how exactly to articulate difference in kind or, the qualitative distinction between things
(things being limitations or conditions of the unconditioned), and their relative infinity. Again, pointing
back to the Freedom Essay, Schelling addresses this problem in regards to will or personality. He
writes:
The unconditioned can express itself as what-is and as being, and it can refrain from expressing itself as both; in other
words, it can be both, or it can let both alone. Free will is just this ability to be something along with the ability to not be it.
But further, the Highest can be what-is, and it can be being.330

Freedom, or will, is thus the same as the unconditioned except that freedom, which is connected
here to the highest (which, elsewhere, Schelling defines as the onto-epistemological location of human
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid. 128.
327 Ibid. 129.
328 Ibid. 130.
329 Ibid. 131.
330 Ibid. 131-132.
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beings) is a maximally extensive view of conditions, an indifference not only between conditions or
choices, but also between what is, and what is being. These two tendencies are unified in a third
moment which Schelling expresses in the exponential language of the potencies.331
Once again, potencies become the structures which attempt to explain how qualitative
difference, which is infinite in kind (will, or personality), can exist equally when all power, as such,
can only ever be measured as quantity in terms of power. That is, since like can only be known by like,
and because there could be no motive contradiction unless there was an underlying unity or continuity,
the difference between potencies must be one that is not absolute contradiction, but relative. Yet, at the
same time, this relativity appears differently, and is viewed differently, according to the conditions it
takes up, i.e., where a potency is located in the all. This leads Schelling, in the 1813 Ages of the World,
to shift the emphasis on contradiction to one of grounding (Verhaltnis des Grundes) in which there is
not total sublation, nor contradiction, but a cooperation which issues a trajectory whether spatial, or
temporal.332 As Schelling puts it, a judgment that expresses a ground and a consequent does not
determine a different degree of existence, or contradiction, but a relation of dependence and
independence (again repeating the opening pages of the Freedom essay). The difference between the
antecedent and consequent, or the subject and the predicate, is one that can be defined in term of
potencies: “The preceding will would act as the ground of its successor, and hence as the first potency.
Now it could certainly fail to be active in the potency of the other will, but this does not stop it all the
while as active in its potency as the other is in the other's potency.”333 In addition to the potencies
restricting one another, and determining succession depending on their grounding relation or ratio to
one another, this co-determination is re-oriented by a particular act or decision of will or motion.334

331 Ibid. 170-173.
332 Ibid. 172-173.
333 Ibid. 173.
334 Ibid. 177.
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“Because the negating will is posited as preceding, it is also posited as the ground of existence
[Existenz], as being, as the (A = B) of what is higher. Moreover, the affirming will (which is grounded
by the negating will) would act as A2. Finally, the third – their living unity would be to them A3 is in
the expressible.”335
At the end of the text Schelling settles back into a discussion of eternality and appears to
abandon how the will, or how a particular aspect of willing, constructs or expresses itself as a
particular existence or as a particular Potenz, or how construction relates to the potencies as coming
out of, and exteriorizing the eternal. The 1813 version of the Ages of the World appears to suffer from
how the eternal relates to the reorientation of the world, or a particular world to the particular agent
doing the constructing.
Before addressing how Schelling attempts to solve this problem, it is worth addressing the 1815
version of the Ages.
Ages of the World (1815)
In the 1815 draft of Schelling's The Ages of the World Schelling introduces the potencies in
relation to the question of unity and how it relates to the law of predication. The potencies are
introduced following Schelling's statement that knowledge requires “movement,”336 as the exploration
of knowledge is the unfurling of a judgment into a conclusion.337 This unfurling cannot be mere
change but most be a form of creation that does not fully erase its immediate grounding and potential
direction hence why all potencies have a degree of self-hood.338 Later Schelling defines this self-hood
in terms of having being,339 of being potencies amidst the All and not being merely immanently
internal to the One. In relation to the 1813 version, the 1815 version of the Ages highlights the tension
335 Ibid.
336 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans. Jason Wirth, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000),
4.
337 Ibid. 8.
338 Ibid. 9.
339 Ibid. 24.
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between the eternal, the individual, and how powers fit in between. It is clear that there are potencies
(plural) and they are infinite in kind. While individuals are generally inhibitions of underlying forces,
the potencies are defined as externalizations (or expressions) of the eternal.
Schelling writes:
The true meaning of this unity that has been asserted in the beginning is therefore this: "one and the same = x" is as much
the unity as it is the antithesis. Or both of the opposed potencies, the eternally negating potency and the eternally affirming
potency, and the unity of both make up the one, inseparable, primordial being. 340

And then:
And here, first after the consummate unfurling of that initial concept, can we glimpse the first nature in its full vitality. We
see it, in an equally originary way, decomposed, as it were, into three powers. Each of these powers can be for itself Hence,
the unity is a unity for itself and each of the opposite powers is a whole and complete being.341

Beyond noting the Naturphilosophical language of the above (powers and their relation to
decomposition) the completeness of each Potenz is a particular statement since, as it appears above that
the potenz determine one another's limits, that their wholeness is limited externally. However, given
the central themes connected with the potencies, particular that of All replacing the One, and first and
last, or low and high, replacing origin and teleology, there is no external to the external, to the totality
of the potencies. This totality cannot be at rest or merely being since, again to quote Schelling:
This [being at rest] is impossible in that initial equivalence since both potencies, so to speak, want to be in a single point
because both make the same claim to be that which has being. But if the negating / principle (A = B) only knows itself as a
potency of the being and thereby makes space for the other principle opposed to it (the A 2 ), then the opposed principle can
become helpful to it and become its liberator from contradiction since the opposed principle is, in accordance with its
nature, unlocking and liberating. 342

The phrase 'making space' is the important emphasis here, as the will or particular directionality
made possible by one potency, in relation to another, is not merely determined by the grounding
relation, but also one of relative spatiality. Just as the potencies can be related to the succession of
times, they should be articulated as an orientation of spaces though, I argue, is only implicit in
Schelling's work.
340 Ibid. 10.
341 Ibid. 11.
342 Ibid.
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As Schelling goes on to write:
Now, we maintain the possibility that what does not now have being could endeavor to emerge from out of the state of
potentiality and elevate itself again to what has being. From this comes an intensified concept of what does not have being
which we are often enough forced to acknowledge in nature and life. This clearly persuades us that there would be
something mediate between what is and nothing, namely, what is not and also should not be, but which still endeavors to
be. It is not because it only endeavors to be. And it is not nothing because in a certain way it must be in order to covet. 343

Furthermore, Schelling goes on to state that the Potenz determine the succession of time given
the fact that powers cannot exist all at full force at the same time, or, for that matter, in the same place.
Schelling makes the important distinction of noting that as individuals, the Potenz are different in that
they have being in every time.344
Or as he puts it again:
When one potency is compared with another potency, the proceeding potency appears lower than the
preceding potency, because the preceding potency necessarily appears as a higher potency in its time than the proceeding
potency does in its time. But when one time is compared with another time and one epoch is compared with another epoch,
the proceeding one appears decisively higher. Hence, such seeming regressions are necessary in the history of life. 345

There is, I argue, an epistemological consequence here in that the Potenz can be read from
above, in terms of the various potencies limiting one another or, they can be viewed in a temporal
sequence, in terms of higher and lower. But I will address this more in detail in Chapter 5.346
History of Modern Philosophy (1833-1834)
In his lectures in Munich, Schelling returns to the history of philosophy, starting with
Descartes, and working up to his present. In the section on Nautrphilosophie, Schelling once again
goes over the Potenzen and their relation to individuation and temporality in particular. In passing over
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff, Schelling indicates tensions between how they utilize being
and how, and in what ways, being can be active in their relative systems. In particular, Schelling
focuses on how delicate the problem of the origin of being or, what he transforms into the firstness or

343 Ibid. 48.
344 Ibid. 82.
345 Ibid. 84.
346 Chronologically speaking I am skipping over Schelling's Erlangen lectures (due to their little referencing of the
potencies) as well as Schelling's Darstellung lectures as I will focus on them in chapter 6.
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Prius of being, is. Schelling adds the caveat that this firstness is a determination, but not merely a fact,
i.e., the first being is determined as first but can be thus determined because of the innumerable
consequences that firstness would mean. In such a move Schelling attempts to simultaneously critique
and absorb the dogmatic gesture of necessity. Quoting Schelling:
we ourselves spoke first of all of what Is and determined it as the Prius, as the original state (Urstand), i.e. as the possibility
of being. Quite right; but we also immediately added that it could not be sustained in this priority, therefore, even though
the Prius, never as the Prius; the transition was inevitable, what Is should not be, thus to think it as not-being (nicht
seyend).347

In this way Schelling attempts to separate the necessity of necessity (as inexistence) from a
necessarily existing being. A necessarily existing being would, for Schelling, eliminate the dynamism
within any system yet, at the same time, Schelling maintains necessity in that necessary stages
determine subsequent ones (whether viewed as the historicization of nature, or the structure of
predication) but there is no means of determining the original necessity, only that a chain of
necessitation occurs and that material existence is a primary, not originary, step. Schelling approaches
this the other way around in regard to Spinoza. Instead of focusing on the Prius contra the originary,
Schelling notes that Spinoza's immanent monism requires an absolute outer boundary in order to make
coherent the correspondences between modes. Schelling argues that Spinoza's notion of being
swallows possibility inside of it348 and that the great flaw of Spinoza's system is that it lacks an
external notion of infinite.349
Schelling finds Spinoza's account unsatisfactory as he believes that Spinoza cannot account for
creation within the closed being of God as anything but combinatorial, yet somehow, infinite. Thus
there is not infinite capacity in Spinoza but only relative and contained capacity which is measured
relative to God. Again, against commentators such as Edward Beach who would place Schelling's
347 F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 53.
348 Ibid. 65.
349 Ibid. 71.
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Potenzen close to Spinoza's powers, the difference lies in the fact that for Schelling the Potenzen have
personalities, or possess infinity relative to themselves, which can not be contained but only limited by
the activity of other potencies.
Returning to the language regarding the dynamics of nature, Schelling argues that nature must
have the structure of a being that would be pure becoming if it did not have a desire to be something to
itself, for it to come to rest as finitude.350 This contradictory notion of becoming is one of
intensification, since the infinitude of creation, or becoming, raises itself to a higher level by
attempting and failing to become an object to itself.351 The uninhibited power of creation appears as
nothing until it inhibits itself, until it attempts to become a being. Here Schelling is repeating, though
perhaps less poetically, ideas from his earliest texts but, in particular, the passages cited sound similar
to those of the Ages of the World. The rotary motion of creation, which even God cannot escape, is cast
in the History as an originary motion which turns in on itself thereby creating finite things. This
creation is a necessity but, not a existent necessity, and therefore the emergence of contingency comes
with existence, with finitude. The three-fold structure of the Potenzen then demonstrates how finitude
emerges as a consequence of infinity, and how that consequent infinity becomes a particular infinity by
locating itself in the world as a kind, as a potency.352 The finite being, working as a pure subject, can
likewise treat itself as infinite (in the A2) after it has submitted itself to finitude. The pre-history of the
Potenzen is thus folded into their status as an essence, their origin, which allows for further
augmentation or intensification.353
Schelling then quickly shifts to the language of the dynamic processes from the First Outline,
and the Ideas in discussing the dynamic treatment of the potencies as categories of physical

350 Ibid. 117.
351 Ibid. 114-115.
352 Ibid. 116.
353 Ibid. 117-118.
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emergences within the three-fold structure. The first stage, A1, is connected to matter, A2 to light, and
A3 to the organic; the level which operates on both as real, and ideal, material.354 Schelling thus
indicates, by way of a cursory review of his earlier texts, how the potencies mark the stages of
augmentation which, in a linear view of nature, leads up to the emergence of humans. The difficulty is
that these stages of potentiaton lead to the capacity of thought, and, to the possibility of pure
knowledge since, in the past, potencies eventually become essences, or mere forms, in order to make
room for further augmentation. But how would such a sublation be conceivable once the process of
conceiving emerges? Schelling states that the human, burdened with the apparent infinitude of thought,
finds herself in the position of the Prius of nature as unconditioned becoming. Thought appears to
itself as completely unconditioned yet, has come after a long chain of determinations in nature.
Because of this, thought copies the determinations in nature as ideal but, in order for thought to
intensify, to progress, it treats the stages of this ideal copy as objects, or tools, whereby action can be
justified.355
Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology (1842)
Schelling's lectures on mythology expand his concerns regarding the personality of God
expressed in The Ages of the World (1813,1815) as well as his discussion of the Potenzen as
personalities or subjectivities.356 Like The Philosophy of Art, or Bruno, Schelling attaches the Potenzen
to a particular discourse which, in the case of this text, is of course mythology. As is the general
function of the Potenzen, Schelling argues that mythology, taken in a very general sense, cannot be
merely subjective but, on the contrary, must be an instance of powers manifesting themselves through
consciousness. He writes:
In this explanation there is also a return to the primordial Being [Urseyn] of man: mythology is no less the consequence of a

354 Ibid. 122.
355 Ibid. 125-126.
356 Beach makes this argument as well in Potencies, 136-140.
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nonarbitrary process, to which man falls prey because he stirs himself from his original position. But as you yourself see,
according to this explanation mythology would be only something false [XI 207] and also something merely subjective,
namely, what exists in such representations, to which nothing real outside them would correspond, for divinized natural
objects are no longer actual ones. But especially to be accentuated, however, would be the contingency that the
drawing-on things brings into the explanation, while alone the manner in which we have reached the concept of the process
brings with it that nothing is required for this process except consciousness, nothing outside the principles it itself posits
and constitutes. It is not at all the things with which man deals in the mythological process by which consciousness is
moved, but rather it is the powers arising in the interior of consciousness itself. The theogonic process, through which
mythology emerges, is a subjective one insofar as it takes place in consciousness and shows itself through the generating of
representations: but the causes and thus also the objects of these representations are the actually and in themselves
theogonic powers, just those powers through which consciousness is originally the God-positing consciousness. The
content of the process are not merely imagined potencies but rather the potencies themselves—which create consciousness
and which create nature (because consciousness is only the end of nature) and for this reason are also actual powers. The
mythological process does not have to do with natural objects, but rather with the pure creating potencies whose original
product is consciousness itself.357

While much can be said about Schelling's articulation of God and of the theogonic (the origin
of the Gods) in general, I will restrict myself to how Schelling's articulation of the potencies emerges
within the discussion of mythology. Immediately, one can take notice that the general thrust of
Schelling's argument regarding the potencies here concerns their environing in the consciousness of
humans.
Powers arise in consciousness, but are not merely due to consciousness, since nothing can be
self-grounding. Because of this outsideness, this exteriority, the mythological content is not only
determined by consciousness but myth, as a creative act, is a narrativization of powers in which
thought encounters its own creativity. As Beach emphasizes, Schelling's discussion of the Potenzen is
connected to his distinction of whatness (Was) and thatness (Das), or, Being and Existence.358 This
distinction, particularly in relation to the Potenzen, will become more central in Schelling's lectures on
the split between the negative and positive philosophies. The potencies thread themselves through any
particular domain of representation, but, this does not mean that such a domain is only ever an example
of those powers. The expressive nature of the domain of action aligns its own notion of modalities
with, and against, the larger exterior of pure-possibility. This tension between possibilities interior to

357 F.W.J. von Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, trans. Mason Richey and
Markus Zisselsberger (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 145.
358 Beach, 147.
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their kind, and possibility-as-such (or potency) is why Schelling finds its necessary to divide
philosophy into positive and negative kinds.
Negative philosophy, which Schelling will associate most directly with Kant, is negative
because it closes the possibility of creativity and, according to Schelling, makes a dogmatism out of an
a priori logic. Or, to return to the language above, Kant attempts to define whatness in such a way that
predetermines all possible forms of thatness without taking into account how thatness forces us to
redefine whatness. Mythology is one attempt at narrativizing such genesis in its most primordial state
by attempting to outline how certain a priori structures came to be from what was before, from what
Schelling designates as the Prius.
Grounding of Positive Philosophy (1842-1843)
Schelling's lectures on positive philosophy, myth, and revelation in Berlin in the place of the
recently deceased Hegel, maintain the overtly historical trajectory of the lectures on modern
philosophy albeit with different emphasis. In particular, Schelling focuses on how the potencies
function in reason following Kant's re-articulation of reason in the critical enterprise. Quoting
Schelling at length:
According to Kant, reason is nothing other than the faculty of knowledge as such, so that what is posited within us
becomes, from the standpoint of philosophy, an object for us—so that reason itself considered entirely objective is the
infinite potential of cognition (for reason remains this even apart from its subjective position, apart from its being in [63]
any one subject). Potency is the Latin potentia—power— and is opposed to the actus. In the conventional use of language,
one says, “The plant in its seed is the plant in its mere potency, in pure potentia, whereas the real mature or developed plant
is the plant in actu.” Here, potency is considered merely as a potentia passiva, as a passive possibility; the seed is not
necessarily the potential of the plant; there must be other external factors—fertile soil, rain, sunshine, and so on, added to it
so that this potency becomes actus. As the faculty of knowledge, reason also appears as a potentia passiva, insofar as it is a
faculty that is capable of development and, in this respect, is admittedly also dependent on external factors. Here, however,
reason is not the faculty of knowledge subjectively considered, rather that standpoint has already been assumed from which
reason itself is its object. Considered as an object, where the limitations of the subject are removed through abstraction, it
can be nothing other than the infinite potency of cognition.359

Once again Schelling's skepticism regarding a necessary being, or any existent which contains
all its own potential is apparent. He will formulate this sentiment more directly in one of his
359 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2007), 132.
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Darstellung Lectures, a point which has been highlighted by Iain Grant: “[n]o primal germ, scattered
into chaos by ourselves as if fallen from the creator’s hand, is required. Everything is primal germ or
nothing is.”360
In stating that “only the infinite potential of being can correspond to the potency of being”
Schelling distances himself from the Scholastic notion of Ens omnimod interminatum. In essence,
Schelling wishes to argue that neither pure possibility (nor pure contingency) exists, nor does being as
such always-already exist, but only a tension between potentiality and actuality exists.361 Schelling
attacks Hegel and, in particular, his use of logic, as failing to recognize that predication, the activity of
the potency recognized in the move from antecedent to consequent, is not the same as it actually
occurring. To equate the motion of the concept with the thing is, for Schelling, to erase the effect of
experience as it would be merely superfluous to the real-conceptual motion occurring. Or, in other
words, to confuse embodied motion with conceptual motion is to confuse that something is, with what
something is, to confuse being with a being.362
While I will address the use of experience in Chapter 6, to remain with the notion of the
Potenzen, Schelling states that reason chases the Potenzen as reason, like nature, wishes to be their
original content, to be infinite potentiality, but to be this, it must continually empty itself of specific
content, it continually chases potencies and finds content that is not itself, and thus has a negative
concept of being as its motor.363
Schelling attempts to address this by returning to the language of will that he utilized in the
Freedom essay as well as the Ages of the World. Following the relation of individuation to the
Potenzen, Schelling shifts to the language of movement, and here to focus on the experience of reason

360 Quoted in Grant, “Remains of the World,” 5
361 Schelling, Grounding. 133.
362 Ibid. 134.
363 Ibid. 137.
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as movement, in that reasoning, as a kind of motion, only encounters possibility and not being as being
since the being sublated, and treated like essence (that is the perspectival position of the self), is what
allows the particular individual example of will, or reason in motion, to occur at all.364
After a detour through Kant, Schelling returns to the motion of reason via the Potenz arguing
that being is the content of thought only as potency since potency is a leap toward a being. If this leap
is objectified, or verified, that is, becomes relevant for experience, thought must move beyond itself
again in order for thought to remain thought.365 Later on, Schelling states that this moving within the
Potenz, as the science of reason, is a negative philosophy, one that sets aside the philosophical
ramifications of experience. Experience, for Schelling, is one that category of sense that takes reason
alongside that which is, existence as infinite in itself, and not merely as infinite possibility as it is
conceived in reason. Schelling states that:
The pure or infinite potency (the beginning of the negative philosophy) is the content identical with thought, which,
because it does not go toward thought (since it is identical to it), only proceeds out from thought. In contrast, that which
simply is is the content that is not identical with thought; indeed, it is excluded from the very start and, for this very reason,
it can and must be first conveyed to thought since it is originally external to thought. 366

It is Schelling's focus on Aristotle's work which appears in the Erlangen Lectures (1821), and
which intensifies for the rest of his life, that is imperative for the positive philosophy, or a philosophy
which, instead of exploring the Potenzen in their development following from an inhabiting of being,
instead constructs an ultimate or goal, or free choice, based on the fact of existing things working as
potential but, importantly, not a potential that can be sublated and is possible in theory, but a notion of
potentiality that follows from the reality of its actualization. While chapter 5 will address the
epistemological ramifications of such a split between the negative and positive view of the Potenz, I
wish to close now with articulating how Schelling's Potenzlehre can be taken in the context of the last
period of his life via a return to Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.
364 Ibid. 138.
365 Ibid. 160.
366 Ibid. 209.
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Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy (1847-1852)
The negative/positive split in Schelling's work, is complicated by the Presentation of Pure
Rational Philosophy (1847-1852) in which he attempts to refashion what Kantian criticality means, or,
what it means to throughly apply the power of reason to itself, alongside a discussion of the philosophy
of mythology. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Schelling's last period of thinking tends to combine
Aristotelian naturalism with Platonic cosmology in order to get at the core of philosophy as a science
of reason. To this end, Schelling engages often, and at length, with Kant's critical system. In the 13th
Darstellung lecture, Schelling discusses the Potenzen as representing that which is ineliminable in
thought contra Kant. Schelling argues that Kant's determination of tenses (past, present, and future)
cannot be a mere logical form, but represent that which thought obtains upon only incompletely.367 It
should be evident that Schelling's language is returning to his earliest writings on potentiality as
expressed in “Of the I” where he makes the claim that Kantian modality incompletely grasps the
possibility outside of it. This return to his earlier thinking is repeated again, only a few passages below
the above referenced one, where Schelling invokes the relation between Aristotelian dynamism, and
Plato's concern for motion in the Timaeus. Schelling emphasizes that the pure actuality of a being
cannot be purely captured by a concept.368 Here Schelling references the line from the Timaeus which
fascinated him as a young man:
What is that which is Existent always [28a] and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is
Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent;
whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never
really existent.369

Schelling continues this line of thinking in the subsequent Darstellung lectures. In the 16th lecture he
writes:

367 F.W.J. von Schelling, Darstellung der Reinrationalen Philosophie, Lecture 13, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant
(Unpublished, 2013), 8. Trans. from F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, Ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Cotta,
Stuttgart,1856, Bd. XI, 294-320.
368 Schelling, Darstellung, Lecture 13, 10.
369 Plato, “Timaeus” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 1234.
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For in what has being, i.e. in reason, not only the material but also the law of movement is predetermined. The principles
that, in the Idea – in what it is that is being – are merely possible or are potencies, were in pure thought the hypotheses or
presuppositions of what the actual in itself is, but each of them is however is immediately the hypothesis of what is
consequent upon it, - A is the hypothesis of +A, both together the hypothesis of +-A: all ultimately of what is the pure
principle, the purely actual, in which there is no longer any possibility. This connection amongst the potencies entails that
the converse of the usual order holds, that, namely, the antecedent has its actuality in the consequent in respect of which it
is accordingly mere [376] potency. 370

Once again, Schelling emphasizes the difference between possibility, and pure possibility, or
potentiality (Potenz). The tumbling determinations of the potencies, is that in treating them as pure
potentiality, they can upset the normal causal order of things in that the consequent of a hypothesis
contends that the hypothesis, as an activity, already existed prior to its hypothesizing, though it would
seem the instance of the potency caused the hypothesis. It is this expressive function of the potencies,
mentioned above via the actants, that can be misread as human-caused actions. In the 17th lecture,
Schelling continues to discuss the Potenzen in terms of the problem of causes. Due to the complexity
of the text I quote Schelling at length:
The three causes are the first, the pure possibilities, from which the concrete possibilities lying between beginning and end
are derived. And they too act in relation to each other as beginning, middle and end. The beginning, first at the gate of
Being, is what immediately can be, and by nature, is pure can-being. Following it is the pure being [Seyende] from nature,
to which the strength (potency) for actualisation must first be given. The end is what is itself originally powerful, selfpossessing. Due to this natural order we have also spoken of a first, a second and a third potency, and without thinking of
an analogy with mathematical thought, we have designated them accordingly. Given what can be in general = A, the
immediately able to be must be designated as A1, but as such it first appears at the end, in the process (for with the relations
of the causes a process is also promised) it appears immediately as ‘unselved’, i.e. as subjectless Being and would thus be
designated as the B, which is first to be brought back into A; the pure being, first posited by B in potentiam, is elevated to
the subject, and thus A2 , and the last, which as object is subject and vice-versa, will be designated A3 . I demand of these
designations only that they serve clarity and brevity; nor, for the same reasons, would I reject to designating what stands
higher than all potency, that is what is and is the cause of Being and itself pure actuality, as earlier, A0, although we are not
thinking here of the arithmetical A0 =1.371

Immediately one can see how Schelling again returns to the critique of Kantian modality, as
well as, re-emphasizing the open-endedness of any determined system. Modality, temporalized as
beginning, middle, and end, functions between the unprethinkable beginning of end that lies in the
pure-possibilities as potencies. The appearance of immediacy, or givenness, must be fed back into the

370 Schelling, Darstellung, Lecture 13, 2.
371 F.W.J. von Schelling, Darstellung der Reinrationalen Philosophie, Lecture 17, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant
(Unpublished, 2013), 4. Translated excerpt from F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, Ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Cotta,
Stuttgart,1856, Bd. XI, 386-408.
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notion of pure can-being, to treat the given as-if it is the consequence of pure being. The givenness as
immediate A becomes B, and then is fed back into A and thus is registered as A2. Thus the action of B,
as a determination, is merely ideal, is a hypothesis, unless its consequences can be viewed as being that
of A and thus can be re-designated as A2 (as always-already a part of A but more of it, A to a higher
power). It is then in the subsequent work of determining what about that higher-power that is not
merely based on our determination, as subject, that it can be treated as adequate ground for future
testing (and thus can be treated as A3).
Here one can begin to see how Schelling is struggling, but not without purpose, to create an
open system of being, and subsequently, of philosophizing, which accepts the consequences of
contingency as well as the consequences of necessity without relying upon, or metaphysicalizing,
either. In the quote above, Schelling carefully toes the line between ideality, or human thinking in
particularity, creating the world, and humans being merely participatory in the Potenz that is thought,
thought being merely a consequence of nature's self-augmentation. But since we 'have' the capacity to
think, we participate, and affect, this augmentative process.372 But, the important third motion (the A3),
is that this movement, is itself, only fully potentiated in its capacity to be a ground for another.
The consequences this structure has for human knowing, and for the practice of philosophy, will be the
focus of Chapter 5. To close this chapter, however, I would like to look at how Schelling's notion of
potency relates to the notion of world, and, in turn, to modality (as related to possible worlds).
4.5 - Potencies and Modalities: Potency and World
In conclusion, the ontology of powers, with its modal determinations (necessity, contingency, possibility, actuality), can
only be regarded as a reducibly metaphysical problem if the physical dimensions of its actuality are ignored […] powers
necessarily involve modal concepts. Against Hegel’s denial that the categories of Modality determine anything objective,
objectality is nothing other than a set of potentials for actualisation, as Plato insisted. Powers make contingency into an
ontology, a metaphysics and a physics. 373
372 Here I skip over the 19th Darstellung Lecture in which Schelling does discuss, but not extensively, the Potenzen. I do
this in part because I discussed the relevant passages above in Chapter 1.
373 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism,” in Collapse: Philosophical Research and
Development v. V (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2009), 450-451.

164

[A]ccording to modality—pure being [Sein]. Specifically this determination separates the original concepts [Urbegriffe] of
being [Sein], not-being [Nicht-Sein], and existence [Dasein] from the derivative concepts of possibility, actuality, and
necessity.374
The concept of not having being, but especially the not being that occurs everywhere in so many forms, has always led the
beholder astray and, like a real Proteus, manifoldly brought them into confusion. For just as it is manifest to hardly anyone
that actual power lies more in delimitation than expansion and that to withdraw oneself has more to do with might than to
give oneself, so is it natural that where they encounter that which through itself does not have being, they rather regard it as
"nothing" and, when it is asserted that it "is" precisely as that which does not have being, they rather explain this away as
the greatest contradiction.375

Given this admittedly cursory examination of Schelling's development of the potencies, one
may ask, why Schelling uses them, and why does he feel like he needs them? Fundamentally, I wish to
argue that Schelling's use of the Potenzen is about the insufficiency of modality to obtain as such.
More than the Leibnizian question of 'Why is there something instead of nothing?' it would seem that
the Potenzen try to answer the awkward question of 'how does our thought thing?' or, less awkwardly,
if there are no absolute divisions between thought and nature, how do we account for creation and
motion when everything is potentially naturalized? At the same time, and taking into account
Schelling's proto-pragmatic emphasis on positive philosophy, the question of 'how does our thought
thing?' might be coupled with the question 'how does experience think?'
As the epigraphs above show, Schelling was concerned with how to separate knowledge, or
reason, from representation. In Chapter 5 I will investigate the epistemological concerns of this
distinction but, to conclude the investigation of the potencies, the present question is why does
Schelling need the potencies in relation to creation and reason's categories (specifically modality)? Or,
to point to the discussion above in relation to the negative and positive split, the potencies are what
allow for Schelling's method of construction to function, while not reducing the potencies to merely
subjective construction.
Returning to the introduction above, I argued that Schelling's Potenzen make up for the
374 F.W.J. von Schelling, F.W.J., “On the I as a principle of Philosophy,” in The Unconditional in Human knowledge:
Four early essays (1794 -1796), trans. F. Marti (Lewisburg : Bucknell University Press, 1980), 71.
375 Schelling, Ages. 14.
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insufficiency of modality as mere categories, as well as, marking the importance of necessary
inexistence. That is, in both the negative and the positive philosophies, there are constraints of
generation which themselves become sublated in the process of generation whether merely ideal or
merely real. The relation between the real and the ideal are skewed by Schelling's utilization of the
Potenzen hence the questions above. Instead of the general question of 'how do mental acts or
representations obtain?' Schelling assumes they do and asks how is it that thought creates things? In
dealing with everyday existence, Schelling does not ask after the relation between theory and practice,
but asks 'how does experience think?' assuming that being in existence, and existing as this particular
thing, this will, is an admixture of theory and practice, that is the price of human freedom. The further
danger of the closeness of Schelling's epistemology and his ontology is to risk a complete conflation of
deontic modality and alethic modality. Deontic modality has to do with morals and choices (should and
can) whereas alethic modality has to do with truth claims (contingency, necessity, and so on). Since the
following chapter focuses on Schelling's epistemology and, in particular, how it relates to intuition,
here I wish to end by discussing what exactly the philosophical import of Schelling's Potenzlehre is for
alethic modality.
Importantly, Schelling's Potenzen index a notion of creation or novelty existing before the
world, or before any thinkable world but, in opposition to philosophies of the event (such as in Deleuze
and Badiou), Schelling is far more skeptical about the means and capacity of human beings to harness,
or even think, this evental status. Potenzen are can-beings but they are, to some extent, particular, or,
can only be detected in, the tracing out of their consequences. Schelling appears to be straddling two
sides of a split in the history of philosophy namely, between Spinoza and Leibniz. While Kant
attempted to suture this split, the German Idealist tradition spread it open by questioning Kant's
grounds in building the critical system.
This split can be read in numerous ways but perhaps, most clearly, in the status of human
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freedom. As was hopefully apparent in the first chapter, and what we will return to in the conclusion, is
that Kant forced the point of whether human freedom is exempted from, or submitted to, the causal
structure of the world. This can be summed up quite simply in the question: 'While our free acts always
seem free for us, are they free in themselves?' While Žižek has famously argued that Hegel ontologizes
Kant's indecision to decide between noumenal and phenomenal freedom, I do not see his account as
taking Hegel's skepticism seriously. While the German Idealists on the whole attempted to seek
grounds for Kant's critical conclusions, these grounds are not clearly ontological, but take up differing
processes as a middle-ground between sheer being, or sheer becoming, or between skepticism and
dogmatism.
As has hopefully been outlined above, this is evident in the case of Schelling's Potenzen. The
potencies are tendencies which are more or less stable depending on how many consequences issue
from them, they are the forces behind real patterns in the cosmos, forces which are apparent in physical
processes and noetic endeavors alike. So, in this sense, it appears that Schelling must therefore
abnegate any difference between deontic modality (morals and choices of should and can) and alethic
modality (ontology and questions of truth via necessity and contingency) but this overlooks the
necessity of position, or location, in Schelling's thought. Location, or determination as will be outlined
in Chapter 5, puts limits on the constructivism implied in Schelling's Potenz while remaining attentive
to the ontological status of the potencies not as things, but, as universal tendencies or qualities.
Schelling's potencies index his Platonism and, in particular, the 'realness' of ideas – which he
maintains from his earliest work (such as in On the World Soul) to the Darstellung lectures. Yet, at the
same time, Schelling emphasizes that physical and perceptual limitations (such as those that arise with
different species' sense capacities) affect where, and when, we detect such ideas. To separate these
conditions according to real and ideal assumes a 'view-from-nowhere' but, at the same time, Schelling
is not endorsing a full-blown constructivism, or perspectival system, where there are not matters of fact
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or universals. Things are facts, or universals, 'so-far,' just as the Potenzen are can-beings. Universals
are in-process but should be viewed as absolute till they are overturned, whereas the Potenzen, are
speculated to exist, but can only be seen, or encountered, in the process of tracing them. Again, while I
will investigate the epistemological consequences of this in the following chapter, for now, I am
interested in the ontological stakes of these claims. This talk of can-beings immediately brings us to
talk of possible worlds, and modality, given that if something can be said to be possible then it exists in
some possible world. These themes are generally discussed primarily in semantic terms following
Kripke and David Lewis whereas Meinong, as the primary forger of possible worlds, is dismissed as
being too literal, or ontological, in his discussion of possible worlds in stating that non-existent beings
exist due to the fact that being understood in a proper sense is beyond being (as actual) and becoming
(as creation). This relation is complicated directly in Schelling's theory. As Bruce Matthews writes in
the translator's introduction to The Grounding:
Thinking is movement, but it is not self-propelled; rather, thought is carried along incessantly from predicate to predicate
by the power of what Schelling calls the infinite potency of cognition. Like Kant’s unconditioned absolute, the actus of this
potency is transcendent to the series of its members, but transcendent only in the sense that it is absolutely other than
thought: as the pure actuality of reality [Wirklichkeit], that which simply exists excludes potency, and thus the possibility
indicative of thought.376

Numerous thinkers and commentators on Schelling have, following William Hogrebe, read
Schelling's philosophy of the Potenzen as primarily a theory of predication. Iain Grant, in his essay
“Remains of the World,” complicates this view albeit slightly. While Markus Gabriel and others have
focused on predication as a particularly human capacity, as one rooted in judgment as defined by Kant,
this leaves out not only the ontological constraints on logic and judgment, but also overlooks
inexistence as well as existence as having actual consequences on predication, on the logicalontological function of predication. As Grant writes: “Powers cannot originally inhere in some essence
or existent, but must, as powers, exceed that existence, and since what exceeds existence is inexistence,

376 Schelling and Matthews, Grounding, 49-50.
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inexistence must be a power paradoxically ineliminable from nature.”377
Schelling's theory of the Potenzen attempts to generate the most creative world in which
creation is not bounded by pre-set limits nor overly determined by thought. Modality then, is a formal
re-presentation of the Potenzen or powers. Furthermore, whereas Kant famously argued that existence
is not a real predicate Schelling argues against this but not for ontological reasons, as was commonly
the case, but in that realness, for Schelling can only be provisionally asserted in its consequences. As
Beach outlines, Schelling thinks through Kant's existence is not a real predicate by questioning what
the jump, or leap, is from being to existence.378 Following Matthews above, the volition of reason is as
powerful as it is because it is of the potencies. As Schelling emphasizes in the 1815 Ages, the potencies
limit one another's existence, or inexistence, in a reciprocal fashion.379
As Markus Gabriel has highlighted, the relation of mind and world is explicitly addressed
(particularly in regards to creation, contingency, and necessity) in David Lewis' theory of possible
worlds. Lewis' theory, as Gabriel outlines, is that the semantic variability of language suggested by
modal statements, means that one most take seriously that possible worlds are as real as our world. Put
crudely, words like can, or maybe, suggest that one should treat worlds in which those events take
place as real as our own.
While Lewis' theory is (in)famous for inviting the 'incredulous stare' of other philosophers,
since the positing of so many worlds spits in the face of Occam's razor, it can be argued that Lewis'
statement is one of behavior, or pragmatics, and not an ontology at all. Either way, Schelling's
Potenzen, in a similar sense, demonstrate the necessity for positing a lean ontology if, for no other
reason, than to stave off dogmatic, or overly reckless or enthusiastic speculation, of asserting that all
logical statements have ontological consequences or that all ontological predicates are completely
377 Grant, “Remains of the World,” 8.
378 Beach, Potencies, 142.
379 Schelling, Ages. 22.
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translatable into currently existing logic.
Following Schelling's reading of Plato put forward in the introduction, there is only one world
and not separate realms for ideas and for things. This seems like a uncontroversial proposition yet,
because of how Schelling views Platonic ideas as being real, Schelling's singular world could invite
incredulous stares of its own. The distinction between real and ideal is one of method and not one that
can be constitutively separated, either in terms of separate realms (such as the natural versus the
normative), or in terms of material (physicalist reduction and rampant idealism on the other end).
Schelling distinguishes the real and the ideal in terms of actual and potential which do not map
on to the terms directly, but instill a concept of motion and a derivative form of judgment. Actual and
potential are modes which are more than formal modality (necessity, contingency, etc) but, whereas
Lewis suggests that modal statements imply possible worlds, for Schelling, the plasticity and creativity
of the singular world manifests, however imperfectly, in modal categories. Because of the actual and
potential relation, whether something is real or ideal, is more a question of what something does than
what it is. Subsequent analysis of something's consequences determines its actuality and potentiality.
Given the potential ubiquity of creation, the tracing of consequences in turn requires means of
determining one's location in the world and, therefore, one's own creative or constructive capacities.
How one determines one's own location epistemologically and pragmatically will be the emphasis of
the following two chapters.

170

Chapter 5 – Lamps, Rainbows, Unicorns, and Horizons: Spatializing Knowledge in
Naturphilosophical Epistemology
Since I seek to ground my knowledge only in itself, I inquire no further as to the ultimate ground of this primary knowledge
(self-consciousness), which, if it exists, must necessarily lie outside knowledge. Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole
system of knowledge, but it casts its light ahead only, not behind […] Whether it is absolutely autonomous can be left
undecided, until such time as the science itself has determined whether anything whatever can be thought, which is not to
be derived from this knowledge itself.380

In the present chapter, I address the apparently problematic status of epistemology in
Schelling's work. Given the (at times) overblown emphasis on Schelling's anti-Kantianism, there
would seem to be little hope in articulating anything like a theory of knowledge in Schelling's thought.
For the sake of brevity, and to touch on the thrust of this project, I will emphasize knowledge's spatial
and navigational functions in Schelling's texts. For Schelling, the navigational is that which locates,
and constructively constrains, the capacity of the subject to synthesize. This is accomplished, I will
argue, via a spatialized reading of Schelling's concept of intellectual intuition. While this form of
intuition initially resembles that of Fichte's, Schelling soon transforms the term, using it tandem with
construction, in order to maintain both the sensory immediacy, yet abstract form, of intuition as the
initial means a knowing subject, immersed in the activities of nature, comes to recognize its own
capacities and begins to form claims about the world.
Epistemology in Schelling can be taken to revolve around the problem of location and synthesis
on two axes. The first vertical axis is the purportedly asymmetrically causal, or generative, axis of
nature represented by Schelling as the Stufenfolge (or graduated stages of nature). The second axis is
the horizontal representation of nature in terms of fields, or domains, of knowledge. Or, put otherwise,
Schelling's epistemology must deal with the vertical axis of the transcendental method which manifests
as the Stufenfolge, as well as the horizontal axis which manifests itself as fields or the scientific
classification of the progression of the potencies (Potenzen) via a form of Peircean abduction.

380 F.W.J. von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 1978), 18.
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Abduction, which will be addressed in the following chapter, is Peirce's name for a non-deductive
inference, a hypothesis, or the logic of creation. This is, to point back to Chapter 1, merely an
extension of Schelling's attempt to radicalize the materiality of Spinoza, and the ideality of Leibniz, to
do justice to the creative capacity of both nature and the idea.
If either of these axes could be perceived purely abstractly, the horizontal axis would view all
domains, or fields of knowledge, as co-determining one another in a massive web or network. Viewing
the vertical axis purely abstractly (as the Stufenfolge) one would see an evolutionary series, a line of
higher and higher potentiation. This view is complicated by the fact that, for Schelling, being an
embodied spectator or observer does not allow for these views to be abstracted apart from one's
embodied position. Furthermore, and as the above epigraph suggests, Schelling advocates a form of
constructivism, but one that is augmentative, in which powers express themselves at ever higher levels.
The question becomes: “What remains of the epistemological enterprise following a world of potencies
on the one hand, and co-determination of facts, or objects, on the other?”
As was illustrated in the previous chapter, the potencies project the unity of subjectivity and
objectivity as subject-object which are separated to think their parts and can never, on pain of
contradiction, be separated ontologically. Schelling claims that due to this function of the potencies, an
irresolvable dualism wedges itself in the very attempt to think philosophy, and thus, one is given
negative and positive philosophies, or, philosophies which think in terms of the 'what there is' (the
negative) and 'that there is' (the positive). Hence Schelling's consistent references to a third thing
(tertium quid in the early work) which eventually shifts to indifference point in the Identity
Philosophy. Gilles Châtelet, who will be engaged once more, demonstrates the importance of
indifference points for examining the relation between intuition and construction, between scientific
theories, and between philosophy and science.
Extensively laying out the positive, the negative, and the indifferent would be an altogether
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different project and one too massive for the present concerns. These concerns can be oriented and
narrowed following the spatio-temporalization of knowledge mentioned above: that of the
horizontality of fields, and the verticality of the Stufenfolge. This in turn will lead us into the protopragmatism of the next and final chapter in that, as Schelling argues in The Grounding of Positive
Philosophy, positive philosophy is a 'higher empiricism' because it utilizes the world of sense as a
material for an epistemological gesture that expands the power of reason. Or, in other words, the
positive philosophy uses experience's relative sensorial stability as a ground for reason rather than
concerning itself with the deeper structures of reason (as Kant does in the Critiques). The threat
remains that such a positive philosophy can be misconstrued as a romantic or naïve phenomenological
enterprise, but, I believe this is clearly not the case especially when the Berlin lectures are viewed in
light of their re-articulation in the Darstellung lectures which immediately followed.381
To address these issues, and to set the stage for Schelling's late proto-pragmatism, the present
chapter will deal with Schelling's attempt to articulate a theory of knowledge that is co-constructive
with nature (as derivation), that isolates and extracts kinds of knowledge as fields (as determination),
that relies upon neither a naïve, nor purely factical account, of intuition or sense. That is, one must
construct a notion of determination that relies on neither the apparent self-evident appearance of things
in sense, nor because they can equally be addressed as facts in a human-buit system of meaning. The
alternative to these two paths is ultimately best represented as a form of navigation following the work
of Gilles Châtelet.
5.1- Epistemology and the Stufenfolge (Derivation)
The Stufenfolge, as a divided series of graduated stages, involves a logic of ground that

381 One could tenuously argue that while negative philosophy works ascendentally and positive philosophy descendentally,
as Schelling puts it, Naturphilosophie is negative philosophy properly made dynamic, whereas transcendental
philosophy, is positive philosophy properly restrained. See F.W.J. von Schelling, The Grounding of Positive
Philosophy, trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 196.
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functions to impart the transcendental as an a priori logical structure to the genesis of nature, and
consciousness, over time. Yet, at the same time, the Stufenfolge can be read as the naturalist demand in
Schelling's thought as it asserts an asymmetrical generation that affects humans as deeply as all the rest
of nature.
Derivation, as a natural occurrence, arises from the fact that nature, to be as productive as it can
be, must self-inhibit in order to create at all (otherwise there would be either pure creation, or pure
stasis). As Schelling argues in the First Outline, the dynamic graduated series in nature (Stufenfolge) is
what must be deduced in order to argue that these inhibitions maintain some level of permanence as
things, as individuals in nature.382 It is with the advent of the Stufenfolge that Schelling may be pushing
his luck with regards tot he kinds of claims he can make about nature without falling back into precritical dogmatic metaphysics.
As will be investigated in the following chapter, it is these kinds of worries about the relation
between causes and reasons (or nature and norms) that lead many contemporary analytic thinkers who
invoke Germany Idealism to abandon the former for the strength of the latter. Following in the
footsteps of thinkers such as Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, it is presumed by Robert Brandom
and Robert Pippin, that the space of reasons, the place of normative commitments and operative
reasons, must be strictly divorced from the realm of causes, or the realm of nature. As was touched on
in the first chapter, and what will be returned to below, is how the Kantian root of this separation lies
in his treatment of teleology in relation to human freedom and the nature this freedom purportedly
escapes.
This normative cut-off, as we will investigate in Chapter 6, is utilized by current strands in
analytic philosophy that have taken up German Idealism in order to complicate, if not only to combat

382 F.W.J. von Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. K.R. Peterson (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004) 53-54.
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directly, the possibility of a ground of naturalism. This is done largely by an appeal to categories of
normativity, due to the fact that the normative dimension of human behavior seems operationally (if
not necessarily causally) divorced from scientific explanation or some other epistemological
articulation of the natural world. That is, as is the case in Schelling, if we assume a one-world physics
suggested in the Introduction, as well as in the conclusion of Chapter 4, what is the best way to account
for the seemingly non-natural tools of human existence (morals, values, laws, etc.) without conceding a
form of pure relativism, scientistic nihilism, or as David Bell has aptly demonstrated, a strange
patchwork world where local ideal claims are somehow made to supervene on a natural, or physical
world?383 As I will argue in relation to reductionism below, and Mark Wilson's work in the following
chapter, this patchwork approach may be fundamentally unavoidable. We are left then with the
difficult task of ascertaining Schelling's position between bald naturalism and anti-naturalist idealism.
Whether this means that Schelling is a liberal naturalist, or some other kind altogether, will be
addressed below.384
As has been the case throughout this work, skepticism is the operational pivot between
naturalism and idealism, or between nature and freedom. But, unlike Kant's skepticism, Schelling's
does not attempt to ground itself on the reality of our experience in order to determine its conditions
(that being the definition of the form of transcendental argumentation according to Kant) but, as we
have seen in Schelling broadly and, in Chapter 1, the naturalization of the transcendental means that
the apparent necessary conditions of our being-as-experience must defer to the seemingly necessary
conditions for Nature to be as productive as it is. This statement is the general form of what Schelling

383 David Bell, “Transcendental Arguments and Non-Naturalistic Anti-Realism,” in Transcendental Arguments: Problems
and Prospects, ed. Robert Stern (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 198.
384 The term liberal naturalism is used by several thinkers who accept the claims of scientific naturalism but believe that
such a form cannot account for the primacy of rational decision making. While Markus Gabriel has argued that the
transcendentalism of German Idealism opposes it to liberal naturalism (which Gabriel aligns with figures such as
McDowell) Michael Blamuer has argued that Schelling in fact embodies perfectly the liberal naturalism of figures such
as Thomas Nagel.
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takes from Fichte, and transfers to nature. That is, the productivity of nature is a postulate that seems
unavoidable if one is to make any further claims about anything let alone nature or the entity that is
postulating.
The subsequent difficulty lies in how we get from such a weak meontology (as I believe that to
be what Schelling advocates) to knowledge claims that are neither ontologically liberal nor antiontological.
As was touched on in Chapter 2, the exploration of the epistemological navigator requires reentering the fray between the normative examination of German Idealism, with its deflationary account
of the school's connections to nature and naturalism, and Schelling's one-world physics as something
between a hard (or reductive) and soft (or liberal) naturalism. The problem with these articulations of
naturalism, is that the former transforms epistemological certainty into a metaphysical frame (we might
say ignoring the difference between structure and form) whereas the latter over-relies on an antireductionism which reinstates its epistemological premises against investigation. Essentially, the
former normative approach transcendentalizes a non-parochial (but not universal) practice as a norm,
whereas the latter crude, or bald naturalist approach, immantizes a field of knowledge into an
exacerbated ontology. This again brings us to the methodological split of Schelling's epistemology,
which, I would argue, ignores the false choice between soft or liberal and hard or bald or reductionist
naturalism, as well as avoids a crude notion of reductionism, is also seen in one of Perice's greatest
heirs, and the figure who stands before the split between the natural and normative, namely Wilfrid
Sellars. But before getting there several other territories need to be crossed and examined.
The apparent alternative to a normative approach (that argues reasons are fundamentally
distinct from causes), and bald naturalism (which argues there are only causes and entities), is one of
an exchange between epistemological and ontological minimalism or weakness. That is, a normative
approach is epistemologically strong but ontologically weak in that it asserts the importance of
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knowledge claims over, and above, ontological claims, perhaps dismissing ontology altogether. Bald
naturalism may be equally strong about epistemological claims, but may claim that the knowledge
claims of science trump those of philosophy, if the arbiter is server to protect human freedom and
action from the judgments of neuroscience for example. Another possibility, is to argue that ontology
trumps all other claims but then establish a minimal ontology, such as that things exist. A fourth
option, and one I believe Schelling takes up, is to claim that there is a speculative meontology that is
necessitated by being in a world that limits out capacity to know it, but seems to simultaneously
engender thinking agents to create with and beyond what we know of it. The problem becomes how to
locate, and properly delimit, the capacity to know against, and with, other capacities.
Despite broad claims about the systematicity of German Idealism, I would argue that the
problem of locating reason (which was focused on in the first chapter) emphasizes the non-totalizing
character of this approach of systematicity. Whether it is Fichte's internal light of determination,
Schelling's unprethinkable as engine of predication, or Hegel's constant reinstatement of the measure
of necessity (or what Zizek has referred to as the contingency of necessity), it becomes apparent that
German Idealism, even though it was attempting to be far-reaching, was not attempting to construct a
view from nowhere. In fact, it is the very emphasis on capacities such as construction, derivation,
determination, and the like which emphasize the work which is always required in order to make any
kind of claim to universality or the Absolute, or to nature.
In fact, it is Kant's inability to properly ground how transcendental schema come to be known
and function, that can be read as the impetus for the German Idealists to set about their project.
For Schelling, productive intuition, which follows from the immediate world of sense, sets the powers
of the imagination off in constructing and creating outwards. But, once the subject, or more generally
any constructive force, recognizes its limitations, it turns inwards and accesses itself. Even these earlier
stages of conscious development, restricted to the human, demonstrate for Schelling the difficulties in
177

asserting a schematic universality as Kant does. Yet, Schelling does not dismiss that something like
universality is capable given the fact that the universality is expressed from a local point that may very
well dislocate the place from which that thought occurs. Schelling's conceptual bind here, is how can
be invoke a concept that is far reaching (consequently or potentially universal) given the localityconstraint he has put on conceptual production? In part, this is possible because Schelling cautiously
utilizes concepts as demonstrations or exhibitions and never things-in-themselves nor meta-stable
categories. The Stufenfolge adapts the genetic-version of the transcendental from Fichte, which, as
Daniel Breazeale lucidly outlines, sought to demonstrate how the kind of subjectivity, or consciousness
that Kant presupposed, could be demonstrated by accounting genetically for the series of acts by which
it comes to recognize itself as such.385 Schelling, as we will outline more below specifically in
reference to intuition, sees this as a middle step (as intellectual intuition) which cannot, for him, be the
sole, or at least main, ground from which construction/derivation occurs. For Schelling, to maintain the
continuity between sensory experience, the production of the imagination, the recognition of the self as
a producer, and then subsequent production, one must set the very process of derivation, of selfconstruction as graduated, outside the subject's control. Whereas, for Fichte, anything set outside the
sheer production-by-consciousness would be merely factical, for Schelling the assumption that the
creative activity is proved by demonstrating our ability to act, overly localizes the underlying
dynamics of action as such.386 At the same time, Schelling does not wish to merely ignore the
impressive constructive capacity of the mind hence why the transcendental is naturalized via its being
opened at both ends, in that our schematization of it is a selection of a potentiated evolutionary process
which he only view from a place, though a temporally 'late' one, inside of it.

385 Daniel Breazeale, “Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” in The Transcendental Turn, ed. Sebastian Gardner
(London: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83-84.
386 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing: J.G. Fichte's 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, trans. Walter Wright
(Albany: State University New York Press, 2005), 37.
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For instance, Schelling's Stufenfolge model presumes, for better or for worse, that the human
organism sits atop the graduated stages, that the human is the highest production of the cosmos thus
far. Highest does not of course mean perfect (as Schelling is consistently critical of perfection as well
as any notion of completeness), but means the most potentiated. The strangeness of the Stufenfolge
model is that while we are viewing the series of developments from a high point, this gives us the
responsibility of being so potentiated as to see how potentiated we are.387
As Schelling writes in his lecture “The Exhibition of the Process of Nature” (1843):
We must of course assume that the Earth is the point of emergence for humanity – why, we do not know, it refers to
relations we cannot survey, but humanity is therefore not specifically a product of the Earth – it is a product of the entire
process – not the Earth alone, the entire cosmos contributes to humanity, and if of the Earth, as, continuing from the earlier
standpoint, he is, then humanity is not exclusively created for the Earth, but [390] for all the stars, since humanity is created
as the final goal of the cosmos. If humanity appears to be a local essence, this is not what it originally is, but has become
localized.388

Also relevant is the following sentiment from Introduction to the First Outline:
But if Nature is absolute productivity, then the ground of this limitation cannot lie outside of it. Nature is originally only
productivity; there can, therefore, be nothing determined in this productivity (all determination is negation) and so products
can never be reached by it.—If products are to be reached, the productivity must pass from being undetermined to being
determined, that is, it must, as pure productivity, be canceled. If the ground of determination of productivity lay outside of
Nature, Nature would not originally be absolute productivity. Determination, that is, negation, must certainly come into
Nature; but this negation viewed from a higher standpoint must again be positivity .389

While I will address determination below, derivation, as graduation, must be a natural process
and not something merely added to nature from the outside. The struggle here is how can Schelling
claim that structures and forms are real but discoverable by humans but that there are also some
concepts which refer to things we cannot, or have not yet, discovered. How can any claim to
knowledge be more than only an artificial claim, how does any statement of fact in Schelling obtain on
reality if everything is nature yet we are limited or localized aspects of it? This is also complicated by
the fact that Schelling no doubt realigns, in various ways, the relation between Naturphilosohie and
387 To wax poetic, we could view Schelling's Stufenfolge as simultaneously the wreckage heap of Walter Benjamin's angel
of history, and the medieval Great Chain of Being.
388 F.W.J. von Schelling, “Exhibition of the Process of Nature,” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Unpublished Manuscript,
2013),
389 Schelling, First Outline, 204.
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transcendental philosophy, in the almost fifty years separating the above quotes. While the human, as
organism, hardly appears in the First Outline, or the Ideas, as they are discussed in terms of their
thought processes in idealistic language, this division seems to slowly disappear over time. 390
While these questions are more directly addressed through determination (and the horizontal model of
knowledge), the concept of the Stufenfolge, of the discovery of non-trivial derivation as a natural
occurrence, addresses the temporal dimension, or temporal pressure, that is creation. That there is
generation proposes the hypothesis that generation can be understood, or can be mapped as a
consequence of that generation. The status of the human as the highest comes from the fact that, as far
as we know, our understanding of generation allows for an augmentation of that generation in a way
that often is used to support the fundamental difference of thought from nature, i.e., the realm or space
of reasons over, and above, the space of causes or nature.391
The Stufenfolge is, above all, the problem of entities, or points of inhibition, from within
creation which seems, definitionally, as if it should be unceasing. The standpoint of the highest issues a
perspective downward into the chain of causes (as well as upwards in terms of speculation). The
perspective of the human, being as high as it is, allows for the creation of a concept such as the
Stufenfolge whereby we can attempt to place ourselves within the chain of ongoing causes, within the
dynamics stages of nature. Thus anything functionally akin to a space of reasons in Schelling (from the
vertical view of the Stufenfolge) would be consequent upon a natural process even when that space of
reasons is absolutized. In this sense, the Stufenfolge is a radical form of epistemological perspectivism
or constructivism but one that admits not only the foundational, but the ongoing, limit-factors of nature
in the process of constructing knowledge systems. Thus, the transcendental, as a provisional
subordination of the real by the ideal, can be viewed as a vertical orientation in that it attempts to trace
390 I must thank Tilottama Rajan for pointing out the strange non-role of the human in the First Outline.
391 I am aligning determination with a horizontal model of knowledge in that it requires a depotentiation of the human's
place, as in the vertical view, thereby flattening all kinds of beings on one horizon.

180

the evolutionary, or augmentating, repetition of forms over time from atop what is traced.392
Whereas Fichte's geneticism could be claimed to be also as vertical, as evolutionary, the difference is
that, for Fichte, the external or the not-I functions as a boundary, and thus human subjectivity is always
at the bleeding-edge of construction. For Schelling, on the other hand, our capacity to thought is a late
development, but it also demands that we properly localize its emergence naturalistically even in a
transcendental context because thinking is derived from nature. Thus activity is more than ideal
propellant for Schelling but is also the not-sheerly thinkable medium by which, and on which, humans
act.
5.2 - Epistemology and the Field Problem (Determination)
Unprethinkable being is the fundamental presupposition of all determination. 393
Unprethinkable being is Schelling's name for the facticity of reason. This facticity for him is resultant of the fact that a mere
dimension of distinction without anything distinct still has no relationship to a differentiation in judgments and is therefore
indeed a necessary proposition. 394

The fundamental question of fields of knowledge, as I see it, is that of how Schelling's system
can account for meta-functions, such as systems of knowledge, if he claims no special capacity of the
human to know the depth of things, and if (on the side of nature we might say for conceptual clarity),
being and thinking are within a heterogeneous monism (nature as subject-object). That is, whereas the
emergence of things or facts is credited to the self-inhibition of an abstract identity (put most directly
in order anything to be something it must inhibit itself into things) how is it that we have privileged
access to domains such as biology, chemistry, physics and so on?
To bring the question specifically to the domain of epistemology: how is it that the domains
which we have constructed (such as the physical sciences) seem more than ontological, but less than

392 Schelling, First Outline, 226.
393 Frederick A. Mortensen, The Fate of Finitude: Schelling and the Question of the World (Doctoral Thesis, University of
Copenhagen, 2012), 108.
394 Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism (London: Continuum International Publishing
Group, 2011), 134.
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metaphysical? Or, put another way, does Schelling ontologize knowledge claims, epistemologize
ontology, or pursue a different path altogether? The unprethinkable (Unvordenkliche) is referenced
above since instead of pointing to a brute metaphysical or ontological claim about the impossibility of
complete knowledge, or to the simple fact that there is always more knowledge produced, the
unprethinkable is the status of the continuum (addressed in chapter 3) as an ongoing synthetic activity,
an activity which is as real as it is ideal.
As has hopefully become evident in the previous three chapters, Schelling's semi-abductive
method follows from the fact that one cannot merely remove oneself from their own sensual domain
but, this does not mean, as Schelling takes from Kant, that the domain of sense is necessarily physical,
or real, nor is it simply factual (contra Fichte) as I will address below. Schelling argues that nature
produces real structures or universals but that these are discovered only through the constant tracing of
their consequences. This problematic situation, I would argue, centers on the forgetting of the field
problem as being one of assumed authority, i.e., the question of fields is one that belongs to science
and philosophical investigations into such concerns of nature which, unfortunately, are no longer the
purview of continental philosophy, and, increasingly, are that of analytic philosophy. The former, more
often than not, simply stands behind a blind rejection of the validity of the hard sciences, while the
latter stands behind blind acceptance (and often of seriously outdated forms of science in both cases).
While this is not always the case, and various fields such as science and technology studies, or
philosophy of cosmology in analytic fields, are generally more open to finer questions of method,
experiment, and, the conceptual history proper to science, the analytic-continental split has done
serious damage to cross-discipline communication. While this may seem a trivial concern, or one that
forces the thinker into either accepting or rejecting the total authority of the physical sciences, I believe
that the avoidance of this question has become accepted as a central characteristic of post-war

182

thought.395 This avoidance is part and parcel of the avoidance of the question of nature. As Schelling
noted:
The entire new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common defect that nature is not available
for it and that it lacks a living ground. Spinoza’s realism is thereby as abstract as the idealism of Leibniz. Idealism is the
soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can constitute a living whole. 396

Before pursuing the ontology-epistemology relation in a general sense to move towards
Schelling, a historical excursus is useful here. An added complexity arises in discussing Schelling's use
of fields as his work, in a broad sense, functions as a base for field theory in modern physics. This is a
contested claim but one, for the sake of this project, finds additional support in that field theory,
abstracted into the field problem, appears central to Schelling's thought. Or, put otherwise, the status
and treatment of physical fields (such as electric, or electromagnetic fields) cannot be separated from
the question of what the borders of epistemological fields are in Schelling's work. This is not merely to
claim a generic irreducibility of historical context, but to demonstrate that whether in the case of
physical fields, or fields of knowledge, the diagrammatic and explanatory function of field, is
necessary given Schelling's removal of objects or any substratum as final explanation of both how we
act, and how we know.397
As L. Pearce Williams argues quite convincingly in his text The Origins of Field Theory, the
history of certain physical theories (such as electromagnetism) appears odd if the influence of German
Idealism, and particularly Schelling, is not taken into account.398 Williams demonstrates that in
contrast to the Newtonians and atomistic chemists of Schelling's time (such as Lavoiser) Schelling
influences a field theory as that which fundamentally embraces the synthetic construction of scientific
395 While this is a broad claim I see very few exceptions in the continental tradition. Besides Whitehead, Merleau-Ponty,
and scattered adventures into ethology in rather rare moments in hermeneutics and phenomenology, I do not see nature
as a productive constraint existing for philosophy.
396 F.W.J. von Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love, and
Johannes Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 26.
397 As is hopefully evident following chapter 3, my use of diagram is following Châtelet. For Châtelet, the diagram is the
soldification of the gesture which, in turn, is the first act of intuition.
398 L. Pearce Williams, The Origin of Field Theory (New York: Random House, 1966), viii.
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concepts, that discovery must be supplanted with the creation of concepts that must be extended till
they break. Williams writes: “The fertility of these mental concepts will be determined by the manner
in which these mental conceptions lead to further discourses and causal chains.”399
The connection between physical field theory, or what is more often than not called classic field
theory, and that of fields of knowledge, is not too difficult to make. Field theory came into existence as
a means of describing how forces act in a space not dependent upon matter but acting upon matter or,
in matter's place. Classical field theory generally discussed gravity and electromagnetism – forces
which were important for Schelling from his early works in Naturphilosophie till his later lectures on
Pure Rational Philosophy. In several places Iain Hamilton Grant has indicated the importance that
field theory has for Schelling, and Schelling for field theory.400 But what Grant does not emphasize is
the diagrammatic function that the field theories instill in German Idealism and vice versa. That is, it is
not merely a question of the scientific success of field theories as explanatory across domains, but also
of the fact that the diagrammatic thrust of fields allows for a non-trivial constructive approach by
loosening the break between the space of reason and the space of nature via an intuitive placing of the
observer as Châtelet puts it.
To link back to the previous two chapters, the importance of field theory and fields of
knowledge for Schelling, demonstrates once more the importance of continuity and the asymmetrical
production of nature before thought; that the idealism of the I follows from the idealism of nature. The
emergence of field theory particularly in the work of Humphry Davy (who was influenced by
Coleridge's Schellingianism and adopted Naturphilosophical terminology),401 as well as in the work of
Michael Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell, shows how diagrammatic non-material forces were

399 Williams, The Origin of Field Theory, 36.
400 Grant discusses this aspect of Schelling's work most notably in “Does Nature Stay What it Is?” and “Movements of the
World,” Analecta Hermeneutica , 3. pp. 1-17, 2011.
401 Williams, Origin of Field Theory, 69.
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imperative for understanding the productivity and general functioning of nature at scales both small
and immense as the eighteenth century shifted into the nineteenth.
Furthermore, because of the synthetic nature of these domains, the diagrammatic and the
geometric become the methods best suited to present them as part of nature. Whereas, for Châtelet, the
diagram is any mark on a material surface, the geometric presupposes a system of relation into which
the diagram may, or may not be, added. This transition is evident in the first diagrams of field-physics.
Lines of force, bent lines of magnetic poles, or, later for Oersted, the cosmos itself was a plenum of
forces, a net of surging powers generating all things. Field theory was a field of study which allowed
further discovery, coupled with diagrammtic rigor, which productively formalized, but did not restrain,
the forces of nature. As Schelling's synthetic philosophy emphasizes, and again as Williams indicates,
any philosopher who relies upon a physical substratum is no philosopher at all.402
As Châtelet remarks, German Idealism writ large can be taken as that which attempted to trace
the generation of structure as such from apparently free speculation or intuition. The leaps made
possible through intuitive means, in the same stride freed certain forms of mathematical and scientific
creativity, but this is not a freedom from rigor but a freedom from certain common sense, or
sensorially hardened constraints, or we might say constraints of the practical which, again as we will
see below, Markus Gabriel emphasizes perhaps indirectly.403 Thus, it is imperative to determine what
exactly replaces the physical substratum in the wake of fields. If not facticity, or matter, then what?
Châtelet suggests an abstract answer – that any mark retroactively identifies its potential medium
whereas the assumption of a medium quickly becomes epistemologically restrictive. Châtelet
highlights how intuition functions to lace together thought and nature in a way that is neither purely
real (where the real determines the ideal only) nor purely ideal (where thoughts produce entities). As

402 Williams, Origin of Field Theory, 114.
403 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 73.
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we will engage in the following chapter, neither does Schelling support a merely ideal separation of the
real from the ideal, i.e., a normative cut-off endorsed by thinkers such as Robert Brandom and John
McDowell (who will be addressed in Chapter 6). That is, for Châtelet, any act, as evidenced by the
diagram, immediately threatens to contaminate the normative given the fact that it is creative yet
stable.
For Schelling the substratum is a gesture and is posited, and its consequences are either found,
or not, in the act of tracing its potential consequences. This act of tracing is, as we will trace out in the
rest of this project, one essentially of abductive demonstration built on speculative motion. It is this
tension that Châtelet emphasizes in the use of the gesture. The gesture, or the figure, are two means of
demonstrating the intuitive field or open space of motion while, at the same time, demonstrating the
material effect of such a motion as caught in the memory of the gesture or as a diagram.
In terms of substratum and intuition, Schelling, like those who pursue field physics after him,
creates electromagnetic space, or, a space which is boundless except for those dimensions created by
motions that appear to occur 'within' that space. This speculative 'within-ness' is defined only as being
neither at the beginning or ending edge of it in a spatial sense or, in a temporal sense, at the alpha or
the omega of creation (pointing back to the previous chapter, as well as, the use of the Stufenfolge
above). Before addressing the relation between fields (whether scientific or philosophical) in the
following section, it is worth examining the diagrammatic ways in which Maxwell and Faraday
attempted to draw the motions of an intuitive substratum.
As Williams highlights, Maxwell dealt the final blow to the physical substratum by
mathematizing the work of Faraday404 and discussed the interaction of various forces and fields
analogically as vortices or gear wheels.405 As has been indicated earlier, the genesis of field theories

404 Williams, Origin of Field Theory, 121-122.
405 Williams, Origin of Field Theory, 129-131.
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can be traced from Schelling's influence on Davy via Coleridge. Faraday, as Davy's lab assistant,
picked up the language and it, in turn, influenced Maxwell. Châtelet traces this progression through the
ways in which the electromagnetic space as such is visualized. Drawing on Schelling's Deduction of
the Dynamic Processes, Châtelet discusses how a free space is produced in the barest notion of system
following Schelling's combination of intuition and the potencies (the virtual or intensive force of
construction).406
For Châtelet, Faraday and Maxwell use diagrammatic figures such as gear wheels and vorticies
in order to organize a willful or “deliberate ambiguity.”407 To attempt to situate these figures as real or
ideal would be insufficient and the emphasis on figures and diagrams indicates the complex interplay
of fields and asymmetrical generation between the two methods. Châtelet goes on to argue that
Faraday and Maxwell utilize wheels, gears, and screws to demonstrate collections of motions but that
these figures are to be expanded and unwound as the consequences of experiments emerge: “Lines of
force are neither 'real nor 'artificial'; they do not mathematize forces; they do not pin geometrical onto
physical, rather they substitute an ideal, but elastic and tough, network, which allows
virtuality to reclaim its rights.”408 And, in addition: “The lines of force weave a 'field', a system of
reverberation and resonance between the space and the geometer or physics: one might speak of a
preparation of space for experimentation, analogous to that of the moved awakened to mobility.”409
He goes on to write:
Faraday takes an inspired position: the diagrams of interlaced axis and loop possess a peculiar autonomy and an allusive
power that must be respected and not treated like an exercise in which a mathematical 'form' is applied to physical
'phenomena.' Faraday's experiments are not enslaved to 'predictions', but instead strive to establish a new overhanging point
in physics by defining a ritual of gestures which is always carefully accompanied by diagrams. Their aim is to produce a
protocol for approach that is sufficiently bold and sufficiently articulated to release all the possible reverberations of the

406 Similarly, Joseph Esposito argues that Schelling's Naturphilosophie should be viewed as a precursor to general systems
theory. See Joseph Esposito, Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature (London: Bucknell University Press,
1977), 10.
407 Gilles Châtelet, Figuring Space: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics, (London: Springer, 1999), 162.
408 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 166.
409 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 163.
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interlace.410

Schelling's inspiration for the field theoreticians, as well as his later reflections on their
experiments, exhibits the difficulties arising from there being an inability to rely upon origin, or
substratum, or upon ideal factors of the idea in constituting any one thing or force.411 If forces merely
are, then what appears as things are intersections of forces, thereby being the result of different codeterminations. It is not merely sufficient to state that forces are and everything else is a result of them
as a concluding remark.412 It is the advent of the positive philosophy in Schelling's later work that
attempts to do justice to the consequence of determinations as more than merely a net of forces, i.e., to
ask what it means for us as creatures capable of a peculiar kind of force (ideation) that forces just seem
to be.
Esposito reads this ambiguity as a hard opposition between experiment and speculation,413 but
this would seem to read abduction out of Schelling's method of determination. Even speculation would
require some embodied resources placed in a particular location. That is, as creatures who produce
thoughts, humans are still situated in particular locations and are subject to certain forces over others.
In other words, while the doctrine of forces largely addresses the ream of negative philosophy (that
things are), the gestural aspect of field physics lends itself to the positive philosophy, in that it
addresses what it is that things are specifically. Thus, ideal constructions (or constraints) contribute to
a situated form of knowledge not because ideas create things in the same way that forces do, but
because ideas are contributory to pre-existing forces.
How this process contributes directly to the practice of philosophy will be examined in the final
section of this chapter as well as the concluding chapter but, for now, it is important to examine the

410 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 164.
411 See F.W.J. von Schelling, “On Faraday’s Most Recent Discovery: Lecture to an Open Sitting of the [Bayerische]
Akademie [des Wissenschaften] on May 28, 1832,” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, (Unpublished Manuscript, 2014).
412 This problem is what Schelling viewed as “the riddle of the world” according to Esposito, Schelling's Idealism, 42-43.
413 Esposito, Schelling's Idealism, 137.
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consequences of how determination is focused in a particular activity, particularly, that of the sciences.
Fields of inquiry, whether scientific or otherwise theoretical, are not self-standing but are meta-stable
fields of co-determinations which, at least for us, are constituted by the results of experiments. These
experiments follow from, and are at times regulated by, entities which lie between our creation of them
and their discovery 'in' nature. As Esposito writes: “Nature itself cannot be an object to anything that is
a part of it, so that we must reject any explanation that does not also contain a way of explaining the
possibility of such knowledge without the Archimedean assumption.”414
However, as Châtelet emphasizes, this does not mean that all of our determinations, or
observations, are always-already thwarted in terms of their epistemological efficacy, but that a
determination is like the potential grasping of a puzzle piece without knowing the final picture. As he
writes in “Interlacing the Singularity, the diagram, and the metaphor” (1999):
We are at the antipodes of the 'abstraction' which always results from the violent deduction of a part, and thus of a
mutilation, whereas while the 'lever' does not subtract anything and acts like certain fragments of a puzzle which, from the
outset, emerge and impose or dictate the solution: to be absolutely concrete is to persevere to some extent in a kind of
tangential approach of thought which grasps its own movement. 415

Schelling's epistemology, and the field physics with which it is entwined, attempts to minimize
(without obliterating) the constraints not only of conceptual creation but creation as such. This entails,
as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, that inexistence is a part of nature in that a reservoir of
creation which is not contained within nature but, in the form of the potencies, runs through nature
without determinable end or beginning (in space or in time).
Schelling's impact on field theory is not merely of historical note but imperative to understand
the relation between philosophy and the sciences broadly. The conceptual work of philosophy on
science and science on philosophy is important as long as it avoids being neither conciliatory or
atavistic in regards to science, as is often the case in analytic circles, or hostile and reductive towards
414 Esposito, Schelling's Idealism, 98.
415 Gilles Châtelet, “Interlacing the singularity, the diagram, and the metaphor,” ed. Charles Alunni, in Virtual
Mathematics: The Logic of Difference, ed. Simon Duffy (Bolton: Clinamen Press, 2006), 43.
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science, as is often the case in continental thought.416 In the following section I will address this in
more detail with an eye to relations between fields, and, between fields and the observer.
5.3 - Rationalizing Rainbows: Between Sense and Observation
In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for
the sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the
sensuous faculty in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed
to say that the former is a cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a particular appearance
or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the
empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself
is to be found, our transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in themselves,
although in the whole range of the sensuous world, investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to
do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the
rain, the reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense,
that is, as that which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of sensuous perception, is known in intuition
to be so and so determined, and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum generally, and inquire, without
reference to its accordance with all our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object as a
thing in itself (the raindrops of course are not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question of the
relation of the representation to the object is transcendental; and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their
circular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or
fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown. 417
The aim here is to demonstrate through a detailed discussion of a concrete example (the rainbow) how fruitful it is to study
the asymptotic domain between theories. We will see that there are phenomena—various observable features of the
rainbow, in particular—that require for their description aspects of both the ray theory and the wave theory. To my mind,
from a philosophical point of view, this is an extremely important fact. It means that the reductive programs championed by
philosophers actually miss out on a lot of interesting physics […] We ought to give up on the notion of reduction in any
sense and consider what of philosophical (and physical) interest can be learned by studying the asymptotic limits between
theories.418
Rainbows glorify neither the subject nor any region of the universe. As the generic light of the universal continuum
traverses regional horizons – each a droplet or a crystallized particle open to light – it enters them. Upon entering a regional
horizon, the light refracts, bringing into the equation the internal conditions of the region. Once the light reaches the end of
the horizon (the back of the droplet), it reflects back. As the light departs the regional droplet, it changes direction
once again, indicating a departure from the regional conditions (the composition of the droplet) into the open, and
accordingly, the continuation of this synthetic illumination for other regions. 419

Taking the asymmetric generation of nature as the model of the Stufenfolge above, in tandem
with the field problem of substantializing the observer, I move on to the necessity of de-romancing the
notion of observer in order to combat knee-jerk reactions (in both directions) in terms of the validity of
knowledge claims as either being totally free of, or completely corrupted by, observation bias whether
416 Esposito argues that Schelling's relation to Kant centers on the conceptual boundaries between philosophy and science
namely that the critical enterprise makes a proper relation between them impossible. Esposito, Schelling's Idealism, 55.
417 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007 ), 84.
418 Robert Batterman, The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 77.
419 Reza Negarestani, “Rainbows and Rationalism,” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2013), 6.
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that bias is coded in terms of naturalistic or normative limitations. I will then, in more specific terms of
the sciences, attempt to show, through Robert Batterman's expert analysis of scientific and
philosophical reduction, that these moves ignore Schelling's approach which asserts the reality, yet
epistemological graspability, of fields of science (or systems of knowledge) which at different levels
approach one another more 'roughly' or, more 'smoothly,' depending upon the apparatuses utilized.420
I want to argue that the contemporary hard sciences present an appealing model of the invariance of,
and relation between, the fields of knowledge in a way that reflects the use of the potencies in the First
Outline discussed in section 5.1. Furthermore, and following from Schelling's logic of determination in
5.2., I will focus upon a somewhat odd example, but one that is quite frequent in discussions of
emergence and knowledge claims, that of the rainbow.
Following the quotations above, and given Schelling's complex epistemological stance, how is
one to grasp the weight of knowledge claims that can be made about, and based upon, an ephemeral
entity such as a rainbow? Beyond this, and as the above epigraphs suggest, rainbows are tricky
phenomena because they bring into question the tension between sense, knowledge, and existence in
that they can be adequately, but not completely, described by different physical theories. As Batterman
and others have pointed out, the ray theory of light explains certain aspects of the rainbow, whereas the
wave theory of light is preferable in other instances. In essence, rainbows demonstrate universality at
the level of particularity as universality means, for him, that “systems of very different microscopic
constitution exhibit identical behavior under certain circumstances.”421 For this reason Batterman
argues that rainbows point to the need to restrain, but not eliminate, the very concept of emergent
entities because emergence operates in a 'no-man's land' of theoretical description. Emergent entities
are thus not inexplicable but partially explicable according to different, and bordering, knowledge
420 This is also expertly explained, in pseudo-pragmatist terms by the contemporary philosophy Mark Wilson in his
monumental work Wandering Significance.
421 Batterman, Devil, 37.
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domains.
These no-man's lands, or zones of transition, are not merely ideal but indicate a system's
internal structure. Constructing a theory to bridge bordering knowledge domains details, but only
obliquely, the relevant correlations between them; the passage from one field to another that makes the
locally detected motion important.422 Thus, the macroscopic or emergent results of a phenomenon's
transition are phenomenologically relevant, as is the context of embodiment or, more generally put,
locality.423
Or, in other words, if an object such as a rainbow can be constructed from the materials of two
different theories (the ray and wave theories of light) then is the insufficiency of these theories alone a
result of some noumenal status of the rainbow, or, of the limits of the structure of how theories
themselves are constructed from particular perspectives?
In addition, rainbows index the relation between sense and being, in terms of what can be
gleaned from something that appears to be a mere appearance. The above quote by Kant suggests that
ephemeral phenomena, in particular, point to the fact that all particular entities are carved out of
sensuous material (here pointing back to Chapter 2 and the physics of sense) but this begs the question,
as Maimon pointed out, of how one then distinguishes analytic propositions from synthetic ones?
Schelling argues that synthesis occurs in any act and that analytic stability is only a meta-stability,
when another form of synthesis is treated as ground or, more unstably, as reason. This treatment of a
particular form of synthesis as ground is what ties Schelling to Peirce, and, to pragmatism more
generally; that of the asymptotic approach to natural phenomena. Schelling's intuition and speculative
temporality-as-derivation is coupled with his horizontal field-based concerns over space and
systematicity. In both cases, reasons are the results of grounds being treated as if they were absolute

422 Batterman, Devil, 38-40.
423 Batterman, Devil, 43.
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(pointing back to Chapter 3 and the extensity test) in order to test the extent to which a particular entity
(which, after all, is only an inhibition of natural processes) is connected to nature. This is evident not
only in Schelling's emphasis on productive intuition (to be discussed in the following section) but also
in terms of the emphasis on location in Schelling's thought. For Schelling, the problem of location, or
individuation, is one of simultaneous epistemological and ontological bordering. Reduction, and
asymptotic investigation, both highlight the difficulty in navigating multiple fields of knowledge where
asymmetrical generation over time does not explain but, in fact, inhibits discussion of the resulting
field's interaction.
To return to Batterman, the zone between theories demonstrates the problems with easy critique
and utilization of reduction (both scientifically and philosophically). Reduction is tempting because
quite different entities and forces in different explanatory realms (such as a organism on the one hand
and the reaction to stress of a metal beam on the other hand) may exhibit similar (or what Batterman
calls universal) tendencies. This places one, at least abstractly, in a similar space as Schelling's axis of
horizontal and vertical knowledge, or, between the difference that thought makes in relation to the
difference that time makes (understood from our particular perspective). Or, in pointing back to
Chapter 3, between apparently qualitative and apparently quantitative distinctions. Or, to put things in
the language of inter-theoretic relations, between derivation and connection. Schelling engages the
inter-theoretic space through extending the possible grounds of phenomena or apparent products
(Scheinprodukt).
One difficulty here, in connecting Batterman's discussion of inter-theoretic relations to
Schelling's thought, is how to properly relate theory and method. The terms are of course mutually
reinforcing in that, for Schelling, by using constructive or productive intuition, he is able to take the
freedom of the transcendental method and restrict it with the demonstratively unavoidable theory, in
his case, that nature is prior to thinking. Nature functioning as Prius in turn allows, or in fact
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necessitates, that thinking functions dynamically, i.e., constructively and intuitively. Both theories and
methods are tests, or experiments, but the former are speculative grounds which justify the locality of
the latter.
As already noted, Schelling’s method is one of constructive-extension, of extending an
experiment to its breaking point (to determine whether something is merely ideal or real according to
its consequences and not its substances). This is why, in the Erlangen lectures, philosophy is that
practice where one must face the infinite. For reason, this points to a certain asymmetry that we have
already encountered: “the lamp of knowledge that only points forward.” In one sense, Schelling
appears to endorse the power of Kant's critical project, of what the science of reason can do and its
necessity for the progression of philosophy yet, at the same time, Schelling does not believe that the
critical project can be constructive based on the slim premises its sets out from, or its method begins to
function as a theory to the extent it does not justify its claim to universality. This is why Schelling
classifies Kant's work as negative philosophy. At times this classification has been obscured by
readings of Schelling that either emphasize his anti-Kantianism (Iain Grant) or claim he is resolutely
Kantian ( Arran Garre).424 In essence, Schelling attempts to de-couple Kant's transcendental method,
which he sees as a novel development in philosophy, from philosophy as such. Partially the issue is
that for Schelling experience is accessible to reason since determination is about ‘whatness’ and not
‘thatness,’ or, what something is (being) versus that something is (existence). Whatness connects to the
augmentative model where the qualitative is only experienced, is only conceptually registered, postfactum. This is the most basic division of the negative from the positive philosophies.
Furthermore, Schelling wishes to argue not only that reason cannot fix its experiential content
and still remain reason but, in regards to the positive philosophy, that the relation between reason and
424 Bruce Matthews deserves mention for providing one of the more extensive analyses of Kant's relation to Schelling in
his text Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2011).
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experience is one in which reason must take experience as essence. The complexity here is that while
Schelling admits the myth of the given, i.e, that what is sensed is already conceptually laden (since one
cannot be sure how real and how ideal a determination is), Schelling acknowledges that while thought
can, and must, set out to see the extent of an object or concept’s consequences, experience, as issuing
from both conceptually-coded sense and that which necessary is, existence as we are already immersed
in it, must be treated as a constructive condition for the content of reason. In this regard, Schelling
follows Wilfrid Sellars in his skepticism regarding the given, but admits that experience must be
treated as given not ontologically but as locative, as locally given in a way that is not immediately
conceptually readable. Or, put in a simplified sense, Schelling rejects givenness as pure or nonconceptual, but accepts the givenness of experience as proximate and local.
But this is not to denounce reason as such but acknowledge the continuing pressure to push
reason alongside experience. It is to try and ascertain the mediation between mind and world (ideal and
real), the question of what is the third thing (tertium quid) as the consequence as consequence (as a
non-trivial result of the investigation of mind into world) as a trajectory (as the appearance of quality
in quantity).425 Is it both reason and experience which recognize the potency as trajectory, as having
occurred in, and out of, experience and reason. Thus reason is that which determines the inexistent as a
what since this occurs in experience, and as sensed, for reason.
In this relation of negative and positive philosophy, naturalism falls somewhere in between in
terms of being strictly methodological or strictly ontological. The distinction between ontological and
methodological naturalism is made methodologically (and would later be determined by one to be
more or only ideal) if one follows a Kantian method. As creatures capable of reason, human entities
investigate their own investment in the world. From the perspective of a self-conscious entity a method

425 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2007), XXXX
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is a filtering device in order to make motion and navigation (as the systematization of motion), into
determination and speculation.
This determination is more than ideal if it expresses a real potency in an actuality. There
appears to be no way of knowing ahead of time (without experience) how many potencies there are, or
how they function which is why, as indicated in the previous chapter, they index inexistence. The
relation between knowing and being can be articulated in terms of determination and derivation, in
terms of horizontal fields establishing one another’s boundaries and a vertical evolution, or derivation,
in terms of evolution. The vertical/horizontal distinction is immediately a crude one, one surpassed and
complicated in the topological and geometrical mathematics.426 The spatial articulation of Schelling’s
epistemology, being one of extensity, of the real-ideal relation becoming one of vertical (evolutionary)
and horizontal (recapitulative) exploration, allows for an embodied or enacted form of skeptical
knowledge. That is, given that experience is treated as an essence in the positive philosophy,
skepticism cannot undo the constraint of experience but questions its applicability outside of its local
context (extended outward).
The question of knowledge then becomes whether to focus on the Stufenfolge (the
transcendental but naturalized) or fields (methodological cuts into nature that may be more real than
their ideal construction). Since there is no ultimate ground nor ultimate end, the vertical model must
determine the scope of the derivation taken for a particular investigation, i.e., the question becomes
how far back or how speculative should one be in cutting out a slice of the progression of a particular
motion in nature?
Fields, on the other hand, are determinations of kinds of knowing (intuition, reason,
speculation) as wall as subfields of science (geology,chemistry, physics etc). These determinations

426 As was hopefully demonstrated in Chapter 3, Schelling's interest in both geometry and the emerging algebra of his time
both inspires and limits his ability to spatialize his concepts.
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disrupt or amplify derivations as cause and effect as being purely or absolutely real. If fields are a part
of nature the endless question becomes whether or not the fields of the sciences, to take one example,
necessarily mean that they are real patterns in nature, i.e., does the field known as chemistry point to a
set of potencies that is not absorbed or superseded over time? Or, in other words, at what point does
the success of a particular field of inquiry imply a field of being (of a potency) as opposed to being
merely ideal or merely a methodological distinction? Whereas the transcendental pays attention to the
motion away from the speculative excess or ek-statsis of an augmentation and its potential
consequences, fields presume that each augmentation, each creation of a new field, may necessitate a
new field, a new method in order to even perceive, let alone measure, the consequences of this
potentially new field.
To return to the theme of extensity mentioned above, observing the relation between mind and world
(between knowing and being) in terms of extensity, in terms of fields, means that creation does not add
to an existing world ex nihilio but expands the boundary of the known world outwards. In paying
attention to fields Schelling is hypersensitive to the material context of what might be considered
otherwise merely ideal creation.
Two immediate concerns and temptations emerge – does the vertical and horizontal reading
map on directly to the negative positive distinction and, furthermore, does it map onto a temporal
versus spatial split (reading the vertical Stufenfolge as temporal and the horizontal as spatial)? These
binaries would immediately seem not to match as, the negative and the positive philosophies engage in
both spatial and temporal characteristics as in the negative potentially being associated with
Schelling’s own Naturphilosophie wherein temporal and spatial characteristics are explored, the
positive philosophy is referred to as historical by Schelling. By focusing on a spatial and navigational
reading of Schelling’s thought generally and, specifically in reference to the positive and negative split,
I hope to clarify the relation between mind and world or, in Schelling’s terms more specifically, reason
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and experience.
5.4 - Rationalizing Unicorns: Facts and Intuition
Following the previous section, if Schelling sees intuition as coupled with determination then a
possible means of distinguishing fields from one another arises. This view of determination, as well as
the passage between determinations, can be attempted from a different view of the transcendental; that
of the irreducible particularity of certain objects or facts. Numerous commentators on Schelling have
remarked on his fascination with the emergence of particular objects following the Leibnizian question
of 'why is there something rather than nothing?'
Given the previous sections regarding Schelling's constructivism, and the ad-mixture of the real
and the ideal, it would be tempting to suggest that ideation is the same kind of creation as that which
happens before, or without, human intervention. This would place Schelling against various forms of
naturalism and closer to various forms of ontological liberalism. One of the more common examples or
figures of ontological liberalism is that of the unicorn, that is, what does it mean to say they do or do
not exist? In the Further Presentations Schelling utilizes a similar example, that of the gold mountain.
Just as the rainbow is a test case for physical theories of emergence as they obtain or fail to obtain on
different explanations, the unicorn is a test case for the relation between facthood and existence.
Markus Gabriel in his text Transcendental Ontology, addresses this relation by bringing reason
and experience closer together under the rubric of sense and specifically in terms of what he calls
fields of sense. In his later work, and in numerous lectures, Gabriel emphasizes that fictional objects
such as unicorns exist but that meta-conceptual objects, such as 'the world,' do not. He makes this
argument by extrapolating from a particular view of Schellingian determination.
While Schelling's “knowledge is a lamp that only points forward” sounds fairly idealist, it can
be tempered by the statement that nature always remains a book closed in darkness. This darkness is
seen productively most notably in Schelling's concept of Das Unvordenkliche. Markus Gabriel, against
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any naturalistic reading of Schelling, has associated the unprethinkable with the very notion of logical
space, that it is the unprethinkable that gives itself as the source of ongoing thought as such. Gabriel
thus reads the relation between reason and existence in Schelling in terms of the relation between
facthood and sense. The upshot of examining the reason/existence (or thought/world) relation in terms
of facts and sense, is that it implicitly and explicitly shows the links between the concerns of analytic
thought and those of German Idealism or Post-Kantian thought more generally. Gabriel argues that
everyday usage of language points to certain cognitive biases which he sees as central to an outmoded
and metaphysical view of the world, namely, in the very concept of world itself. Gabriel argues that the
notion of totality, whether described as world or universe, is one that is simply the result of longstanding fears of uncertainty, that behind much of our everyday thinking is the assumption that there is
a maximally big object which contains everything.
Rather than making a direct appeal to Cantorian set theory in terms of asserting the
impossibility of a set of all sets following Alain Badiou or Quentin Meillassoux via Cantor, Gabriel
argues along similar lines that a thoroughgoing physicalist approach to the universe, or to the world,
cannot account for the existence of facts. Facts have an accretative function since for every fact there is
the fact of that fact ad infinitum. This errancy of logic, Gabriel argues, makes it impossible for their to
be a maximally 'big thing' or, viewed in terms of factiality, there cannot be a list of all lists because the
most recent list would itself have to be included on a new list.427
While not always direct in his references, Gabriel's argument that the world does not exist but
unicorns do, is because the latter has identifiable contexts which verify certain qualities and aspects of
unicorns whereas the assumption of the world, having no context but its own, cannot exist. Gabriel
argues that instead of totalities then we should utilize what he calls fields of sense or Seinnspharen.

427 Whereas for Fichte facticity referred to the unquestionability of the status of a fact, for Meillassoux facticity refers to
the impossibility of determining an ultimate ground for anything.
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Thus for Gabriel sense is simply the organizing (non-factual) power of facts. Hence why there can be
no world but there can be fictional entities (as long as the occupy their proper field).
While Gabriel gives a convincing account of the history and current use of German Idealism as
that which is best suited to bridge the gap between analytic and continental thought, I find his
articulation of fields of sense somewhat unclear other than as a vague form of ontological liberalism.
As Gabriel writes: “Being is nothing other than a side effect of the transfinite, nontotalizable plurality
of fields of sense.”428 For Gabriel existence is determined not by real objecthood but by anything
appearing in a field of sense, as a mode of presentation most generally.
Relating back to our first section, however, one can see that Gabriel is promoting a weak
ontology that, as has come to be expected, poses no epistemological apparatus as to the appeal, for
instance, to facthood. Gabriel states that there are facts following a logic of factiality, i.e., the selfgrounding postulate that facts are stable, that the fact there are facts is more than a fact. Whereas
Quentin Meillassoux admits the groundlessness of the regime of facthood as such, Gabriel does not.
Gabriel takes it as a given that facts are, that they are as ontologically certain as things we can
physically manipulate. Gabriel argues that facticity is rooted in sense and that sense need not belong
only to subjects. Gabriel takes Frege's notion of sense and reduces it to the most bare notion possible.
Given Schelling's heterogeneous monism as defined by Paul Franks, as well as Iain Hamilton
Grant's reading of idealism as asserting not the triumph of ideas over 'the real world' but in exploring
the reality of the idea, this seems to fit. Gabriel refers to his own thought as an objective idealism
which allows for internal realism (in terms of the reality or coherence of facthood holding for the sake
of reference), yet, at the same time, he argues that facts as facts with the most cosmological meaning
that is, have having the widest facthood (such as a star in a galaxy far far away has exploded) requires
knowing very little about it. Whereas Gabriel states that a subjective mental state requires more
428 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, viii.
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specific knowledge about mental states in order to ground its particular context.
Gabriel appears to be following largely in Heidegger's footsteps given his emphasis on both
world and fact. In Heidegger's text on The Essence of Human Freedom, he emphasizes the importance
of distinguishing fact and factuality.429 However, unlike Gabriel and like Châtelet, Heidegger does
emphasize the naturalistically perspectival aspect of Schelling's Naturphilosophie via Schelling's
incorporation of Kant's notion of world view into the sciences430 as well as emphasizing that following
Kant's discussion of perspectives (as analyzed in Chapter 2) is taken up but altered by the German
Idealists in that they focus on constructing such systematic perspectives alongside being as opposed to
finding those structure as a priori epistemological structures.431
Against the scientific-synthetic approach, Gabriel argues that ontology, in his sense of it, relies
upon and, also indexes, a transcendental logic. The motor of this logic, as we touched upon in the first
chapter, is Schelling's notion of the unprethinkable, that concept which determines there is always
more to be predicated, that there is always another antecedent to be discovered and a consequent to be
found or produced. The brilliance behind Schelling's unprethinkable is that it deploys the function of a
meta-rule (as Gabriel names the field of sense of all fields, i.e., the maximally biggest thing) but is
constitutively underdetermined. Thus, it functions as a necessary logical structure but one that is so as
to make sense as the basic structure of a non-closed world, or an open set of the sensible.
My disagreement with Gabriel's reading is that while anti-Kantian readings of Schelling would
usually over-emphasize derivation (the naturalist thrust of Schelling's work) Gabriel over-emphasizes
the constructed nature of determination, of determination being only ideal. This is why Gabriel can
claim that unicorns exist while the world does not. In essence, Gabriel overemphasizes determination
by putting too much stock in the ungroundedness of things produced being ungrounded because of the
429 Martin Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence Human Freedom (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), 15.
430 Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise, 18.
431 Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise, 37-38.
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lack of all derivation, a lack stabilized, in his view, by fields of sense (his name for the distribution or
web of determination).
Given Gabriel’s focus however, it is odd that he, and many other contemporary readers of
Schelling, set aside the question of intuition even when they focus on knowledge and methodologies of
knowledge acquisition. In many of the texts on Schelling, intuition is erased or, more egregiously
perhaps, equated with Schelling’s method as such (as Eckhart Förster attempts in his The Twenty-Five
Years of Philosophy).432 Gabriel's text is practically devoid of any discussion of Schelling's intellectual
intuition whatsoever which, given his emphasis on how sense and facthood interact to make claims,
appears particularly strange. While neglecting one Schellingian concept among many is no crime, it is
particularly interesting that Gabriel's text, which focuses primarily on knowledge claims, could make
such an omission. It will be helpful to outline a typical view of Schelling's notion of intuition as put
forward by Eckart Förster.
For Förster, in his Naturphilosophie, Schelling errs by erroneously applying Fichtean
intellectual intuition to nature. From this Förster argues that Schelling's observations of nature merely
function to prove the power of intellectual intuition. Furthermore, Förster argues that Schelling's notion
of intuition, as well as that of identity, are dead or inert in that he claims that Schelling is attempting to
add activity to nature via a Fichteanism. However, Förster claims that the observational key of
productive intuition, that the intuiting and the intuited are the same, cannot be the case for nature.433
But Förster gives no justification for why this is so, as if it is self-evident, but how is this possible?
Förster detours through the question of inhibition and Kant's theory of matter as an influence on
Schelling's Naturphilosophie before returning to the issue of intuition as a method. Förster repeats that
Schelling's notion of intuition is taken from Fichte and crudely inserted into the Naturphilosophie and
432 Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012).
433 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 238-238.
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that Eschenmayer had raised a similar objection to this transplantation.434 Yet even though Förster
analyzes Schelling's response to Eschenmayer, Förster still claims that Schelling's method “is wholly
insufficient” because the method of cognition must be the same for nature and the I.435
Förster writes:
[Schelling] is fundamentally mistaken when he infers that the method of cognition must be the same
for both nature and the I, namely intellectual intuition, for he has clearly failed to learn the lesson of
what I referred to above as Fichte's central insight: that 'I am' and 'it is' express two wholly distinct
modes of being.436
In so doing this Förster is reading Schelling like a Fichtean in assuming that the kind of activity
at ground must be a form of cognition whereas, for Schelling, cognition is a form of this activity, a
form which intellectual intuition, along with other kinds of thinking, enacts but as thought. Thought is
a form of a more primordial activity and, at the same time, it is the privileged form of human access to
that primordial activity. Intuition, as opposed to reflection, speculation or other forms of cognition, is
spatially immediate and not non-conceptually immediate since, for Schelling, reason is always
accompanied by experience, there is no mystical connection only different articulations of conceptual
space. To ignore the spatial aspect of intuition is to also assume a crude notion of synthesis or
construction in relation to idealism. So, whereas Forster follows a traditional assumption that intuition
is a merely romantic category, thinkers such as Heidegger in his text on Schelling, rightly dismisses
this naïve assumption. Heidegger notes that Schelling's intuition, as an attempt at systematic or
absolute knowing, is merely a knowledge which recognizes the original, if obscure, unity between
knower and the known.437
The evidence pointing to intuition's complexity is clear enough in Schelling's own texts. In the
Ideas Schelling puts forward the hypothesis that unity only exists for thought, or for the thinking
434 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 247.
435 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 249.
436 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 249.
437 Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise, 47-48.
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being,438 but that intuition suggests absolute simultaneity of nature and mind.439 This might suggest
that unity is only intellectual but the intellectual capacities cannot be separated from nature. As
Schelling also makes clear in “On the True Concept” this does not mean that mind merely generates
entities or forces, but that mind and nature realize one another.
This is further explained in the System of Transcendental Idealism where intuition is a
limitation, whereas the self is a localization of the real and the ideal as limiting one another.440 As has
been addressed already, separated things are ideal determinations but the ideality of these
determinations cannot be known to be merely in the mind since the mind is a part of the world, and
hence, the quality of the thing is as real though its location and potential consequences may be limited.
Intuition's simultaneity is more structural than temporal, intuition is merely a local instance at an
attempt at individuation for the sake of navigation, for navigating between determinations. Intutition,
to point back to Batterman, is intertheoretic.
As Bruce Matthews puts it, Schelling's progressive method, as a combination of a
transcendental method and an abductive method, attempts to grasp the unconditioned in terms of
combining the sensual and the intellectual in treating both as ground or essence to construct
outwards441 or, again as Matthews puts it, construction is the human imagining of natural powers.442
Formally, the question is simply how to incorporate, yet maintain methodologically, the distinction
between the particular thinking subject and the nature in which it is embedded, and that it thinks, from
that particular location.
While I cannot in the space allotted combat each of these views what I wish to pursue is the

438 F.W.J. von Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. E. Harris and P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 31.
439 Schelling, Ideas, 36.
440 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1978), 40.
441 Matthews, Schelling's Organic Form, 149.
442 Matthews, Schellings Organic Form, 197.
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interesting fact that they generally approach the avenues they do only by rejecting the obvious place to
go in order to combat Hegel's theory of representation: that of Schelling's use of intellectual intuition.
Schelling's notion of intuition, I believe has been largely misunderstood, taken as fundamentally
misguided and succumbing to Kant's critique of it in The Critique of Pure Reason. However, given
Schelling's reading of Kant, I believe that the former's notion of intuition cannot be read as completely
compatible with that of the latter's critique.
One of Schelling's later statements on intuition is made in relation to Hegel and is one of the
strongest portrayals of the capacity. In On the History of Modern Philosophy Schelling lays out how he
came to his own formulation of intellectual intuition. He notes that the concept moved from Kant's
typically cautious definition to Fichte's elaboration. For Fichte, according to Schelling, intellectual
intuition was the fact of the I's immediacy. Schelling argues that, against his former master, he wished
to assert the immediacy of the content of the subject-object over and above the immediacy of content
in the Fichtean 'I am'.443 Schelling writes in summary:
This first basis, this true prima materia of all thought, cannot, therefore, be what is really thought, not be what is thought in
the sense that the single formation is. When thought is concerned with the determination of this matter, it does not think
about this substrate (Unterlage) itself, but rather only of the determination of the concept which it puts into it —
(sculptor—clay) — it is, therefore, what is not really thought in thinking. A thinking which does not think (ein nicht
denkendes Denken) will, though, not be far from an intuiting thinking, and, as such, a thinking which has an intellectual
intuition as its
ground, goes through the whole of this philosophy, as it does through geometry, in which the external intuition of the figure
which is drawn on the blackboard or where-ever is always only the bearer of an inner and spiritual intuition. This, then, is
said in relation to a philosophy without intuition. 444

While for Hegel, according to Schelling, it would seem that intuition is completely allergic to
anything approaching rational, or even systematic, thought (and therefore be what Kant critiques)
Schelling faults Kant for limiting thought's outer limits. So while one could abandon intuition as a
flawed but early attempt on Schelling's part to break through such limitations, in fact, for the late
Schelling, intuition is the fact and embodiment of thought and nature's coexistence. Intuition, as a
443 F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 150.
444 Schelling, Modern Philosophy, 152-153.
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means of conceptual and constructive navigation, is not mere idealistic fancy, but the vagueness of
being in a nature that we can manipulate but not fully understand. In its final rendition, Schelling
opposes intuition to Hegel's emphasis on logic, particularly, on logic being that which is, and that
which ends, once nature starts.445 Intuition then, is an important category as it toes the line between
merely accepting a common sense view of the world and admitting that philosophy's role is to reduce
or decompose common sense into simpler, and also potentially deeper, reservoirs. One such instance of
this is is how Schelling argues that teleology, though a naturalized teleology, is no less inscrutable than
the mechanic causality Kant favored.446 Or, as Joshua Meddelson has pointed out, while Kant abjures
teleology because it threatens normativity, Schelling sees teleology as an objective part of the world.447
To return to the epistemological axes with which we started, intuition can be said to be the
necessary passage between the horizontal fields (immanent condition) and the vertical evolutionary
Stufenfolge (transcendental condition). Furthermore, intuition, from the located position of the thinker
steeped in experience, is the means by which one can determine the difference between the positive
and negative philosophies, between those forms of thinking which work alongside experience and
those that abstract away form it.
In the Grounding Schelling argues that the positive philosophy is the application of the
transcendental within an immanent context.448 Where the Naturphilosophie attempted to naturalize the
transcendental, to explore the transcendental as an augmenting motion of natural processes later
articulated into fields, in the positive philosophy the transcendental, or act of transcendence, is simply
an augmentation relative to a location.
Thus, in taking Kant’s critique to heart, Schelling makes the transcendent of this world thereby
445 Schelling, Modern Philosophy, 153-154.
446 Esposito, Schelling's Idealism, 76.
447 Joshua Mendelsohn, “Teleology and the Scientific Image in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature,” (Unpublished
Manuscript), 8.
448 Schelling, Grounding, 205-206.
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getting around Kant’s prohibition of it as being above, or out of, experience. Experience transcends
reason but not because it is absolutely separate from it, but because of the manner by which reason
functions in relation to experience. Experience transcends reason simply because reason cannot 'catch
up' to experience as movement in the world. Whereas the transcendental method attempts to
reconstruct derivation either by naturalizing it or localizing it, intuition functions via immediacy, not in
the manner which Kant prohibits against, but via the processes of knowing which follow from
continuous relations between our position as knowing against, and being unknowingly connected to,
that which we are attempting to understand. Or, put otherwise, whereas the transcendental method
attempts to trace the paths of derivation, intuition measures the local co-determinations of subjectobjects in an immediate context.
To put this in navigational terms, the transcendental method which tracks derivation, moves
from the general to the specific in that it reduces a chain of derivations to fuel an instance of action.
Intuition, on the other hand, starts from the immediate, or local, and expands it outward. Once again it
is worth returning to the work of Gilles Châtelet as he puts an emphasis on intuition, and
Naturphilosophie, in relation to the gestural. As intuition can be said to spatially map the difference
between determination as a web, and derivation as a chain, Châtelet's diagrammatic approach to
intuition and Naturphilosophie views potentiation (or the naturalized transcendental) as an unfolding
and depotentiation (or the reductive notion of immanence) as a folding.
5.5 – Gestural Scars: Châtelet and Intuitive Anchoring
In his remarkable text Figuring Space Gilles Châtelet writes:
Any detailed inspection of a landscape or of a domain of knowledge presupposes a survey, and the horizon is what endows
caution with some style. If this survey were reduced merely to prescribing a 'horizontal' reading and a 'vertical' reading. it
would lead only to a fixed stratification. The survey induces an axis of distribution of the mobilities that reactivate
knowledge: the strata become a field, whose exploration implies a norm of virtual grasp of the statements. This norm never
offers itself up placidly for analysis and always evades anyone who would seek it 'on the near or far side' of the horizon that
controls it. Its withdrawal is always painful and is paid for by a 'metaphorical" dislocation of the field or by its reduction to
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significant networks subordinated to a code. The implicit pressure of the horizon is like the scar of a gesture... 449

In Figuring Space Gilles Châtelet takes up Schelling’s focus on the point of indifference as
itself the producer of two symmetries450 – an argument which Schelling uses to situate himself
between Spinoza and Leibniz in his Investigations. Schelling’s intellectual intuition is what makes
possible, and in turn is made possible by (though on a different scale), the description of the universe
as polarities which can only be adequately described in the diagrammatic register. Where Schelling’s
concept of the potenz is often dismissed (such as by Beach and Vaughn) as Spinozistic power and
nothing more, Châtelet recognizes that it speaks to an original tension of fields in Schelling that
exponentially produce, and spin out of control, producing more and more stages of being (Stufenfolge).
Or, put another way, the arithmetic of qualities gives rise to a different order of quantity. This is why
just as identity and subsequently powers must be plural, powers add qualities in such way that not only
are magnitudes multiplied, but the metric of reading such multiplication, as addition of quality, is the
production of the ideality of nature.451
In examining Châtelet's reading of Schelling, I hope to provide a transition from intuition as a
localizing function between facts and sense, to intuition as providing a springboard for action in the
form of a proto-pragmatism, or positive philosophy, to be addressed in the following chapter.
What are these symmetries exactly?
The problem is that fields, viewed one at a time, obscure the fields beneath them whereas
viewing nature as derivation minimizes the fields' relation to each other as well as de-spatializes the
Potenz (making them appear as nothing but generation over time). Châtelet's emphasis on both gesture
and horizon can be used to tilt the Stufenfolge (bisected all along the way with fields) over, to deform it
slightly into a horizon. As the above quote emphasizes, the style of the gesture, the particular form of
449 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 54.
450 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 75-76.
451 See Grant, Philosophies, 169.
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motion in the individual, is what allows for the Naturphilosophen in the field to address the horizon as
that which is ontological, and epistemological, in equal measure through a navigational assertion.
The symmetries produced, or made possible by the observer as the blank X in the field, in
relation to the horizon, is one of depotentiation and potentiaton. In the case of depotentiation the
synthesis of the Stufenfolge and the repetition of fields, becomes the horizon from which the thinker
reduces one aspect to a singular ground to then re-expand or construct a new horizon from that one
point or ground as if this were the origin of the world as such. Potentiation, on the other hand, treats
the hybrid of derivation and determination as the foreground thereby fashioning a speculative
vanishing point as if this point were the goal of nature.
Following Châtelet above, norms function as a reactive gesture to figure out this oscillation
between viewing the horizon as such and viewing it as a vertical progression, or, as a horizontal (yet
flattened) plane. The indifference point, taken as an observation post, functions as an hinge which is
not merely a hinge between material elements but as a hinge which produces an orientation.452
Furthermore, Châtelet notices in Schelling's Naturphilosphie an emphasis on the productive or
constructive function of intuition that furthers, not only epistemological endeavors, but also expands
nature as we know it.
Châtelet writes:
We are touching here on the tender spot of the philosophy of nature: that of the intuition of the degrees of articulation, those
where Being overhangs, where quantitative difference and 'cannoical' choices of paramatrege vanish.” 453 Intuition allows
the philosopher-scientist to occupy a space by which one can occupy a motion that is not merely of the self. Intuition
creates maximal ambiguity, but not as a kind of debilitating fog, but in that it frees the observer for creating between things.
In this regard, intuition functions as potentiation, as it creates space as space free of all constraints, where construction
occurs only according to thought but, this thought, is itself of the same kind of the natural forces which produce it. 454
Relating back to Chapter 3, the exponent as a potentiation of a number is the power whereas the number is the indifference
point, the particular individuation thus either potentiated or depotentiated.455

This leap of intuition, a leap which Schelling addresses in the Erlangen lectures, sets Schelling
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apart from either simply following exhaustive deduction or abstraction from common features.
Châtelet's understanding of Schelling's notion of intuition comes largely from the Bruno. The Bruno,
as an expansion of the identity philosophy, attempts to articulate the relation between the potencies as
the kinds of thinking of which humans are capable.456 Furthermore, and to return to our
methodological axes, the point of indifference as where the observer locates themselves and intuits
from. This pivot complicates the two methods which, again following Grant, are not reducible to one
another.457 Schelling is neither endorsing deduction or induction but transcendental naturalism and
material abduction.
Châtelet masterfully demonstrates how Schelling, following Kant's discussion of negative
magnitudes, allows for thought to escape mad and endless deduction,458 for separation of fields and
transcendental generation, to set up stakes, to trace consequences not merely real or merely ideal. 459
Thought does not merely produce things, nor is thought produced by things alone but, again tracing
Schelling's Fichtean roots, points to an activity in which thought and nature are of a singular kind.
Châtelet goes to great pains to attempt to demonstrate how the stake, how the particular
inhabiting of an indifference point is not merely arbitrary that is, it is not a division of two
methodological processes within the ideal only, but that this has stakes for nature. Châtelet attempts to
do this by discussing the shift from 0 as merely a point (whether merely ideal or material real as in
Lorenz Oken's terms) to where the 0 becomes a loop of forces.
Châtelet discusses the '0' as the heart of the kinematic scale where it is not merely the tipping
point of a physical scale but it is the point from which negative and positive forces encircle, and move
456 F.W.J. von Schelling, Bruno, or, On the natural and the divine principle of things, trans. Michael Vater, (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1984), 100 n30.
457 Iain Hamilton Grant, “The Eternal and Necessary Bond between Philosophy and Physics: A Repetition of the
difference between the fichtean and schellingian forms of philosophy,” in Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical
Humanities, v 10, I 1, (London: Routledge Press, 2005), 53.
458 This is how Brady Bowman describes Schelling's method as opposed to Hegel's sober dialectics in Brady Bowman,
Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 227.
459 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 81.
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away from, one another in relation to the '0'. Intuition functions as the identification of difference and
indifference, as the point from where two different dimensions (such as length or width mentioned
above in relation to electromagnetism) emerge.460
Following the famous electric experiments of Volta, Châtelet describes how Schelling's zero
becomes a loop. He writes:
“A new around has been grasped diagrammatically in nature and thought and we do indeed rediscover
the creative ambiguity of the indifference centre: disrupt a unity to reach the next plateau of Being.”461
The indifference point, the sprout of intuition,462 shows how articulation strikes out in the progress of
becoming in the stream of becoming. Intuition functions as a form of individuation that is
simultaneously a point of observation. 463
Intuition, as Châtelet understands it, and as Schelling reads it in relation to Kant, is a form of
thinking which functions as a form of knowledge which is non-purposive or at least, as Forester puts it,
does not require the assumption of purposiveness.464 Thus Schelling's position appears quite close and
quite far from Kant's following the navigational mode outlined in chapter 2. The motive or motile zero
also distinguishes Schelling from Oken. Whereas Oken's zero was substantively additive, Schelling's
zero is a trace or gesture composed of motion and is thus augmentatively additive.
Intuition is the introduction of a disturbance that is simultaneously a vantage point and a hinge.
The inscribing of this disturbance is never an arresting of becoming, nor the mark of being, but a
gesture or inscription of the being of becoming and the becoming of being in tandem. In the case of the
0, the mathematical mark is a knot, or tying of the stream of becoming, it is a gesture or instance of
being that, nevertheless, stays in motion. Potentiation and depotentiation occur as either the untying of
460
461
462
463
464

Châtelet, Figuring Space, 90, 94.
Châtelet, Figuring Space, 154.
Châtelet, Figuring Space, 85.
Châtelet, Figuring Space, 94.
Châtelet, Figuring Space, 144.

211

this knot, or of testing its extensity through the application of experiment which, indexing Chapter 3,
can be represented in the form of the exponent. The gesture, or intuition, is the transit between these
stages that leaves a trace of its action while attempting to emphasize not the means of its path, but the
potential impacts of how it has already moved. This is the strange kind of navigation present in
Schelling's theory of knowledge: that of a self-inhibiting exploration that speculates about the spaces it
may find.
As I will aim to show in the next and final chapter, Schelling's navigational mode differs from
Kant's not only via the emphasis on intuition, but also in terms of Schelling's commitment to
naturalism, but a form of naturalism different form the more common forms adopted by contemporary
philosophy.
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6 - Conclusion or Speculative Pragmatism: Navigating the Richtungen of Nature and Thought
In this concluding chapter I demonstrate how Schelling's emphasis on motion and space,
coupled with his particular mode of philosophical speculation, leads to a form of proto-pragmatism. I
work out this pragmatism via Schelling's 1821 Erlangen lectures (“On the Nature of Philosophy as a
Science”) by moving through the connections between the great American pragmatist C.S. Peirce and
Schelling. I then compare Schelling's proto-pragmatism with the analytic thinkers who have taken
German Idealism, in conjunction with the pragmatic legacy of Peirce as well as Sellars, as implying a
philosophy which emphasizes normativity at the cost of nature, namely, McDowell and Brandom
(referred to as Left Sellarsians or Pittsburgh Hegelians). I then close by appealing to the contemporary
pragmatist Mark Wilson who synthesizes and operates between the scientific considerations of Peirce,
and the communicative and practical pragmatism of the Pittsburgh Hegelians. Wilson, through a focus
on classical concepts in the physical sciences, demonstrates the limitations of a normative approach to
human thought. Specifically in regards to thought, Wilson attempts to argue for a navigational
approach to cognition that steers clear of both the normativity of the Pittsburgh Hegelians (or Left
Sellarsians) as well as the more hard-nosed neuroscientific articulations of consciousness in the work
of Daniel Dennett, and Patricia and Paul Churchland (categorized as Right Sellarsians); the former
emphasize reason as sui generis from the naturalistic context, whereas the latter investigate the impact
of the natural sciences arguably at the cost of normativity. Peirce, Sellars and, as I will argue,
Schelling, all in their own ways, attempt to construct a philosophy where the division between the
capacity to articulate particularly human concerns, and the capacity to adequately describe and situate
our place in the natural world, are not incompatible endeavors.
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6.1 - Abducting Intuition: Schelling and Peirce
The heart of the dispute lies in this. The modern philosophers -- one and all, unless Schelling be an exception -- recognize
but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a place
for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that existence. 465
I carefully recorded my opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the Absolute, and asserted that 'the one
intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind' This is as much as to say that I am
a Schellingian, of some stripe; so that, on the whole, I do not think Dr. Carus has made a very happy hit in likening me to
Hume, to whose whole method and style of philosophizing I have always been perhaps too intensely averse. Yet,
notwithstanding my present disclaimer, I have little doubt apriorians will continue to describe me as belonging to the
sceptical school.466
My views were probably influenced by Schelling – by all stages of Schelling, but especially the Philosohpie der Natur. I
consider Schelling as enormous, and one thing I admire about him is his freedom from the trammels of system, and his
holding himself uncommitted to any previous utterance. In that, he is like a scientific man. If you were to call my
philosophy Schellingism transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard. 467

In Chapter 5, I attempted to demonstrate the epistemological space Schelling attempts to construct, and
then navigate, in order to re-establish the relation between the real and the ideal, as well as, between
the activities of determination and derivation. This entailed avoiding the Charybdis, on the one hand,
of a factial and logical based account of our production of knowledge, buttressed by the apparent selfsufficiency of sense (Gabriel) and, on the other hand, the Scylla of a physicalist, or hard-nosed
naturalist position, where causal or teleological models of nature can explain all worldly capacities
both human and non-human.
Schelling attempts this navigation by accepting a naturalist position but one that admits nonphysical or process-based ontological (or perhaps more accurately meontological) powers into nature.
Thus, Schelling attempts to avoid an ontologically liberal approach that grants equal being to all
things, as well as, an appeal to facthood as such in order to avoid negating an appropriate dose of
epistemological skepticism. Furthermore, Schelling dodges an over-reliance on becoming or
meontology that reduces everything to mere emergence without worrying about positionality or

465 C.S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorn and Paul Weiss (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 21-22.
466 Peirce, Collected Papers of Peirce, 2182.
467 Letter of C.S. Peirce to William James, 1894, quoted in Joseph Esposito, Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of
Nature (Lewisburgh: Bucknell University Press, 1977), 203.
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methodology. In other words, Schelling does not allow becoming to replace epistemology as a negative
constraint (position, or from where do you think) or as a positive constraint (knowledge claims are
strong because one has established a method).
The complex midway position that Schelling constructs, one that puts him in close proximity to
C.S. Peirce, can be summarized in the following manner: there is a self-inhibiting creative structure
where the realness of things is determined by the reach of their consequences, i.e., realness is
simultaneously its synthesis and the testing of its extensity by another agent. Realness is thus less
about the matter or substratum upon which a thing or fact rests, as was discussed in Chapter 5, but
more about the measurable activity of a meta-stable individuation (a Scheinprodukt). Ideas are a
peculiar part of nature that index inexistence, as discussed in Chapter 4, whereas objects tend towards,
and index, existence.
In emphasizing Schelling's proto-pragmatism here, I wish to argue that intellectual intuition, as
it functions for Schelling, is an abstract form of Peircean abduction, or, Peircean abduction is
Schellingian intuition put into disciplined practice. Both concepts represent their respective creator's
attempts to find a third way between realism-as-mechanism and idealism-as-overly speculative, in
Schelling's case, and between crude empiricism and crude nominalism in Peirce's case.
A passage from Schelling's System of a Philosophy as a Whole (1804) captures the predicament nicely:
Merely reflective humanity has no idea of an objective reason, of an Idea that as such is utterly real and objective; all reason
is something subjective to them, as equally is everything ideal, and the idea itself has for them only the meaning of a
subjectivity, so that they therefore know only two worlds, the one consisting of stone and rubble, the other of intuitions and
the thinking thereupon.468

Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition, as was addressed in Chapter 5, has been criticized
for falsely suggesting the possibility of immediate knowledge (this was Kant's central objection to the
very notion of intellectual intuition). But, as I attempted to show, the immediacy at stake does not

468 Quoted in Iain Hamilton Grant, Interview by Leon Niemoczynski, http://afterxnature.blogspot.fr/2013/04/iainhamilton-grant-interview-with.html. April 10, 2013.
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suggest an immediacy in terms of intimate knowledge, but a faster but more crude form of knowledge
in comparison to the slowness of reason in the wake of an immediate natural response of mentation-asintuition. That is, intellectual intuition is Schelling's way of pointing out the slowness and locality of
reason in relation to the kind of information indirectly gathered due to the continuity of reason and
nature. Or, in other words, intellectual intuition is the name for the process by which we are capable of
localizing thought, to simply to say 'this thing is here' with the navigational self or observer-as-X being
one of those determinations.
As a result, the capacity to determine whatness (or being), is inexorably tied then to a thing's
whereness, its location. Or, to say what something is, requires asking where it is since the ontological
arises from location, in so far as, the productivity of the thing is determined by, and determines, its
location in terms of origin and emergence. The whereness of intuition is, again pointing back to the
previous chapter, the question of transit between the negative philosophy of whatness and the positive
philosophy of thatness.
If every individual thing is a production of the interaction of powers, as Schelling seems to
consistently argue, then the question of which powers, and in what proportion they function, indexes
the importance of location. A thing as a location in a nexus of powers is a failed containment or, as
Schelling puts it in the First Outline for a Philosophy of Nature, every thing recognized as a product of
nature is a failure.469 Powers produce things which are not strictly reducible to the powers, nor are
powers reducible to the products they produce, things can be viewed as trajectories of a stalled
becoming, or as a mobile capture of powers or potencies. A thing is a less mobile capture of those
powers, a knot of particular potencies in nature, which is a consequence of them. As Schelling puts it

469 F.W.J. von Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004). 41.
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all definition is containment.470
Thus, the immediacy of intellectual intuition is an auto-coincidence of thinking and being or, of
the transcendental method and the naturalistic method gaining shared traction on the world. Intuition is
immediate because it is ideally determined to be spatio-temporally contained or, as was put in the
closing of Chapter 5, intuition functions as the extensity test of an object's roots and consequents. Thus
determination-as-such suspends space-time to augment it, or, the isolation of a thing isolates that which
produced and continues to produce it as ground.
To say that determination is ideal, as crude caricatures of idealism would have it, because of its
suspension of the not-merely ideal (the mixture of subject-object) is to erase the augmentative capacity
of thought in the merely ideal as well as in terms of the non-thought that thought carries with it (the
inexistent potentialities it bears). Or, as Schelling puts it in “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science,”
(1821) while all ability is a form of knowledge not all knowledge is necessarily ability. 471 Here we can
investigate the re-allocation of the ideal given its determinative capacity not being merely ideal, but
being so only in the inadequacy of its consequents to be materialized.
That thought purportedly floats above the world at the cost of the earth (as Kant's crude reading
of Plato would have it) misses the thought composition of the very notion of the world. The purported
motionlessness of the world is itself ideal, but a more real, or existent ideal, whose apparent selfevidential status seems to grant it automatic materiality. Yet, if nothing is what it is on its own (if
nothing is self-standing) then to say that the world is only material depotentiates the world without
augmenting it, in other words, without feeding the notion of the world back into itself properly it
determines the world by re-mobilizing the immobilized by stretching or extending the isolated (or
determined) thing as if it was the world. Or, as Schelling puts it, thought is a stretching as opposed to
470 F.W.J. von Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” in German Idealist Philosophy, ed. And trans.
Rudiger Bubner (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 216-217.
471 Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” 221.

217

knowledge which is a mirroring.472
Once one forgets the space-time suspension of a determination, the fact that determination
depends on derivation, then all sense of materiality is lost as anything consequent – it becomes merely
that which it is for us. But if the world was self-standing or self-determining, how exactly would it be
contained? Schelling's notion of the world is consequent and thus any determination is an extainment
(Ausschließung), an unfolding, but not of a predetermined one or wholeness but a self-augmenting
non-One that adds its self to the entirety of its existence though possibly as inexistent (though no less
real).473
Thus determination is both stronger and weaker than containment. Determination implies an
exploratory model of knowledge whereas reason attempts to locate the drawing of conclusions, or the
self-aware activity of thought, outside of the problem of space-time. Schelling explicitly explores the
tension between the exploratory and the navigational, or, between systems of reason and the asystaton
of coexistence.474 In order to recognize this 'inner tension' the human “must have already searched in
every possible direction” or, as Schelling argues, systems come after not only an internal disarray in
thought from individual practitioners, but, their imperfect collectivization.475 Or, put otherwise, reason
is the drawing of conclusions but within an already stabilized space, whereas pure navigation, as
wandering, would simply be exploring chaos. Systems are the vessels by which knowledge claims can
explore the world without replacing the system of the world with the system of reason.
It is this combination of meontological musings on the notion of individuation in relation to
space via local experiences, and time in terms of the slowness of reflection, that Schelling's thought
472 Ibid. 234.
473 Extainment is Iain Grant's translation of Ausschließung which is more commonly translated as separation. Grant
borrows the term from Châtelet as a term that is not merely opposed to containment, but is a spilling outwards that
retains its connection to that which it appears separated from. See Iain Hamilton Grant, “How Nature Came to be
Thought: Schelling's Paradox and the Problem of Location,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 44 (1)
(Newcastle: Newcastle University, 2013), 40-41.
474 Ibid. 209, 213.
475 Ibid. 210-211.
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begins to appear in the form of a proto-pragmatism. Pragmatic should not be taken as commonsensical
in a naïve sense, but a practical way of handling local existence given the complexities of space-time
or the slowness of reflection, or whatever lurks behind the everyday use of concepts and the everyday
consequences of actions. This brings us to Peirce and Peircean abduction.
Peirce's notion of abduction is generally situated between deduction and induction (while being
'closer' to the latter), and can be defined crudely as an educated guess, or the form of thought that
produces hypotheses, or what functions as the logic of discovery. Despite its wide usage one may be
surprised to find that there is no single text of Perice's that focuses on the concept specifically, its
definitional traces have to be tracked across Peirce's infamously wide and rambling oeuvre.
K.T. Fann in “Peirce's Theory of Abduction” explicates how abduction is a synthetic form of
amplifying inference. While induction is also amplifying and synthetic, deduction is explicative and
analytic.476 Peirce asserts that while deduction is secure, its security is at cost of its creativity, and thus
abduction inhabits the opposite end of the inferential spectrum.477 Here the general character of
Peirce's abduction should not seem alien to Schelling's thought. The creative and synthetic nature of
abduction, of a risky form of creation, should appear similar to Schelling's notion of intellectual
intuition. My hope is that the spatial qualification of Schelling's intuition given immediately above and,
in Chapter 5, should ease the strain between these contextually disparate concepts. Numerous authors
have commented on Schelling's relationship to Peirce. Most notably Joseph Esposito, Bruce Matthews,
Jason Wirth, and Tyler Tritten have compared the knowledge claims of both thinkers to arrive at
various results.
Matthews emphasizes Peirce's respect for Schelling's early attitude towards systematicity
(reflected in our introduction under the title 'ablative systematicity') as well as an appreciation for

476 K.T. Fann, Peirce's Theory of Abduction (The Hague, 1970), 7.
477 Fann, Peirce's Theory, 8.
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Schelling's Naturphilosophie.478 This appreciation is also echoed by Esposito following the epigraphs
above. Tyler Tritten, on the other hand, is more skeptical of Peirce and Schelling's methodological
closeness. In his Beyond Presence Tritten argues that Peirce's notion of abduction is too empirical for
Schelling's taste in that Peirce's model of hypothesis attempts immediately ground to the object of
inquiry.479 Furthermore, Tritten argues that Peirce's arbitrary guessing is too capricious for Schelling's
model of freedom, that there is a kind of internal self-certainty which gives Schelling's investigative
process more noetic, if not external, confidence.480 As Tritten writes:
Schelling does not arbitrarily posit a hypothesis among other possible ones but attempts to scientifically and objectively
corroborate that for which subjective conviction already exists. Doubt and certainty are not theoretical but practical, and
one does not test the practical by means of experimentation, just as one cannot afford to experiment and play with one’s life
but must always act with resolve. Abduction searches and hunts while for Schelling the hunting is over as he strives only
after that having already seized him; one must only ask if a scientific path leading to the predetermined destination exists. 481

Tritten's reading, in my view, overemphasizes the epistemological function of revelation and
grace at the cost of epistemological navigations whether those navigations are of apparently external
nature or of apparently internal mental episodes. In addition, being seized by powers, or by objects in
the continuum of nature as conglomerations of powers, requires that one divide oneself
methodologically from the certainty of inner episodes of knowing in order to test that knowing. The
certainty that Tritten highlights is thus by no means incompatible with abductive investigation. It is
only that Schelling's notion of intuition treats the mind itself like an environment which abduction can
navigate but, since our own epistemological and, in particular, reflective limitations require us to
objectify our own thoughts, it is only by externalizing ourselves that we abductively approach anything
that we wish to investigate even if that thing is our own certainty of investigation, i.e., the activity of

478 Bruce Matthews, Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State University of
New York press, 2011), xi.
479 Tyler Tritten, Beyond Presence: The Late F.W.J. Schelling's Criticism of Metaphysics (Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 6163.
480 Tritten, Beyond Presence, 62.
481 Ibid. 63.
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thought.482
Lastly, what many accounts of abduction, and its relation to Schelling overlook, but what is
clearly evident in the above epigraphs from Peirce, is the future-orientedness of abduction against what
Peirce sees as crude nominalism. Peirce's emphasis on laws or universals is not because he believe
these things can be definitively articulated for all time, but because he believes pragmatic activity
requires justification for its future or, in a spatial sense, possible non-local ramifications. Thus there
must be something that guarantees future creation with and without us; and is necessary not in a
metaphysical sense but in an explanatory sense. To use a simple example, the fact that stones fall when
we drop them cannot be reduced to the pragmatic logic of “because it works.” If this were the case,
how would we augment, or amplify, our existing activities without being able to speculate as to their
broader meaner outside that one particular activity? That is, how could we properly systematize our
experience with nature if if was merely an accumulation of happenstance or an accretion of habits?
Given the emphasis on the local status of experience for thought in the Erlangen Lectures, and
in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, the immediacy of intuition is not that of a thinker being
mentally 'attuned' with all of nature, but of the continuity of nature allowing for the possibility of a
local gesture or action to be a more than a local account of synthesis. Examining the above epigraphs,
it is no stretch on Peirce's thinking to argue he is invested in the continuity of mind and nature, nor to
affirm the importance of local wanderings or investigations to synthesize systems, however provisional
they may be. It is in this sense that speculation, or the threats of notions of idealistic vagueness orbiting
intuition, can be addressed if they are tools in pragmatic engagement. This aspect of intuition, unlike
abduction, is often ignored following a crude caricature of idealism, or of philosophy more generally.

482 This difference hinges on the degree to which one sees the importance of God or of the theological in Schelling's work.
While I do not have the space to engage in such an enormous issue, my intuition is that Schelling's ungrounding of God
in the Weltalter drafts, as well as, his general skepticism regarding treating God as equivalent with a justificatory
absolute in general, seriously questions this theological emphasis.

221

The idealist is portrayed as the arm-chair philosopher par excellence who philosophizes so that she
need not set out into the world. As Schelling puts it to quote the Erlangen text yet again:
Those who dare set out to sea can certainly, due to storms or by their lack of skill, lose their way and be led astray, but
those who never even leave port and whose entire endeavor, rather, consists in not leaving port and in preventing
philosophy from ever beginning, by endless philosophizing about philosophy, those, of course, have no dangers to fear. 483

But this is not to merely equate intuition and abduction. The reason for caution, I believe, is that
of the core of pragmatism itself, i.e., that the navigations in the world inevitably alter our concepts, if
those concepts were ever good to begin with. Schelling is also taking aim at Kant's overly cautious
schematism, his inability to accept challenges to the critical philosophy. Thus, it would be erroneous to
claim that Peirce's abduction is only a repetition, or differently clothed, form of intuition. Abduction is
the experimentally-fueled skeptical pragmatism that follows the locative function of intuition.
Abduction functions as a formalized or ramified form of intuition. If intuition is spatiallyimmediate mental movement between methods, then abduction is this reading of intuition co-extensive
with experience. Experience, in the context of abduction, functions as 'experimental feedback,' adding
to the evolutionary paths of knowledge, which folds and unfolds the continuum through our concepts.
Less extravagantly, Peirce's abduction moves between deduction (or Schelling's derivation) and
induction (Schelling's determination) as a progressive, or evolutionary, attempt at constructing a
piecemeal net of conceptual reference that does not over-determine its own internal composition, nor,
too stringently derive its derivations either into the past (as origin) or into the future (as a pre-thinkable
human future). Thus the insuperability of thought and world does not entail that 'anything goes' but
emphasizes the necessity of experience in locating and contextualizing reason. That is, because it
seems like anything goes, we must be incredibly careful with our local activities.
The speculative aspect of Perice's pragmatism lies in his aforementioned anti-nominalism,
against those that would claim that the facticity of things is more important than either their sensual or
483 Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” 212.
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lawful (universal) ramifications. It is perhaps unsurprising that Peirce would be attracted to various
forms of Objective Idealism as a third way of avoiding both speculative and anti-speculative excesses.
We can ask then, to advance the experiment of Schelling and Perice's proximity, if the sensual and
universal stages (or Peirce's notion of firstness and thirdness) are to be found analogously, or otherwise
in Schelling's thought, and if this has consequences for the emphasis here on motion, space, and
nature.484
Beyond the connections between Schelling's intellectual intuition and Peircean abduction, there
is a relation of spatio-temporality to cognitive continuity that links Schelling and Peirce.
Schelling closes his Essay on Human Freedom in the following way:
We have the greatest respect for the profundity of historical investigations, and believe to have shown that the almost
universal opinion of man only gradually arose from the dullness of animal instinct to rationality if not our own. Yet we
believe the truth lies closer to us, and that we should first look for solutions to the problems stirred up in our day at home,
on our own soil, before we wander to such distant sources. The time of mere historical faith is past when the possibility of
immediate knowledge is given. We have an older revelation than all written ones-nature. It contains prototypes that no man
has yet interpreted, whereas those of written revelations have long since received their fulfillment and interpretation. 485

Take also the following quote from Peirce:
How was it that man was ever led to entertain that true theory? You cannot say that it happened by chance, because the
possible theories, if not strictly innumerable, at any rate exceed a trillion – or the third power of a million; and therefore the
chances are too overwhelmingly against the single true theory in the twenty or thirty thousand years during which man has
been a thinking animal, ever having come into any man’s head. Besides, you cannot seriously think that every little
chicken, that is hatched, has to rummage through all possible theories until it lights upon the good idea of picking up
something and eating it. On the contrary, you think the chicken has an innate idea of doing this; that is to say, that it can
think of this, but has no faculty of thinking anything else. The chicken you say pecks by instinct. But if you are going to
think every poor chicken endowed with an innate tendency toward a positive truth, why should you think that to man alone
this gift is denied?486

Thus, what is immediacy of action in relation to the immediacy of knowledge if the immediacy
of knowledge is spatially determined? What becomes of the relation of activity and location, of the
pragmatic maxim of 'what works' being what must be followed? These questions bring the general

484 As we will see below Sellars advocates the use of analogy in relating the known to the unknown as Brassier will later
emphasize.
485 F.W.J. von Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes
Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 76-77.
486 C.S. Peirce, “Methods for Attaining Truth,” in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorn
and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 414-415.
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issue of intuition, abduction, and navigation, into the purported isolated interiority of thought. If
intuition and abduction feed into navigation (both mental and pragmatic) because they allow us to fix
points, objects, or hypotheses, in order to carry out any act whatsoever, then inverting this problem
becomes one of determining the geometry or topography of a given mental space.
Given Schelling's minimalist definition of subjectivity for example, in the Erlangen lecture,
when he states that the subject only is the movement that is what is, that moves without remaining,
how can the navigational model be made introspective?487 Tracing Schelling's commitment to the book
of nature in the quote above, we can say that his answer to this conundrum is his particular form of
naturalism, of what in Chapter 5 was discussed in terms of the temporality of the vertical measure of
the Stufenfolge. The question becomes what form does Schelling's naturalism take in a contemporary
context? As I will argue below, Schelling attempts to push the consequences of naturalizing
consciousness to the extreme but in a way that amounts to neither panpsychism (consciousness is
merely inserted everywhere) nor a pure scientific-naturalist treatment of consciousness where it is
merely an effect of matter.
Clearly, Schelling is skeptical of any naturalist explanation in appeasing the emergence of
reason. But rather than arguing that mind or thought is different in kind from nature, or from the
natural processes of evolution, Schelling recognizes the material effect of methodology on nature,
because methodology is a part of it. However, this part cannot be defined in terms of its absolute
location, because the cosmos is unbounded, and so can only be thought in relation to its effects on its
neighbors, on those things and processes in its vicinity. How the seemingly unbound mental space of
conceptualization can be related to its localized material instantiation, the brain, may appear as an
unnecessary detour here.
But, as I will argue, the way in which one perceives the mind perceiving the mind, and the
487 Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” 215.
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brain producing the concept of mind, becomes increasingly dilapidated without a robust theory of
nature to support it. Furthermore, this apparent digression into naturalism will serve as an inroad into
the thought of Wilfrid Sellars who attempted to develop not only a transcendental naturalism, but also,
a theory of pure processes. While these facts may not themselves justify an investigation into Sellars'
work the fact that Sellars serves as the direct inspiration for a multitude of contemporary theorists
utilizing German Idealism, warrants this path.
6.2 - What Does Naturalism do to the Brain? What Does Nature do to the Mind?
In its ordinary functioning. science seems to limit itself to the gestures that guarantee the preservation of knowledge and
leave undisturbed the patrimony of those that set it alight and multiply it. Those are also the ones that save it from indefinite
accumulation and stratification, from the childishness of established positivities, from the comfort of the transits of the
'operational ' and, finally, from the temptation of allowing itself to be buckled up in a grammar. They illustrate the urgency
of an authentic way of conceiving information which would not be committed solely to communication, but would aim at a
rational grasp of allusion and of the learning of learning. The latter, of course, would be far removed from the neuronal
barbarism which exhausts itself in hunting down the recipient of the thought and in confusing learning with a pillaging of
informational booty. Schelling perhaps saw more clearly: he knew that thought was not always encapsulated within the
brain, that it could be everywhere, 'outside ... in the morning dew.' 488

Naturalism is generally divided into methodological and ontological strains. First,
methodological naturalism can be discarded insofar as it merely claims that the methods of the natural
sciences are the best methods tout court especially when the historical and developmental nature of the
methods of natural science are adequately situated. Ontological naturalism is most directly defined as
the claim that nature is all there is, but the question arises what is nature if it is not merely what natural
science tells us? If the conceptual engagement with nature supersedes the methods of the natural
sciences, then how can nature be conceptually separated from both nature and the concept? Or to put
this in a way that would fit Schelling's and Peirce's inquiries: what must nature be in order for it to
continually test and allow for our amplified knowledge of it? Or, to put it in yet another way, in what
philosophical cases does ontological naturalism (or some other strong form of naturalism) have a
pragmatic function? Rather than outlining every form of naturalism, in the following I will attempt to
488 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 14. While he does not cite the source, Châtelet is no doubt referring to a passage from
Schelling's Clara, 22.
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address various thinkers who relate various forms of naturalism to Schelling and to the Sellarsian
lineage (Sellars, McDowell, Brandom, Sebit) in order to determine what Schelling's form of
naturalism, particularly as it relates to the role of consciousness, is.
Bana Bashour and Hans Muller's collection Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its
Implications provides a succinct overview of various naturalist positions. A minimalist or tenuous
naturalist position would simply be that of an anti-supernaturalism, i.e., that only entities or processes
we can at least vaguely describe should be said to be natural. From this minimalist naturalism the
positions become more and more methodologically and ontologically strict regarding the place of
reasons. Generally, this resolves around whether one can claim that reason evolved from primarily
biological or other natural sources, or, if some normative emergence is required.489 While Schelling's
naturalized transcendental method (discussed in chapter 1) rules out his adherence to methodological
naturalism a strict alliance to ontological naturalism is complicated, but not ruled out, by Schelling's
utilization of processes over things.
Immediately the threat of anachronism arises, of how Naturphilosophie relates to contemporary
naturalism. Since Naturphilosophie was a philosophical investigation of nature in its totality, it relied
upon transcendental methods to critique scientific claims, if not, necessarily, scientific methods.
Schelling's work in particular demanded that science think carefully about the claims it could make
from particular fields of study but, as was investigated in Chapter 5, he clearly saw more merit in some
methods (such as field theory) than others (such as atomism). Clearly, Schelling fits neither into
ontological or methodological naturalism. This leaves liberal naturalism and transcendental naturalism.
Liberal naturalism is generally described as a form of naturalism that recognizes the
explanatory power of scientific naturalism (as a combination of ontological and methodological

489 Bana Bashour and Hans Muller ed., Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications (New York:
Routledge, 2014).
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strains) but argues that other forms of knowledge can explain the world as well and, perhaps, in better
ways than a strictly reductive scientific approach. Schelling would seem to fit in this category straight
away.490
Markus Gabriel, however, argues that Schelling's transcendentalism does not permit liberal
naturalism. In Transcendental Ontology, Gabriel associates liberal naturalism with John McDowell's
position in Mind and World.491 For Gabriel, liberal naturalism must assert a physical totality, the world
must be one giant physically closed object, in order or its claims to hold. Yet, as far as I can discern,
Gabriel offers no specific proof of why liberal naturalism, or any scientific theory, requires a closed
world made of matter only in order to make scientifically valid claims. Gabriel notes that Schelling's
notion of totality (or of what Schelling refers to as either the All or the Absolute) should be taken as a
meta-theory and not as a physically massive thing yet this does not make Schelling's generally thinking
regarding nature anti-naturalistic.492 Gabriel's argument for Schelling's concept of non-totality stems
from the concept of the unprethinkable functioning as the tireless engine of logical predication,
whereas I argue, that the same argument can be made following a lean ontological structure of nature.
Again, to assume that Schelling's advocacy of non-totality, of a collection of systems as opposed to one
system, does not override his insistence that the cosmos pre-exists all logical construction. But, since
that cosmos contains logical construction, since we exist and can logically construct, logical
construction is not merely ideal but always a mixture of particular acts of creation, and their more than
local consequences. The absence of this natural structure, I would argue, causes problems for both
sense and logic, as well as many fields beyond strictly human concerns, which justifies the speculation

490 A central flaw of liberal naturalism. which is important to note here, is it generally collapses reduction interior to
particular scientific fields, with reduction that is eliminative, i.e., it believes scientific explanation necessarily
eliminates entities in other fields. As was seen in Chapter 5, this confuses ontological and methodological meanings of
reduction as Robert Batterman argues.
491 Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism (London: Continuum International Publishing
Group, 2011), 3.
492 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 11.
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that non-totality and construction is not merely ideal.
If nature affects conceptualization then it becomes imperative to understand naturalism as a
concept, in the space of nature, that proposes a space of reasons without cutting the ontological or
generally constitutive tether between them. The division, following McDowell and other left
Sellarsians, is one anchored in a plea for coherence in that the space of reasons cannot function
(normativists claim) with the impingement of nature. Yet, without the acknowledgement of nature, the
normative space has no material with which to work unless it amplifies the immateriality of thought
and human action. The appeal to reason as a social exercise, put forth by Robert Brandom, attempts to
circumvent this problem. Here we can investigate whether Schelling fits better in the category of
transcendental naturalism as opposed to liberal naturalism since, for Schelling, the HegelianBrandomian socialization of reason does not adequately address how reason occurs in nature in a
structural sense for Schelling.
But if naturalism is the thought that nature, as the nested set of physical systems, is what there
is, then how does one explain the strange positionality of that thought can abstract the cosmos – that a
view can be constructed that knows about nature as a non-totalizable whole or, following Paul Franks,
a heterogeneous monism. The claim that everything is nature is less problematic (in an ontological
sense), than a two-worlds solution.
While I will address the normativists McDowell and Brandom as well as their forefather Sellars
below, for now the question remains: what is the stuff of thought in relation to the very notion of
totality? Is it methodologically efficacious to divide mind and world, or thought and nature, into kinds
of spaces at all? Is it necessary that mind be ontologically or operationally separate from world in order
for mind to abstract in terms of totalities? Or, perhaps more pertinently, to what degree do we need to
think thought operates independently from nature in order for thought to reach its 'proper' potential
which is, a priori, unknowable?
228

Frederick Mortensen argues in his text The Fate of Finitude, that Schelling's position is quite
close to that of Thomas Nagel and, in particular, his View from Nowhere. If mind is in the world, and
mind cannot be adequately explained through evolutionary means, then Mortensen argues that this
opens the door for the religious naturalism of Nagel, which is closely aligned to liberal naturalism.493
Both religious and liberal naturalism emphasize the importance of nature, of a world out there, but
argue that other methodological approaches are integral to the investigation of nature as such.
However, these approaches do not seem to adequately account for why it is then that the natural
sciences are so apt at producing new entities and manipulating the external world.
In Mind and Cosmos Nagel attempts to get around this problem by claiming that the hard
sciences, particularly biology, are fundamentally limited because they had to abstract mind from the
world in order to set out to investigate it. Nagel claims that the physical sciences are therefore
incapable of describing subjective experiences and argues that this dismisses physical reduction as a
means of explaining nature and thought's role and location in it. While Nagel's non-materialist
naturalism appears, at first glance, very much like Schelling's form of naturalism, I believe that
Schelling's investment in the physical sciences, particularly physics, means he cannot (pace
Mortensen) be associated with religious or liberal naturalism.494 While Schelling is a non-materialist in
the sense that he argues for knowledge and science that is substratum-independent, he thinks that
processes such as gravity, chemical decomposition, and the like have a epistemic impact that is not on
par with other kinds of knowledge, at least, when it comes to discussing nature. That is, when
Schelling discusses light, gravity, or the unfolding and enfolding of organic entities, the formal
structure of these motions are extended into the all of nature. Furthermore, they are formal to the extent

493 Frederick Mortensen, The Fate of Finitude: Schelling and the Question of the World (Copenhagen: University of
Copenhagen, 2012), 17.
494 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Concept of Nature is Almost Certainly False,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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we detect them operating in thought but, this operation within thought, needs to be properly tested so
that it is not merely in thought, or merely ideal. To assume a form discovered by thought belongs to
thought only, does not properly account for the constructive subordination of thought to nature.
Furthermore, Schelling's great heresy against Kant, besides his general attack on the critical
system as merely negative, i.e., non-creative, is his argument that existence is a real predicate. What is
interesting is that Schelling's reason for this is not to re-claim an ontological proof of God, but instead
to demonstrate that thought and actions have processural or physical (if we read physical in terms of
fields and not hard stuff) effects since they are in the world and there is only one world.
If nature is even partially similar to what we think it is, then we are natural beings with
naturally endowed capacities. Assuming that mind is either unnatural, or functions in an unnatural
domain separate from nature, i.e., that mind acts according only to its own rules, ignores the preexistence of nature; nature as the processes and structures without which we cannot explain why
anything holds together at all. As Michael Halley puts it“The concept of nature, does not entail that
there should also be an intelligence that is aware of it. Nature it seems, would exist even if there were
nothing that was aware of it.”495 Yet how does the mind determine, or decide, from a degree, or space,
of unnaturalness? A certain coherency is acquired following any kind of normative isolation and yet
why should this be taken as more than a methodological distinction, how could the advent of the
normative, the space of reasons, be a cut in the real? How could the space of reasons be separated from
the space of nature?
If the creation of a space of normativity is because of a need for coherency, then the space of
nature must be fully abandoned to the natural sciences. The problem is not to question the authority of
science as such, but to acknowledge the fact that if philosophy is to be as generic, or universal, as it
claims, then it must apply to the sciences as well. Even if one separates the space of reason from the
495 Michael Halley, “Schelling's Empiricism: A Transcendentalist's Conversion,” in Idealistic Studies, v37, i2, (2007): 114.
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space of nature, it is granted that a degree of self-reflexivity allows for a process to identify itself, but
in the case of the normative system, to also isolate itself operationally, maybe even ontologically, from
the natural world.
Intelligence, for Schelling, is a hyper-active (or for us proximal) form of self-relation, it is a
form of self-relation that convinces itself it is without limit but its limit becomes that it thinks it has no
limit. Thought appears to itself as a boundless trajectory yet the path it has taken only matters if the
material consequences are worked out, followed through. This pragmatism works against a normative
space that would confuse, or at least conflate, cause, ground, and reason. Grounds and reasons are held
apart from one another in Schelling's work (Vernuft is a different term than Grund) since reason is a
human capacity where grounds are both human and nonhuman.496
Thus, the space of reasons cannot contain the space of nature, but the space of nature can be
said to produce the space of reasons as a consequence, and thus, reason can be viewed as an
augmentation of nature, at least insofar as nature comes to know itself as nature for us, and in itself. In
both the space of reason and the space of nature, what is is it that which structurally engenders the very
base capacity for self-reflexivity. Or what does the very process of self-modification consist in? If
reason is a later version of nature, in that it is another form of self-reflection, does this properly
account for reason's capacities? For Schelling, only an appeal to the senses, but an appeal that remains
aware of reason's, and experience's transformation of what is sensed, can demonstrate the insufficiency
of reason in the space of nature. As he writes:
Of itself, reason cannot realize or prove any actual, real being even in the sensible world; it cannot realize or prove any
present existence, for example, the existence of this plant or this stone. If reason wants a real being, if it wants as something
real any type of object discovered within itself in a concept and, thus, as something merely possible, then it must submit to
the authority of the senses. For the testimony of the senses is nothing other than an authority, since through it we know the
present existence, the plant that exists here, which cannot be realized from the mere nature of things, and thus from

496 This is evident in the example of legal jargon which separates grounds and reasons. Whereas one's reasons are
understanding they may not count as legal grounds for performing an action, i.e., grounds require justification outside
an individuals desires or individual reasons for doing something.
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reason.497

It is manifestly demonstrable that claims that the mind or cognition is a product and operator of
nature does not deny the possibility of self-modification. Therefore, the question becomes what a
theory of expansive, or transcendental naturalism does to the mind, to the very concept of mind or
mindedness? This raises a different, but not unrelated question: what does the normative mind think of
the scientifically determined concept of brain or cognition? The question of what naturalism does to
the mind becomes 'what directives are not engendered by naturalism for the mind?' What does it mean
to be operating both according to nature and according to our own freedom or direction (to put it again
in a navigational sense)?
There are thus two interrelated questions: 'What does naturalism do to the brain?” and “What
does nature do to the mind?' If nature is capable of self-modification (of augmentative recursion) then
how is the self-modification that we seem to do to the mind and the brain related to how nature
modifies the mind and the brain? Are the relations of mental and natural self-modifications themselves
natural or normatively determined without concern for nature, or only concerned with nature after the
fact?
The danger that arises here, in combating liberal and or religious naturalism, is that following a
nature of processes one falls into panpsychism to explain mind in general. That is, if thought is a
process, and all that there is are processes, then does thought become a ubiquitous feature of the
cosmos? Or, in other words, what are the adequate means of differentiating, but not not sundering,
thought from nature given that we inhabit thought and, in a quite different sense, inhabit nature?
One temptation here is to follow numerous interpreters who see Schelling as therefore
endorsing either a traditional monism, or a panpsychism. Since the former has been addressed in
chapters 3 and 4, I will focus on the charge of panpsychism. Paul Hayner, in his text Reason and
497 Schelling, Grounding, 210.
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Existence for instance, claims that Schelling's monism is a panpsychism following a complete identity
of mind and nature.498
However, Hayner seems to suggest that this is a traditional notion of identity and not one of
copulation and genesis as outlined in Schelling's Freedom Essay. That is, as Daniel Whistler, Iain
Grant, and others have pointed out, and as has already been discussed above, Schelling's notion of
identity is a thesis of univocal extension such that the statement A = A does not mean that entity one is
equal to, or the same as entity 2, but that it means entity 1 is the ground of entity 1 and is expressed by
the consequence of entity 2. It is only in ignoring the difference between a literal understanding of
identity, as opposed to Schelling's particular notion of identity, that Hayner can claim that the absolute
is a category that ruins all of Schelling's early work both in the philosophy of nature and the identity
philosophy.499
Michael Blamauer in his “Schelling's Real Materialism,” argues that Schelling's
Naturphilosophie, which denies body, or any other physical substratum at bottom, necessitates that
Schelling is therefore a panpsychist.500 For instance, not every thought re-writes the brain but thoughts
contribute to consciousness as self-modification. Becoming convinced by an argument, or watching an
incredible film, may adequately be described as natural occurrences as visual and or auditory stimulai
change the way we think about some state of affairs. Thus, while there is clearly weak emergence,
things combine in a way that is pre-determined by the qualities of their components, the question
remains of whether strong emergence, or radical novelty, occurs or not.
To refer back to Chapter 5, strong emergence, the claim that reduction erases or fails to explain
novelty, could be seen to be guilty of what Robert Batterman has referred to as property dragging; in
other words strong emergence does not appear to maintain any distinction between structure and
498 Paul Collins Hayner, Reason and Existence: Schelling's Philosophy of History, (Boston: EJ Brill, 1967), 41, 47.
499 Hayner, Reason and Existence, 51-52.
500 Michael Blamauer, “Schelling's Real Materialism,” in Minvera, 16, (Open Access, 2012), 3.
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change, between potency and actuality. Following the discussion of the potencies in chapter 4, all
creation is constrained but all constraint is subsequently expressed (thus adding to creation). The world
is as creative as it can be while still holding itself together again pointing back to chapter 4. In this
regards, and following Schelling's notion of identity as a thesis of extended univocity, he would most
likely be critical of strong emergence as it would negate the properly expressive relationship of the
consequent from its antecedent.
The navigational character of Schelling's notion of creation can be expressed in creation being
the production of constraints, of creation being the extending of boundaries and not the rupture of
boundaries. Production, or creation, is the motion of inhibitions. Nature can be described in its most
basic sense as merely self-deforming space, or, nature is the universe's most plastic aspect. Or, as
Gabriel puts it in logical terms: “the absolute necessity of the origin must therefore be compatible with
the contingency of everything that originates.”501
Because self-modification and recursion occurs within one world, or one space, only a space of
nature, then it cannot be methodologically efficacious to merely naturalize epistemology fully, as
thoughts act according to other thoughts, in a very particular way, and at least for us, seem to be
contained by the concept of the mental. Yet, as Iain Grant emphasizes in his Philosophies of Nature
After Schelling, epistemology must undergo significant change if 'what thinks in me is outside of me.'
To address this, the apparent externality of the world, as well as the apparent irreducibility of interior
thoughts and or experiences, it will now serve us to move onto the thought of Wilfrid Sellars whose
critical combination of nominalism, naturalism, and process-ontology, allows for a nuanced approach
to maintaining a space for reason's seemingly unnatural capacities given the efficacy of naturalism
without falling into either crude empiricism, materialism, or panpsychism.
6.3 - Impure Immediacies: Sellars and Schelling
501 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 66.
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The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars has a novel attempt to deal with the problems of
naturalism and epistemology. Furthermore, Sellars is a remarkable bridge between post-Kantian
analytic thought and contemporary utilizations of German Idealism in the English-speaking world.
Sellars' most important concepts for our purposes here are his synoptic image of the human, the myth
of the given, and his later concept of pure processes. As I attempt to show, Sellar's dual methodology,
and his reliance on a metaphysics of pure processes to link the two domains of knowledge, appears
compatible with Schelling's general philosophical trajectory. Sellars' synopticism is simply the
methodological dualism in viewing human beings either in terms of the manifest image or the
scientific image. The manifest image treats humans as cultural, meaning centered, and conceptmongering creatures while, in the scientific image, the human is treated as a mere biological entity, an
animal subject to the laws of nature.
As he puts it in “Philosophy and The Scientific Image of Man”:
The 'manifest' image of man-in-the-world can be characterized in two ways, which are supplementary rather than
alternative. It is, first, the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world. It is the
framework in terms of which, to use an existentialist turn of phrase, man first encountered himself-which is, of course,
when he came to be man. For it is no merely incidental feature of man that he has a conception of himself as man-in-theworld, just as it is obvious, on reflection, that 'if man had a radically different conception of himself he would be a radically
different kind of man'.502

He then later in the same text discusses the scientific image thusly:
The scientific image of man-in-the-world is, of course, as much an idealization as the manifest image --even more so, as it
is still in the process of coming to be. It will be remembered that the contrast I have in mind is not that between an
unscientific conception of man-in-the-world and a scientific one, but between that conception which limits itself to what
correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events and that which postulates imperceptible
objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles. It was granted, of course, that in point of
historical fact many of the latter correlations were suggested by theories introduced to explain previously established
correlations, so that there has been a dialectical interplay between correlational and postulational procedures. (Thus we
might not have noticed that litmus paper turns red in acid, until this hypothesis had been suggested by a complex theory
relating the absorption and emission of electromagnetic radiation by objects to their chemical composition; yet in principle
this familiar correlation could have been, and, indeed, was, discovered before any such theory was developed.) Our contrast
then, is between two ideal constructs: (a) the correlational and categorial refinement of the 'original image', which
refinement I am calling the manifest image; (b) the image derived from the fruits of postulational theory construction which
502 Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1963), 6.
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I am calling the scientific image.503

Despite Sellars' daunting verbiage, the thrust of the argument is straightforward. Simply put,
Sellars wants to argue that we cannot avoid having a quasi-historical and pragmatic view of ourselves
as a species, as being a type of thing located in a world. Yet, at the same time, in order to navigate that
world, we have to make speculations or theory constructions which redefine our position in the world
as it allows us to move through it. The caveat is that our relation to ourselves is no less problematic or
nuanced than our epistemological relation to facets of apparently external reality. This general attitude
of Sellars, divided between naturalism and pragmatism, is what leads him to the myth of the given as
well as the theory of pure processes.
Sellars' myth of the given is outlined in his famous essay “Empiricism and Philosophy of
Mind.” Sellars wants to preserve inner episodes of consciousness (the fact that we have immediate
experiences, or at least reliably can talk about, these experiences in a scientific world view) while not
granting some special status to the given, or givenness, in philosophical theories of sense. In other
words, Sellars wants to preserve internal states but argue that our purported immediate knowing of
something is a loose attachment of language to a process and that, between language and process, there
is a game-like give and take which occurs.
This is often diagrammed via the inconsistent triad. Sellars, and his followers, argue that only two of
three statements regarding the relation of sense and knowing can be true.
A) ‘S senses red sense content x’ entails ‘S non inferentially believes (knows) that x is red.’
B) The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired
C). The capacity to have classificatory beliefs of the form ‘x is F’ is acquired.504
Or, sense means one can know a fact, that we know what we sense is automatic, and our ability
to claim a fact is learned. If we think that we have immediate access to sense, and that this also gives
503 Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” 19.
504 Ray Brassier, “Bergson, Lived Experience, and the Myth of the Given,” talk given at To Have Done With Life Vitalism and Antivitalism in Contemporary Philosophy conference at MaMa, Zagreb, June 17-19,2011.
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us unmediated knowledge, then we have fallen into the myth of the given. As Ray Brassier argues,
Sellars selects the first and third capacities leaving out the second. What this means is that for Sellars,
the passage from recognizing sense to making a fact about the world is conceptually coupled with the
fact that facthood is something that must be learned. The process of saying that this apple looks red
therefore is possible because 'it is red' is automatically true for the interior thoughts of the observer but,
for them to communicate with other observers, they must be trained to make classificatory beliefs (for
them to know about redness generally).505 Or, not all experience is conceptual, but all communicable
experience is conceptual.
To point back to both Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 Sellars view is, I believe, compatible with that
of Schelling since Schelling emphasizes that the co-dependency of thought and world requires an
appeal to intuition but an intuition that is about immediate locality (objects in the field of sense) that
may have deeper conceptual import for philosophical navigation of space. Furthermore, as I have
begun to demonstrate above via Schelling's transition to the positive philosophy, such a philosophy
treats experience itself as a material to demonstrate the insufficiency of reason by itself. So while
negative philosophy has its function (to say what something is, to make classificatory statements in
Sellars' language) it requires the immediacy of experience but locally limited (that x is this or that) in
order to furnish the beginnings of a form of proto-pragmatism, to adequately grasp how or why
something exists.
Practical activity tests the cut of the normative named above as occurring only within the
normative, of being only according to the stability of reason, and thereby quarantining nature. Sellars
pragmatism is transcendental in Schelling's sense (in being about conceptual and not merely

505 Here I follow Ray Brassier's reading of how Sellars treats the inconsistent triad as opposed to Robert Brandom's.
Brandom argues that Sellars merely drops option A. See Robert Brandom, “Guide to Empiricism and Philosophy of
Mind,” available online. For further discussion of the inconsistent triad see James O'Shea Naturalism with a Normative
Turn as well as John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, 235-237.
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conceptual motion) because it makes reasons into causes. Sellars' pragmatism, in treating reasons like
causes, is close to Schelling's positive philosophy in treating experience as causes. For Sellars, nature
as a series of extended physical processes, is evident to us in our own doings and sayings (Robert
Brandom will go on to emphasize the latter to great effect).
It is here that the importance of Sellars' late notion of pure processes emerges. Like Peirce's
open notion of universal laws that are never known but only abductively approached, Sellars' notion of
pure process not only keeps open a space for future knowledge, for what we might not know that we
do not know, but also allows for the play-space between language, or pragmatic activity, and its grip
on what seems to be a relatively stable physical world. This emerges in Sellars' Carus Lectures.
Sellars' lectures, which were printed in the Monist in three parts, re-examine his critique of the
myth of the given in relation to an ontology of pure processes. In the first lecture printed as “The Lever
of Archimedes” (1981) Sellars re-presents his general account of sense. While Sellars maintains that a
sensed quality like red is already conceptually coded by the time we can refer to it, our experience of it
is more or less immediate, but this immediacy is not conceptually accessible in the same way that the
sense-as-quality is. However, Sellars argues, this access problem is not due to the fact that we have a
concept of experience before we have experiences, but because of the complexity of quality-asprocess.
In essence, Sellars argues that knowing the difference between 'the apple looks red' and 'the
apple is red' does not hinge upon knowing, a priori, the iffyness of experience as such, that it is
intrinsically indefinable, but because our immediate conceptual grasp is not of objects per se but of
processes, of expanses of red.506 Or, in other words, it is not because we know experience is relative
that we assume that we may experience a disjunction between is, and seems, but because the character

506 Wilfrid Sellars, “The Lever of Archimedes” in The Monist, Vol. 64, No. 1, Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure
Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 7-10.
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of experience is processural, we are always working to update our knowledge of redness. While the
distinction may seem trivial, Sellars is advocating for reduction but a reduction to processes which, he
argues in an odd but convincing fashion, that adverbial forms are the most useful reductions we can
perform. This is Sellars attempts to hang onto some notion of nominalism in the wake of his
naturalism.
This is, I would argue, akin to Schelling's wholesale rejection of substratum-reliance. It is quite
telling that Sellars closes his third Carus lecture by quoting from his earlier “Philosophy and the
Scientific Image of Man” in which he states:
But the scientific image is not yet complete; we have not yet penetrated all the secrets of nature. And if it should turn out
that particles instead of being the primitive entities of the scientific image could be treated as singularities in a space-time
continuum which could be conceptually 'cut up' without significant loss? In inorganic contexts, at least?into interacting
particles, then we would not be confronted at the level of neurophysiology with the problem of understanding the relation
of sensory consciousness (with its ultimate homogeneity) to systems of particles. Rather, we would have the alternative of
saying that although for many purposes the central nervous system can be construed without loss as a complex system of
physical particles, when it comes to an adequate understanding of the relation of sensory consciousness to
neurophysiological process, we must penetrate to the non-particulate foundation of the particulate image, and recognize that
in this non-particulate image the qualities of sense are a dimension of natural process which occurs only in connection with
those complex physical processes which, when 'cut up' into particles in terms of those are features which present in
inorganic the common least as well as organic of physical process?--the complex alike---become denominators processes
system of particles which, in the current scientific image, is the central nervous system. 507

To point back to Chapter 5, we can see how Sellars argues that particles, or other entities,
function as descriptive footholds for processes, particularly processes which are not, due to our
naturalistic albeit technological appended capacities, perceptible to us in the same way events like
thunderings or runnings are. That is, a particle is an indexer of a process which we are attempting to
come to grips with, while events we can perceive occurring between objects, as more sensibly
accessible, can be defined either in the relation of the objects, or, can be reduced to the event. That is,
the phrase 'Socrates ran on Sunday,” can be productively reduced to 'a running took place.' Similarly,
Sellars' discussion of particles, like Schelling's use of actants, demonstrate the difficulty in objectifying
processes or qualities which requires the opposite move, of added objects to explain the underlying
507 Wilfrid Sellars, “Is Consciousness Physical?” in The Monist, Vol. 64, No. 1, Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure
Process (1981): 87-88.
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event. Things are objects which are logical cuts into the continuum (to point back to Chapter 3) which,
if they have operative or pragmatic efficacy, does not make them less real since, following Schelling,
realness is a measure of consequence (what that event means) and not material composition (not what
this particle is made of, but what it does in this particular instance).
Furthermore, and to point back to Chapter 5, Sellars is skeptical of the kind of fact-ontology
which Markus Gabriel utilizes, since the immediacy of sense, and the purported simplicity of fact,
cannot be aligned prior to the collective mediation of facticity either by inferential training (such as a
child by its parents to know what facts are) and/or by social filtering and amplifying (as Brandom
highlights in a Hegelian vein). Thus for Sellars and, I would argue, for Schelling, the problem is not
immediate knowledge as long as one recognizes the conceptual and local features of that immediacy
which have already been processed prior to reflectively acknowledging it.
Beyond these surface level similarities, I believe that there are methodological congruities
between Schelling and Sellars. The methodological bifurcations of Schelling’s work (whether
discussed as negative versus positive, or Naturphilosophie vs transcendental philosophy) can be
compared (though as not strictly analogous to) Sellars’ scientific image versus the manifest image, or
viewing things as bundles of micro-physical processes, as well as sensa or, irreducible causes in, and
of, experience. What is central here, as James O’Shea points out in relation to Sellars, is that physical
grounds and logical grounds need not be collapsed. This ties in to Schelling’s relation to Peirce
discussed above. These divides, in both Schelling and in Sellars, are due to underlying processes but
these processes are apparent because of the informative ambiguity of sensory experience.
For Schelling, the informative status of experience in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy is
imperative for the very practice of philosophy itself as well as its non-sensorial or intuitive
consistency.
The necessity of experience as a material is not in order to bring philosophy 'down-to-Earth' so to
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speak, in an Aristotelian sense, but in order to account for the demands of dogmatic metaphysics
without accepting their substantial metaphysical claims. Or in other words, taking experience as a
material means taking its insufficiency as explanatory in itself thereby absorbing the desire for a
metaphysical structure but, at the same time, acknowledging that the extravagance of metaphysical
systems can, and has, gone far beyond being instructively compensatory in relation to sense.
Schelling's claim about the thirdness of the subject-object distinction (mentioned above in
Chapter 5) is the claim that matter is synthetic, or constructed, in a way that makes it neither strictly
subject or object (nor is it strictly potency) since it is, is existent, but is not dead or brute as matter is
often reduced to in the case of materialism or mechanism (both of which Schelling rallied against
particularly in the First Outline and in The Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. The synthetic dimension
is the creative dimension of metaphysics reduced (in a positive since as discussed above) to the
creative potentiality of subject and object.
Given his treatment of sense, it may not seem surprising that Sellars work has, though with
quite a temporal delay, fed into contemporary analytic utilizations of German Idealism namely by John
McDowell, Robert Brandom, Robert Pippin, and Brady Bowman, just to name a few. However, the
form this reception has taken seems to be very much against Sellars' spirit as the reception of his work
has divided into the commonly known split of left and right Sellarsians with the former being
Hegelians who emphasize the manifest image of Sellars' work, while the right Sellarsians (who include
Daniel Dennett, Ruth Milikan, and Patricia and Paul Churchland) emphasize the scientific image. In
addition, the Hegelianism of the left Sellarsians, which I will engage below, has been criticized as
being a Fichteanism at heart, since it emphasizes the Logic and the Phenomenology over, and above,
all of Hegel's other texts regardless of the subject matter being discussed. Furthermore, these left
Sellarsians display little to no understanding of Schelling and, in regards to the legacy of Sellars, seem
to overlook or purposefully ignore Sellars' emphasis on pure processes.
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Johanna Seibt is the Sellarsian who has contributed the most to reinvigorating the processreading of Sellars work. In her masterful “Pure Processes and Projective Metaphysics” Seibt argues
that despite Sellars' general emphasis on semantic games as the corner-stone for his thinking, processes
function as a “projective metaphysics.” which is indispensible to his overall project508 Seibt states that
Sellars' very notion of picturing, of the projecting and use of the scientific image and the manifest
image for example, is only possible with the concept of pure processes.509 Ultimately, and in a way that
I argue aligns itself with the discussion of Schelling's method, Seibt calls the utilization of this process
as “a transcendence from within.”510
This transcendence has do to with the fact that the processes function, not only as, a bridge for
the manifest and scientific images, but because an altogether different technique of thinking is
suggested by the processes. Seibt argues that processes go beyond the correlational techniques of the
manifest image, the use of analogy to move slowly through the world, as well as those techniques of
the scientific image which proposes entities. As noted above, the techniques of either explaining events
with objects, or constructive objects to explain events. Alternatively, she argues that the positing of the
processes is about proposing new formulas for a potential new model.511 The following statement sums
up their function:
In ontology as in science, then, the external significance of a theory is something we assert ‘from within,’ comparing the
theory with its competitors rather than with ‘reality.’ Such external significance essentially remains comparative
significance, since it derives from the comparative explanatory force of a theory relative to a data-set whose degree of
picture correctness is unknown. Moreover, it remains projected external significance in the following sense. Sellars claims
that ideal coherence and ideal picture-correctness go hand in hand, which allows for the possibility that in the sequence
of frameworks leading up to the Peircean framework increases in picture-correctness and coherence or inferential
integration may be occasionally out of step.512

In essence Seibt is saying that framework independence, or admitting the limited ground from
which one's knowledge claims begin, does not mean that those claims cannot have external
508 Johanna Seibt, “Pure Processes and Projective Metaphysics,” in Philosophical Studies, 101 (2000), 254.
509 Seibt, “Pure Processes,” 266.
510 Seibt, “Pure Processes,: 267.
511 Ibid. 275.
512 Ibid. 284.
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significance, on the contrary, it is only through such an admission that one can see what is exterior or,
following the discussion of Schelling above, the speculative gesture can tell us about the actual
ramifications of our local actions. The temptation, and one which Schelling rallies against in a different
form in his own time, is to overemphasize the degree to which reason is the sole capacity for
stabilizing and projecting a possible picture of the world. It is this over-reliance on the normative
structure of reason that will be addressed next.
6.4 - Netting Nature through Norms?
The whole world lies, so to speak, in the nets of the understanding, or of reason, but the question is how it entered these
nets, since there is obviously something other and something more than mere reason in the world, indeed there is something
which strives beyond these limits.513

We can now investigate, head on, the normative uptake of Sellars' work that engages with the
broad themes of German Idealism, though, never Schelling specifically. It is Schelling's difficult
method, as well as his emphasis on nature, that removes him from the Sellarsian use of German
Idealism.
What is interesting here, in regards to the concepts of space and motion, is that a spatial
division is made by Left Sellarsians, the division between the space of reasons and the space of nature,
in order to defend the very process of reason. Our guiding question here will be: how can these
thinkers divide nature from reason in a spatial metaphor, in order to justify a movement within, but not
across, these spaces, given the naturalist roots of consciousness and the non-normative explanatory
power required to discuss movement and space as such?
As Markus Gabriel points out, all post-Sellarsian Hegelians interpret the division of mind and
world, or reasons and causes, or thought and nature in different ways, means following Sellars' famous,
and already discussed, “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind.”514 However, while Brandom and

513 F.W.J. von Schelling quoted in Christopher Lauer, The Suspension of Reason In Hegel and Schelling, (London:
Bloomsbury, 2010), 194.
514 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 35-36.
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Gabriel emphasize the semantic aspect of this division, as we have seen in the work of Seibt, the later
Sellars complicates the strictly semantic character of the treatment of such spaces. If the tissue of the
world is made of processes or occurings it appears that Brandom, Pippin, and to a lesser extent
McDowell, take the division of spaces that justifies its act of cutting in merely normative terms.
Normativity becomes a netting of nature that then proceeds by splitting nature into two halves and
throwing out the nature part.
Given this it can hardly be surprising that in the ongoing adoption of German Idealism by
contemporary analytic philosophers, Hegel has been the star, Fichte the understudy, and Schelling the
enfant terrible. Schelling receives little or no mention, other than as kook, romanticist, or half-stepping
stone, half-obstacle to Hegel's meteoric rise to greatness. But given the contemporary emphasis on
German Idealism as helping to navigate the gap between the logical space of reasons and the logical
space of nature it is odd that Schelling is ignored, as his work, is so focused on the relation of thought
and nature, or mind and world.
The purported dubiousness of Schelling's Naturphilosophie is often held up as the glaring
metaphysical hex damning him from contemporary appropriation yet, his critics fail to even
consistently critique him, oscillating between accusing Schelling of being a bad influence on the
physical sciences of his time to claiming he had no influence at all, and citing little proof in both cases.
As a corollary, Schelling's work on Absolute Identity (or what he saw as the ur-logical form
undergirding his numerous systems of philosophical inquiry discussed in geometrical language) is
dismissed by reputation alone following Hegel's infamous statement that Schelling's conception of the
Absolute was the 'night in which all the cows are black.' Thus Schelling is critiqued for simultaneously
being too specific in his empirical claims and too vague in his philosophical claims with little or no
attention given to Schelling on his own terms, or to the positive citing of his work in the physical
sciences by figures such as Humphry Davy, Michael Faraday, and Hans Christian Oersted.
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Against this reputation, and following the work of contemporary Schellingians such as Iain
Hamilton Grant, I will argue that Schelling's work can be brought to bear on the nature and mind
divide in a way that can inform the uptake of Hegel by figures such as John McDowell and Robert
Brandom. Specifically, Schelling's work can account for a more positive description of the space (or
logic) of nature than one demonstrated by the aforementioned Pittsburgh Hegelians.
A brief overview of McDowell's work and the motivations behind it would serve here.
McDowell's Mind and World is a text which aims to clear the philosophical field of a large swath of
misunderstandings. Following Kant and Sellars in particular, McDowell argues that contemporary
philosophical problems stem from an inability to accept the idealistic power of human thought above,
and against, the sense of world. McDowell argues that too much hand-wringing has been done in
concern over a world 'out there' and in attempting to explain how our minds may or may not be able to
map it.515 For McDowell the problem stems from either giving into what Sellars' the aforementioned
myth of the given (the claim that the outside is somehow immediately compatible with human thought)
or stressing over the dualism between sense and intuition in the wake of Kant.
McDowell's solution is to argue that there is no fundamental limit to the conceptual following
from his Sellarsian reading of Kant.516 That is, in order to avoid the myth of the given, spontaneity and
receptivity must be co-constitutive. In essence, receptivity and spontaneity are always-already working
in conceptual space and therefore it is fundamentally contradictory to draw a line between conceptual
space as interior and natural space as exterior. For McDowell the relation between mind and world
must be normative one and hence the world (or nature) will be understood in normative terms or as
empirical laws.517 Following a particular reading of Sellars, McDowell defines the logical space of

515 As Ray Brassier has pointed out however, this elides the emphasis on Sellars' use of processes in his later work namely
the Carus lectures.
516 McDowell's reading of Kant is also heavily influenced by P.F. Stawson's text The Bounds of Sense.
517 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), xii.
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nature negatively, as functioning according to different rules from the space of reasons. Beyond this
nature and naturalism are only to be operated upon in terms of epistemological description. While
McDowell argues that receptivity, and spontaneity, co-construct reason, McDowell must seriously
downplay the latter as having any contribution other than as suggesting epistemological images of
what nature may be.518 For McDowell, freedom can only describe itself in its own terms, and thus,
nature must be navigated away from following normative rules alone. Or later on he states
“independent reality exerts a rational control over our thinking but without falling into the confusion
between justification and exculpation.”519 Here I find it difficult to ascertain how McDowell can
account for the infinite speed of reason, of reason being embedded in nature in such a way that is
completely conscious to us. McDowell ends his short text with an appeal to a kind of “naturalized
Platonism.”520
As should be evident from the above discussion of the various forms of naturalism, McDowell
works under a mode of soft or liberal naturalism, that attempts to accept the ramifications of nature but
only to the extent that they are produced by the natural sciences. Furthermore, McDowell claims that,
because of the emergence of the space of reasons, nature is transformed into a second nature, over
which our own human spontaneity allow us control.
Robert Brandom, who in many ways takes up the reins of McDowell's project, and is classified
as a left-Sellarsian alongside him, further distances nature from reason. Like Robert Pippin, Brandom
argues that McDowell does not go far enough in downplaying the active role of the space of nature.
Brandom attempts this by emphasizing the social aspect of reason. In his impressive Reason and
Philosophy, Brandom argues that reason is fundamentally normative due to the centrality of the
concept of recognition – recognition of any and all ingredients to normativity and to the efficacy of
518 McDowell, Mind and World, 9.
519 McDowell, Mind and World, 27.
520 McDowell, Mind and World, 92-95.
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normativity itself as the giving and taking of reasons in order to explain and justify behaviors in
ourselves and other (presumably) rational agents.521 Brandom justifies his engagement with Hegel in
asserting that “We are social, normative, rational free, self-consciously historical animals. This
powerful and finely conceptually articulated vision of ourselves is the crowning achievement of
German Idealism.”522 For Brandom this is possible because, in following Kant, the German Idealists
(which for Brandom means Hegel up-most) took the activity of searching for a unity of apperception as
the ground of rationality itself. Rationality, for Brandom, becomes a triangulation of the conceptual via
inferences and incompatibilities of the use of numerous predicates. Brandom effectively argues that, at
base, the subject is simply that which attains definiteness in a social setting.523 An essentially
naturalistic account of the individual, and its acquisition of language skills, is accelerated by social (or
normative) existence as Brandom argues that Hegelian recollection (Erinnerung) utilizes the Kantian
integration of concepts into reason and casts it in a broader and historicized light.524 Brandom argues
that: “Kant replaces the ontological distinction between the physical and the mental with the
deontological distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom: the distinction
between things that merely act regularly and things that are subject to distinctively normatively sorts of
assessment”525 and hence Hegel historicizes, and socializes, this process.
In this regard, within the normative realm, Brandom's rational Hegelian agent is capable of
determining both the behaviors of itself and others (via the linguistic giving and taking of reasons) as
well as ordering historical or other grand narratives in order to construct a progressive or evolutionary
account of reason's or, in a more embodied sense, humanity's ascension.
521 Robert Brandom, Reason and Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 2-4.
522 Brandom, Reason and Philosophy, 17.
523 This speaks to a tension between continental and analytic readings of Hegel where the former emphasizes his
metaphysical aspects whereas the latter emphasizes his historical uses modified for the present. These lines have
become significantly blurred in works such as that of Adrian Johnston, Brady Bowman, and Markus Gabriel to name
but a few.
524 Brandom, Reason and Philosophy, 90-91.
525 Brandom, Reason and Philosophy, 115.
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Brandom emphasizes, in summoning the figure of Minerva's owl, that the Hegelian dialectic
gives contingency the form of necessity.526 Within this discussion Brandom emphasizes the 'newness'
of Hegel's concept of determinateness yet it appears, albeit in an slightly more abstract form,
throughout Maimon's work as the law of determinability as was discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas
Brandom's account acknowledges the heuristic and pedagogical roots of determining, the very form of
the act is mystified beyond being the propellant of language. Brandom explains determination as
occuring through the giving of taking of reasons. Whereas McDowell offered some space for nature,
for Brandom, determination as such occurs only with normative reasonable discourse. In addition,
Brandom's erasure of Sellars' pure processes, can only beg the question of how is it that the relation
between saying and doing can be fully articulated with human controlled normative functions? Here
Brandom goes even beyond Fichte in asserting that activity, as such, is the sole purview of human
beings.
In Tales of the Mighty Dead Brandom again connects Hegel to determination as a form of
subjective-objectivity that centers upon processes of individuation.527 Here I believe that Brandom,
once again, over-determines the linguistic skeleton of determination itself in order to better stitch
together mind and world with tools crafted from and within the logical space of reasons without
recourse to the space of nature (to say nothing of whether this latter space is logical as such). My point
here is not that there is an easy alternative by which we could describe the space of nature as it
asymmetrically forms the space of reason (of normative space) but to argue that the patchwork means
by which we construct theories of X are naturalism at work in that our senses (although they may
already be present to us consciously as always-already conceptual content via Sellars). But this does
not speak to the spatio-temporal kinematics of ourselves in relation to those concepts locally isolated.
526 Brandom, Reason and Philosophy, 102.
527 Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 179.
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Or to return to the discussion of Seibt above, and Schelling's discussion of experience and sense
in The Grounding, just because our sensed world is already conceptually riven, categorized, and
formed, does not mean that everything subsequently affected by that content must be fully
conceptually graspable. Nor, however, does it mean one should thrown out the conceptually coded of
the world and claim we can sneak thoughts into the world before epistemologically treating it. The
difficulty is once experiences or senses have been recognized to have been conceptually coded, how do
extend our concepts of those experiences while, at the same time, acknoweldging that the 'matter' of
those concepts, are not only conceptual?
To reconnect to the discussion of naturalism above, one can also engage with some of the Right
Sellarsians' critiques of Brandom and McDowell. The neuroscientist and philosopher Daniel Dennett
has critiqued the division of normative space from the space of nature albeit for different reasons.
In his essay “The Evolution of Reasons” Dennett points out the difficulty in distinguishing questions of
'what for?' from those of 'how come?' from within the so-called normative space of reasons.528
While Dennett admits that reasons of 'what for' can be discussed effectively in terms of socially
mediated practices, those of 'how come?' generally require a more engineering or practical model to
explain their function.529 A consequence of this is to say that termites and architects both have reasons
for why they construct the way they do but humans can represent those reasons to one another whereas
termites cannot.530 But this difference does not adequately justify the normative form of 'what for'
replacing or overriding the questions of 'how come?' Dennett argues that Brandom, and other
Pittsburgh Hegelians, use of the space of reasons effectively terminates inquiry if it keeps reason so

528 Daniel Dennett, “The Evolution of Reasons,” in Bana Bashour and Hans Muller ed., Contemporary Philosophical
Naturalism and Its Implications, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 54.
529 Dennett, “The Evolution of Reasons,” 51.
530 Ibid. 54-56.
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isolated from nature.531
As I hope to show, while Schelling and German Idealism writ large similarly endorses closing
the ontological gap between mind and world (or between thought and nature), the way in which
McDowell proposes such a suture does not provide an adequate grounding for the ambit of the
practical for which he argues. Furthermore, it remains to be seen how exactly the very split between
mind and world (between thought and nature) is merely ideal for us, and how this split for our own
sake maps onto the split (or perhaps more tentatively the emergence) of thought from nature
ontologically. Or in other words, a de-ontological account of nature and myself as a thinking being
cannot account for natural impediments on my capacity to think in the same way my giving of reasons
affects nature.

6.5 - Tethered Ekstasis and The Speculative 'Go of It'
But a glimpse into its recent history provides adequate material for melancholy reflections on philosophy; this is because
until now there has been no way to philosophize, or, as one otherwise says, none of the different philosophical systems has
been able to survive over the course of time. I contend that it is also the duty of the teacher to reveal this side of philosophy,
which repulses more than it attracts. For whoever considers how many people have shipwrecked on this rocky sea, how
some with no vocation for philosophy have consumed the best years of their life, emptying their very soul in the fruitless
and foolish pursuit of philosophy, who, without mentioning the desolate halls of prehistoric schools of wisdom, wander
among the weather-beaten tombstones of former doctrinal systems 532
To start our project upon grittier wheels, we must appreciate how easily humble and natural musings about concepts and
attributes can insinuate themselves into our practical affairs and lead us onward to unhappy conclusion. Sometimes the
process resembles a familiar species of nightmare. We have been cheerfully ambling along a pleasant country lane when we
notice that our surroundings have turned grim. Now we seem trapped within some vast cemetery that sprawls endlessly
over gray hills. We find nothing but huge mausoleums that honor dynasties of abstracta of which we’ve never heard.
‘'Where did all these edifices come from?’' we ask and wonder what faulty turn in the road could have led us into this
disconcerting City of the Dead. It’s better that we do not linger long amongst the marble but instead retrace our way back to
that sunny lane.533

How to bring together transcendental, Naturphilosophical, and pragmatic (or positive) sciences

531 Ibid. 59.
532 F.W.J. von Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, trans. Bruce Matthews, (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 2007), 97.
533 Mark Wilson, Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behaviour, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
17.
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as well as bring Schelling's thought into the 21st century? The enduring legacy of Schelling's thought
is that nature, of how the basic power of inexistence, of a self-deforming space, is a necessity reverse
engineered from the momentum of being thinking creatures in a world, a world that depends upon a
physical history but one that generates not only technological objects but also fictional entities,
contradictions, and a self-altering neuronal architecture. Put otherwise, the great problematic which
Schelling outlines is that we humans are products of nature that have a capacity (thought) so powerful,
that it constantly appears to contain all of nature, or exclude nature when, in fact, it is nature which is
always thinking through us. Thus, nature is always inexistent because it is always trying to become an
object to itself and yet it fails to do so and instead extains, it generates time and space. Nature produces
more constraints and this failure of easy access produces distance, produces a self-altering topology
which in turn engenders more extainment (Ausschließung). Thinking, just as much as it can point to the
inexistence of the past, of what has gone and left only traces, or no traces at all, points to the creativity
of the future, of a more-than, but a more than in which we have a current creative stake. Or, what does
the conjunction of speculation and pragmatism mean in Schelling's view of a freedom that is bound to
its antecedents but uncontainable in the form of its potentially countless consequents?
One threat is a tendency to wander, to have to explore the consequences of Ideas that may have
no tooth or claw to them. But is not the advantage of thought the generally 'low-cost' simulations of the
potential consequences of Ideas? As hopefully was shown in the previous section, the strictly
normative approach of the Pittsburgh Hegelians sacrifices too much in the name of discursive and
rational stability. Broadly speaking, the normative approach overloads the restrictions on concepts
before deploying them while emphasizing clarity over extension. In emphasizing clarity however, the
normativists cut short the model of conceptual use for philosophy in that concepts, overwhelmingly,
re-emphasize their own groundedness at the cost of exploration. Schelling, on the contrary, attempts to
synthesize an ecstatic account of embodiment (taken from his extrapolations on Aristotelian
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naturalism) with the Platonic Realist approach to the life of the idea. While this would seem far afield
from any pragmaticist concerns, this tension regarding conceptual use is central to the contemporary
pragmatic thinker Mark Wilson.
Mark Wilson's mammoth text Wandering Significance aims to redraw the map of conceptual
use broadly, arguing that both the linguistic turn in philosophy, and the classical picture of how
language and concepts grasp meaning, are presented either in too loose or too stringent a light. While
addressing the function of language in Schelling would be its own project, it is the linguistic
ramifications of the conceptual that I am interested in connecting to the relation of pragmatic and
speculative navigation. Why pragmatism and speculation?
Schelling's fascination with the classic Leibnizian question 'Why is there something rather than
nothing?' has been interpreted in a multitude of ways but, I would argue, that it is the statement that
captures Schelling's thought as pulled between pragmatic and speculative concerns.534 By pragmatic I
mean thought that is driven to do justice to action which means both the productive processes we can
observe, as well as, the very activity or process of thought which is arguably the most basic fact of our
existence. By speculative I do not intend the pejorative sense of the armchair philosopher who creates
out of her mind alone, pulling monads and explanatory specters from the ether, but the sense shared by
the German Idealists broadly, namely, the possibility of unbinding thought from the obvious and
apparent in order to service not only thought but, seemingly paradoxically, in order to dismantle
potential barriers to action if one were to focus on only the immediate horizon.
The question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is essentially Schelling's way of
asking why individuation occurs given the fact that, at bottom, there seem to be only processes. It is
this question which haunts Schelling for his entire life in letters, that manifests itself in a process or
powers based meontology that has no determinable origin and no determinable end. It is a meontology
534 See for instance Tritten's Beyond Presence.
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that must cut this continuum of powers, which are speculative and can be said to inexist (see chapter 4)
in that they allow for the retro-revisal of epistemological practices as well as the ongoing production of
new forms of knowledge.
Schelling's interesting move is to use these desires to philosophize, to check and balance one
another: to reduce the world to navigate it (pragmatic maxim) and to expand the world to truly
understand it (speculative maxim). The difficulty here is that the figure of the philosopher becomes a
lonely wanderer, not only of the world, but a figure that must attempt to engage in ekstasis, to float
above the world without leaving it, a leaving the world that pushes against its edges. Ekstasis should be
taken to be the embodiment of conceptual abstraction in the most literal sense.
How can this procedure be fleshed-out in a pragmatic and speculative sense?
Just as Schelling attempts to navigate between Kantian restrictions and metaphysical
inebriation, Mark Wilson attempts to show the importance of finding a place between inflexible
classical definitions of concepts and the conceptual play of post-modern thinkers. Wilson's difficult
task is to demonstrate how it is that concepts can be plastic yet robust without appealing to a
definitively realist sense of the world 'out there' that the concepts necessarily grip onto, and on the
other hand, without reducing conceptual use to merely a socially mediated language game unfolding
over time.
Wilson argues that it is by investigating dull things, such as concepts, pragmatism is at its most
powerful as a philosophical field. Furthermore, this application of pragmatism, of the maxim do what
works, to abstract capacities such as conceptualization, further indicates the important difference
between practical and pragmatic, one that, as hopefully was seen above, the normativist camp elides.
Practical thought takes the immediate horizon for granted as it sets about its tasks. A pragmatic view,
on the other hand, is constantly distilling a greater horizon in order to act in such a way that is local,
yet future oriented. Wilson argues that a pragmatic approach allows one to avoid both associating
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conceptual authority with hidden desires of domination while also critiquing concepts for being overly
rigid, for not allowing transformation or movement between domains.535 Furthermore, Wilson's
pragmatism is constantly in contact with, albeit an abstract, conceptualization of nature. As he writes:
“It is then commonly presumed that Nature's uncooperative tendencies with respect to descriptive
acquiescence emerge mainly with the rise of relativity and quantum mechanics but this is not true;
allied difficulties glower sullenly even at the core of what we may mistakenly regard as the most stolid
and respectable corners of engineering.”536
He then goes on to say:
The main consideration that drives the entire argument of the book is the thesis that the often quirky behaviors of ordinary
descriptive predicates derive, not merely from controllable human inattention or carelessness, but from a basic
unwillingness of the physical universe to sit still while we frame its descriptive picture. Like a photographer dealing with a
rambunctious child, we must resort to odd and roundabout strategies if we hope to capture even a glimpse of our flighty
universe upon our linguistic film. 537

Wilson's proximity to Sellars contra Brandom and McDowell, should begin to become clear.
Wilson's doubt about the self-consistency of the so-called space of reasons begins to emerge and, in
addition, he draws the ontological strings tighter between pragmatic activity and concept-use. This is
possible, which is again evident from the quote above, due to Wilson's focus on engineering, on what
in a conceptual sense could be called applied physics. Wilson is thus particularly focused on
construction both in an ideal and in a real sense (to transpose his concerns to Schellingian language).
It is from this middle-ground of concept-into-action that Wilson makes his philosophical stakes in
favor of pragmatism and against the normativists, explicit. But this requires a brief detour through
Wilson's notion of ur-philosophical concepts.
Wilson warns against ur-philosophical concepts or those concepts which under-gird, with
almost utopian naivete, the general thrust of a philosophical endeavor. Just as one can, looking at the

535 Wilson, Wandering Significance, 2-3.
536 Ibid. 9.
537 Ibid. 11.
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above epigraph, get lost in the graveyard of concepts, one can also advance too quickly on the sunny
lane of non-contingency.538 This ur-philosophical favoritism which asserts that the world is fully
graspable, is exactly the kind of bias that Schelling attempts to torpedo with both the unprethinkable
and the inexistence of the Potenzen.539 That is, Schelling opens up the beginning and the end of the
world and runs it through with a plurality of processes not to explain it dogmatically, but to make it
possible for us to think its complexity, our role in that complexity, but never in a complete manner.
While a strict sense of the pragmatic maxim might seem, on the face of it, rule out speculative
entities, the inexistence of the potencies and the singularity of the world of powers, allows pragmatism
to apply to both thought and action, to treat thought as a kind of activity that our limited access, and
not our ontological or theologically decreed finitude, makes pertinent.
Inexistence and the potencies are speculations which in fact function as meta-pragmatic in that
they epistemologically, and meontologically, keep pragmatic thinking functioning into the future. If
the world was closed via a philosophy of immanence (Spinoza and his heirs) or, if we resort to a fact
based ontology (Gabriel), then pragmatism would become nothing other than a local adumbration of
philosophical riches where, in fact, the richness of the world as discovered and as created only occurs
because of local activities, and, furthermore, these activities are local because of the limitations of our
particular individuations and locations within bigger processes not because things are, in and of
themselves, unknowable or ungrapsable. As Wilson illustrates through and against Hume, one cannot
simply ban oneself from speculation, keeping our noses to the immediate conceptual ground, as to do
so would fail to locate the local space of action in any meaningful sense.540
One can take the various forms of naturalism above as case and point. How could one in good
faith claim that biologists, or even technicians working in biological fields, should not, or could not
538 Ibid. 16-17.
539 Ibid. 600.
540 Ibid. 602.
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benefit from, grand theories of biological development such as Darwinian evolution? Only with such
theories does local pragmatic work in biological realms have more than local meaning. This does not
mean that such acts are only in service of a particular theory, but it is only when couched in a
theoretical or speculative context of some kind that such activities could ever even contribute to a new
theory.
It is here that we can investigate Wilson's direct critique of the normativist approach to nature
and reason. While Wilson supports Brandom's general objective in terms of trying to identify what
human mental capacities are in the wake of the failure, or insufficiency, of our past attempts at selfreflexivity, Wilson becomes increasingly skeptical of the socially-normative tissue that Brandom and
his enclave aim to articulate.541 Wilson begins by critiquing John McDowell's claim that conceptual
authority can be easily replaced by social agreement and that, as a result of this, that the purposes of
science are conceptually limited because a concept's proper home is in the space of reasons as opposed
to the space of causes.542 Wilson furthers his critique by stating that he does not think the normative
move of segregating human use of concepts, and their sub-personal or neurophysiological activity, will
hold over time. One can return to the Schellingian approach to naturalism above, as well as the
concerns of the previous chapter as Schelling articulates this problem, though in a very different
historical context, in terms of the epistemological conundrum of 'what thinks in me is outside of me.'
Or, in other words, concepts must not only be flexible in terms of their observable content (as
was emphasized via Sellars above) but also in terms of the point of their generation, i.e., in terms of it
being my concept as well as a concept, of a locality within the mind, and an intuitive locality of
immediate surroundings. That is, local and universal conceptual use may function differently, but this
does not mean that two different concepts are at play.

541 Ibid. 30-31.
542 Ibid. 613-614.
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As Wilson puts it:
With respect to the terms of macroscopic classification we have investigated, public norms, however formulated, are
implausible as a final magistrate of conceptual correctness, simply because our chief objective is to make practical headway
within an often uncooperative external world. Getting matters right with respect to those externals usually matters more to
us than the opinions of our chums. 543

He then concludes the sentiment with the following:
Once we are concerned with building a skyscraper or laying down long extensions of telegraphic cable, the standard 'get the
right answer' represents our avatar, not any norms promulgated by civic rigorists. Indeed, these are the exact concerns that
led us to conclude, long ago, that environmentally determined standards of correct use apply even to the lonely mumblings
of a Robinson Crusoe, at least when he is busy counting his goats or planning a mousetrap. 544

If pragmatism functions on thought in relation to questioning what a thing does, then
Schelling's thought focuses on the where and when of creation or generation. A concern with nature is
all too quickly written off as appealing to pre-critical metaphysics, as wanting merely to go on
speculative fancies without constraint or measurable consequence. Yet, once again, this caricature
ignores the generative, and regulative, power of nature on the pragmatic.
As Wilson makes clear, conceptual use is always interfaced with the environment in which one
is engaged and, at times, the same environment in which one became conceptually trained. Again,
following Sellars above, it is only this kind of training which allows to amplify our naturalistically
granted capacities, in order to get a better sense of the world in which we are forced to navigate.
Schelling applies this problematic to the very nature of philosophy itself via the notion of Ekstasis in
“On the Nature of Philosphy as a Science” in which the philosopher makes the world into an object of
thought, while recognizing that the philosopher herself is only ever operating on the world secondhand, and that this conceptual delay applies to the thinker viewing herself as a philosopher.
As Schelling writes outlining the dire task of philosophy as navigation:
Those, then, who want to find themselves at the starting point of a truly free philosophy, have to depart even from God.
Here the motto is: whoever wants to preserve it will lose it, and whoever abandons it will find it. Only those have reached
the ground in themselves and have become aware of the depths of life, who have at one time abandoned everything and
have themselves been abandoned by everything, for whom everything has been lost, and who have found themselves alone,
543 Ibid. 615.
544 Ibid. 616.
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face-to-face with the infinite: a decisive step which Plato compared with death. That which Dante saw written on the door
of the inferno must be written in a different sense also at the entrance to philosophy: 'Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.'
Those who look for true philosophy must be bereft of all hope, all desire, all longing. They must not wish anything, not
know anything, must feel completely bare and impoverished, must give everything away in order to gain everything. It is a
grim step to take, it is grim to have to depart from the final shore. This we can infer from the fact that so few have ever been
capable of it.545

Thus Schelling's speculative sailor, the one who engages in apparently reckless Ekstasis, if she
cheats death, can only hope to become Wilson's Crusoe, to pragmatically attune such explorations on
stable land even if such stability is only temporary. But does this mean that Schelling's philosophy
implies or even requires the lonely thinker, one who must abjure the collective labor of thought and
practice so celebrated by McDowell and Brandom. I do not believe that this is the case.546
The upshot of Schelling's entire philosophy, I believe, is the importance of the worldliness of
ideas, where unworldliness, or mere ideality, is replaced by inexistence, by that which has not yet
come to be. This in fact burdens the thinker with responsibility. At the same time, it disallows any
privileging of thought or action – in that the typical advantage of action over thought is that thought is
of another world (even when Platonism is attacked). Or the purported advantage of thought over action
is that it had, or has, some purity, some aloofness. Following the general thrust of Schelling's thought,
if realness is measured in terms of consequences then action, for its own sake, or armchair thinking, for
its own sake, can not appeal to being only of, or never of, this world. That is, actions are not
immediately more valuable because they are right before us, nor are ideas only things to be aspired to.
Actions are not merely before us, nor are ideas merely above the world before us as there is only one
world in Schelling's Aristotelian naturalism combined with his Platonic realism. There is a natural
Aristotelian world but stripped of its essences and its perfection, haunted by the open ended
temporality of a Platonic world, a world that restlessly churns with chaotic change.
This is why the subject for Schelling, whether engineer, philosopher, naturalist, or geometer, is
545 Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science,” 217-218.
546 Interestingly, Wilson discusses the importance of nautical metaphors in Peirce in regards to conceptual behavior
Wandering Significance, 42.
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nothing but an instance of eternal freedom. But it is a freedom that does not mean freedom from as,
once again, there is only this world, rather it is the freedom to adopt a form, to carve out a space and
navigate it.547

547 Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science,” 220-221.
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